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Abstract
This work is concerned with the nature of fiscal illusion and its effect on local 
government spending. Fiscal illusion is hypothesized to be a source of the "flypaper 
effect." The flypaper effect is an empirical phenomenon of the asymmetric effects of 
income and intergovernmental aid on the level of local public spending in the context of 
demand models of the local fisc. Lump sum aid is observed to be more stimulative on 
the level of public expenditures than income (Gramlich and Galper 1973). As a method 
of explaining this phenomenon, tax-price and income illusion are incorporated into 
demand models of the local fisc [Oates (1979); Courant Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1979); 
Filimon, Romer, and Rosenthai (1980); Turnbull (1995); Holsey (1993)].
This work provides both theoretical and empirical contributions to the growing 
body of literature on fiscal illusion. The theoretical contribution is a clarification of the 
parametric interdependence between income and price illusion. The relationship between 
income and price illusion has ramifications for estimation. This paper contributes to the 
empirical literature by estimating local public expenditure functions using two panel data 
sets, one for county government spending and the other for state government spending. 
The results demonstrate that fiscal illusion is felt primarily through the traditional grant 
channels rather than Holsey's depiction of the income illusion channel.
xi
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Chapter One 
Introduction
Over the past few presidential administrations there have been several eras of 
proposed "new federalism" with respect to how the federal government redistributes 
resources back to state and local governments. The Nixon and Reagan administrations both 
proposed significant shifts in the federalist structure, each emphasizing different roles for 
matching and block grants from federal to state and local governments. The current 
legislation spearheaded by Newt Gingrich is promotes yet another revision, with renewed 
focus on the use of unconditional block grants as a method of revenue sharing in hopes of 
giving the state and local governments more control over the distribution of resources.
This process of continually revising intergovernmental relationships within the 
federalist structure may reflect overall dissatisfaction with how the federalist structure is 
operating or may represent ideological shifts in the definition of the appropriate roles for 
federal and state governments in the U.S. Either way, any misspecification of or 
misunderstanding about how local governments respond to changes in policy hampers policy 
debate. Significant revisions in the structure of fiscal federalism that are based on faulty 
models of local fiscal behavior may generate outcomes that are neither intended nor desired. 
Not surprisingly, the steady stream of literature concerned with modeling local fiscal 
behavior is, in part, motivated by the need to better understand the consequences of 
redefining the federalist structure.
1
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2This work is concerned with the nature of fiscal illusion and its effect on local 
government spending. Fiscal illusion, the notion that taxpayer-voters misperceive the 
connection between govemmentally provided goods and their associated tax burdens, can 
substantially modify how intergovernmental aid affects the delivery o f local government 
services. Taxpayer ignorance about the government budget process, and in particular about 
intergovernmental aid awards and receipts, plays a key role in the modem fiscal illusion 
models, typically leading to income effects as well as perceived tax price distortion effects 
not present in the perfect information framework. Further, a variety o f types of fiscal 
illusion have been proposed in the literature, with a corresponding variety of implications 
for local spending behavior. Identifying the nature and effect of fiscal illusion, which 
remains an unsettled issue in the Public Finance literature, is therefore an integral part of the 
search for models that best explain the behavior o f the local fisc.
Mueller (1979) attributes the fiscal illusion concept to Amilcone Puviani (1897), who 
views the state as a tool of the ruling class, seeking to extract as much revenue from the 
ruled as possible. The state deliberately creates fiscal illusion by exercising its monopoly 
power over tax and spending information in order to increase its control over economic 
resources and thus expanding the size of the public sector.
The modem approach to fiscal illusion at the state and local level follows Puviani's 
to the extent that it typically views the illusion as taxpayer misperceptions o f the incremental 
taxes associated with increases in public spending. The presence of intergovernmental aid 
plays a key role in most modem fiscal illusion models. Generally, the separation of taxing 
from spending decisions, necessitated by the introduction of intergovernmental aid from
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3higher to lower levels of governments in the fiscal tier, provides the complex multi-level 
fiscal relationships between governments that are used to justify voter ignorance in the form 
of fiscal illusion [Winer (1983); Wagner (1976)]. A more direct role for intergovernmental 
grants is evident in the partial equilibrium public spending models in which voter ignorance 
about the presence of intergovernmental aid drives a wedge between the true marginal tax 
price and the perceived tax price of spending at the state and local levels [Oates (1979); 
Logan (1986)]. Also voter ignorance about the amount of their own tax payments for 
intergovernmental aid going to other jurisdictions generates income effects (Holsey 1993).
Fiscal illusion is hypothesized to be a source of the "flypaper effect." The flypaper 
effect is an empirical phenomenon of the asymmetric effects of income and 
intergovernmental aid on the level of local public spending in the context of demand models 
of the local fisc. Lump sum aid is observed to be more stimulative on the level of public 
expenditures than income (Gramlich and Galper 1973). As a method of explaining this 
phenomenon, tax-price and income illusion are incorporated into demand models of the local 
fisc [Oates (1979); Courant Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1979); Filimon, Romer, and Rosenthal 
(1980); Turnbull (1995); Holsey (1993)].
This work provides both theoretical and empirical contributions to the growing body 
of literature on fiscal illusion. The theoretical contribution is a clarification of the parametric 
interdependence between income and price illusion. The relationship between income and 
price illusion has ramifications for estimation. This paper contributes to the empirical 
literature by estimating local public expenditure functions using two panel data sets, one for 
county government spending and the other for state government spending. The
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4disaggregate county data set used in this analysis allows us to address previously ignored 
issues like how fiscal illusion varies with fiscal complexity, temporal trends of fiscal illusion, 
and how fiscal illusion varies over different levels of governments. The panel data for county 
governments provides several advantages. First, the disaggregate county data lies closer to 
the underlying crucial voter, thus making it more appropriate than aggregated data for 
estimating local government spending functions. Second, county governments are multi­
purpose and reflect differing degrees of fiscal complexity, which Wagner (1976) argues 
underlies taxpayer-voter fiscal illusion. We can use this data set to directly estimate how 
fiscal illusion parameter estimates vary with the degree of fiscal illusion, as reflected by our 
measures of budgetary complexity. Third, this data allows us to examine the intertemporal 
stability of the estimates using data from 1970 and 1980 and come to some conclusions 
about the long term trend of fiscal illusion effects on local spending.
Chapter two reviews various models of local and state government spending 
behavior, beginning with an explanation of the Leviathan model of government. The chapter 
also summarizes the median voter models that comprise much of the empirical public 
demand literature and concludes with how fiscal illusion has been integrated into modeling 
local government spending behavior.
Chapter three begins with a methodology laid out in a recent paper by Holsey 
(1993). In that paper she uses the Stone-Geary framework to directly estimate fiscal illusion 
parameters and identifies two potential channels of illusion that she labels as “grant” and 
“income” illusion. Grant illusion stems from voter misperceptions about aid receipts and 
income illusion stems from the misperception of the taxes associated with aid. She uses
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5local spending data aggregated to the state level to estimate the fiscal illusion parameters. 
Taking this study as a point of departure, I show that the two separate types of fiscal illusion 
identified by Holsey are not independent, as she assumed, which leads to inconsistent 
econometric estimates of her illusion parameters. This chapter extends and corrects 
Holseys analysis, using disaggregate local government data (county) from 1970 and 1980 
to find consistent estimates taking into account the interdependent nature of grant and 
income illusion.
Chapter three also uses the county data set to examine how intergovernmental aid 
affects the provision of specific services as well as general services. The empirical results 
show that the structural demand equations derived from the Stone-Geary utility function 
with Holsey’s corrected procedure leads to fragile and unstable fiscal illusion parameter 
estimates. The remainder of the chapter estimates the local public expenditure functions 
using an alternative reduced form approach. This reduced form approach exploits the 
derived relationship between “grant” and “income” illusion to test for the presence o f the 
different types of fiscal illusion. The results from the reduced form approach demonstrate 
that fiscal illusion is felt primarily through the traditional grant channels rather than Holsey's 
depiction of the income illusion channel.
Chapter four examines how fiscal illusion effects vary between higher and lower 
levels of government. It employs state data from 1970 and 1980 to estimate the demand 
equations and compare the size and significance of the key parameter estimates to test how 
fiscal illusion varies across levels of government for the provision of general services and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6specific services. These results yield an interesting pattern of changes from the county to 
the state level and does not find uniformity between the county and state estimates.
Chapter five focuses on the issue of fiscal complexity as a possible source of fiscal 
illusion. The sample is partitioned by degree of fiscal complexity using a switching 
regression technique and then the fiscal illusion parameter estimates are compared for both 
the county and state governments. These results show that the degree of tax and revenue 
complexity play an important role in determining the size and significance of the fiscal 
illusion parameter estimates.
Chapter six uses the results derived from the previous chapters to examine the 
temporal stability of the estimates by analyzing the trend in size and significance of the key 
parameter estimates. These results show no evidence of systematic growth or decline in 
fiscal illusion at the county or the state level for either the provision of general or specific 
services. Chapter Seven provides a brief summary and conclusion.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter Two 
Modeling Fiscal Behavior
Broadly speaking, there are two popular ways of modeling the public sector. The 
first follows what is known as the Pigouvian or Musgravian tradition which assumes the 
government behaves as a benevolent agent. Models in this orthodox tradition assume that 
politician-bureaucrats find the advice professed to them to be compelling. This approach 
also assumes that the politician-bureaucrats have the power to determine governmental and 
political outcomes.
The major alternative to these models are those in the Wicksillian tradition. 
Wicksillian public choice models assume the median voter in majoritarian democracy drives 
the political machine so as to generate the results that reflect the wishes of the electorate, 
or at least a subset of it. It is argued that these models are limited in that they have been 
almost entirely demand driven.1
Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan (1980) revive a hypothesis about the 
behavior of government known as the Leviathan hypothesis. This topic has sparked much 
debate and research as to whether the government sector really behaves "as if1 it were a 
monolithic entity whose sole purpose is to expand its size. First there is a rejection of the 
benevolent agent that is implicit in the conventional "normative policy framework" such as 
a Bergstrom-Samulson type welfare function in either the Pigouvian or Musgravian
1 In these types of models government is considered to be neither despotic nor benevolent
7
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8tradition. Brennan and Buchanan argue that it seems illogical to assume or to use the 
benevolent despot model. If government could be predicted to act perfectly, then there 
would be no constitutional limits for that will only hinder the ability for the representative 
to do what may be desirable. Perfect prediction of government actions implies that the 
constitutional perspective is at odds with the model of the benevolent despot. They feel 
those who argue for agent benevolence are "denying the legitimacy of any constraints on 
government, including electoral ones” (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980). If this is the case 
then there is no logical or plausible reason for a constitution.
2.1 Leviathan Model
The leviathan model views government as monolithic. The only difference from the 
aforementioned orthodox models is that the assumption of benevolence is dropped. If such 
is the case then the question becomes who would give advice to a non-benevolent entity. 
The emphasis now turns on constraining government in light of this new image of 
indifference or malevolence.
Brennan and Buchanan assume that the political process in a post-constitutional 
setting is not constrained by the electoral competition in a Wicksillian manner and that the 
electoral process can adequately constrain the natural tendencies of government only when 
coupled with additional constraints and rules imposed at the constitutional level. Brennan 
and Buchanan seek non-electoral constraints on government because they believe the 
assumption in current public choice theory that the electoral process is sufficient to constrain 
government is vulnerable.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9First, the electoral process, even when harmonious with the demand of the 
electorate, is inappropriate for certain types of decisions relating to resource use. For 
example, some resources like police and fire protection, and the judiciary cannot be made 
subject to the will of the majority, thus these decisions must be made independent of in­
period political processes. Also, preferences may change at the post-constitutional phase 
from behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance. Additionally, voters in a Downsian sense are 
rationally ignorant due to the asymmetric information; thus yielding monopoly power to 
those in possession of such information. It is empirical evidence of this type of asymmetric 
information that this paper attempts to find.
Second, the inadequacy of the majority rule to constrain and can lead to cycling, and 
depending on the sequence of voting, the outcome can be steered away from the most 
preferred outcome of the median voter. Thus with sequential announcement of platforms, 
monopoly power can be derived from the simple majority rule in that the winning party has 
resources available for his or her discretionary use (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980).
Third, bureaucrats who have the right of tenure have the power to select and 
implement certain policy proposals and are inherently in a monopolistic position in the 
provision of public goods and services and are not constrained by the voting populous. 
They are the agenda setters. Romer and Rosenthal expand upon this inherent monopoly 
power in their setter/reversion models.
According to the above arguments government is effectively unconstrained by the 
electoral process, which leaves open the question of how to model government behavior. 
The Leviathan model assumes that the decision makers maximize their own utilities subject
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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to the constitutional constraints and the constraints they face enter as parameters in the 
agent's utility function.
The simple version of the Leviathan model assumes that governments maximize 
revenues from whatever sources of taxation that are made available to them constitutionally. 
Without constraints on uses revenues then become equivalent to personal income to the 
decision makers.
Government maximizes revenue because it becomes a proxy for surplus, which is 
defined as the total revenue generated less government spending on goods and services.2 
Even if specific restrictions did not exist on the tax side, revenue maximization is still a good 
measure of Leviathan's maximand, if taxes were to be spent only on the specified goods and 
services and could be identified in some agreed upon way, then government agents could 
maximize their own utilities such that they manipulate the tax system so as not to pay any 
taxes themselves.
With government spending not restricted to financing pure public goods and 
services, but quasi-public goods and services (which yield benefits to those in the political 
community), we again see an incentive for budgetary expansion by the government. Thus, 
revenue maximization is the main characteristic of government behavior.
This model does not imply that government is something that exists independently 
of those people on whose behalf it supposedly acts. The individual decisionmakers may not
2 The surplus is defined as S = (l-a)R. where the citizen taxpayer would like "a" to be 1. This 
implies that all revenue taken is spent on goods and services that are of benefit like in the polar 
Samulson case. S is the excess of revenues collected over spending of specified uses of G and "a" is the 
share of revenues spent on G.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
11
have revenues enter directly as an argument in their utility functions, and do not try to 
further Leviathans interest any more than the public interest. The idea is that revenue 
maximization emerges from the whole set of government decisionmakers even though no 
one person explicitly sets revenue maximization as a goal, much the same way that the 
"public interest" is promoted by the operation of a competitive marketplace. If the Leviation 
model accurately depicts the "as if' behavior of government, then one should observe, at the 
local level, monopolistic characteristics exhibited by these governments.
It does not seem plausible that the citizen taxpayer would allow unconstrained 
growth of Leviathan. With electoral constraints being inadequate to constrain growth, then 
the question of what type of non-electoral constraints exist arises. Brennan and Buchanan 
suggest that decentralization of the public sector is one mechanism by which the size of 
Leviathan can be constrained.
In sum the underlying assumption of the Leviathan model is that the outcome is 
driven by the agent and the alternative modeling, those in the Wicksillian tradition, posit that 
the outcome is driven by the median voter. If one is to a accept the Leviathan model as the 
model that appropriately describes local expenditure decisions then it becomes necessary to 
examine those median voter models to see if some of the implications of monopoly power 
are evident. As mentioned above, this paper searches for evidence that the median voter is 
confronted with asymmetric information about the level o f intergovernmental aid that is 
received in his or her jurisdiction. If the agent can control the amount of information flowing 
to the median voter, then the agent has obtained some monopoly power. This monopoly 
power allows the agent to manipulate the budget and the size of the local fisc. It now
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
becomes necessary to examine the models of local fiscal behavior that follow the Wicksillian 
tradition.
2.2. Models of Local Fiscal Behavior
The early demand models begin with Gramlich (1968) who hypothesizes local 
expenditures to be a linear function of per-capita income, per-capita grants in aid and other 
socio-economic characteristics. An important outcome from this ad hoc model is that it 
yields empirical evidence of a systematic relationship between local spending and economic 
and demographic characteristics.
Later work by Gramlich (1969), Henderson (1968), and Barr and Davis (1966) view 
the process of local fiscal choice as an as i f  preference maximization subject to a budget 
constraint. This demand framework assumes a continuous, quasi-concave preference 
function representing individual preferences. This then raise the questions concerning 
whose preferences are being maximized. Two alternative models are presented; the median 
voter model and the dominant party model. In the median voter model, the voters determine 
the outcome. Two restrictions in this demand model are that each government supplies only 
one service financed by a fixed tax structure and the median voter is the one with the median 
income. Thus, the as if  maximization of the preference function corresponds to the family 
with the median income subject to their income constraint. The dominant party model allows 
for the examination of multi-service governments in medium to large cities. In this model, 
local politics is seen as "an occasional two-party fight" in which a clear and controlling 
winner emerges. The winner is given full control over the local fisc and is hypothesized that 
the local political bosses maximize their own long run welfare, thus the budgetary process
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will be defined by the bosses' preference for income. Romer and Rosenthal (1978) expand 
on this assumption and introduce a model that allows a limited referendum check on the 
chosen budget. In this agenda control model, the referendum approved budgets will be 
greater than or equal to the median preferred budgets.
Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) attempt to 
include technology in the budget model. Borcherding and Deacon introduce a model of 
public spending derived from a collective decision making theory and test the significance 
of certain variables that are deemed important in determining the level of expenditure. The 
motivation for this type of model is that the previous models used in the analysis of the 
public sector were ad hoc constructions with little theoretical standing. This type of model 
requires the aggregation of voter preferences, tastes o f the chooser, and the opportunity 
costs to the chooser of the activities. The median voter model is applied as method of 
aggregating voter tastes and preferences, which permits the estimation of key parameters 
like price elasticity and the degree of publicness of the goods.
The assumptions of the model are: 1) No logrolling, 2) bureaucracy is not present, 
3) only non-discriminatory taxes are used, 4) labor and capital are the only inputs used 
where capital is perfectly mobile and labor is not which implies that the price of capital is 
the same across all communities and wage differentials can exist across communities, 5) 
fixed prices of labor and capital, 6) governments are price takers, and 7) using a Cobb- 
Douglas variety production function, the local government is assumed to provide services 
using efficient production.
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The median voter model is employed in order to be able to aggregate voter tastes 
and preferences. After solving the input choice problem and rearranging terms, the marginal 
cost of provision is defined as
(2.1) C ^ k 'w 8
which describes a "unique and horizontal supply function for each unit dependent only on 
the wage rate, w, in that unit" (Borcherding and Deacon, 1972). The parameter B 
represents the cost of mobile capital and k is constant term.
The amount of consumption for the median voter is defined as q = G/N1, where a 
is the congestion parameter and G is the level of public output and N is the population. 
With non-discriminatory taxes, each voter pays an equal amount to finance each unit of a 
public good. The tax share for the median voter is defined as
(2.2) sq = CgG/N 
which becomes
(2.21) s  = CgN -1
The median voter demand schedule for expenditures is assumed to be log linear in tax share, 
s, and income, y.
(2.3) q = AsV
Reduction of equation (2.3) into per-capita expenditure yields
(2.4) e = A’wB(,|+,)yfiN(*'1)(,,+1) 
and taking the log of (2.4) yields
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which provides an estimable expenditure equation for estimating relevant parameters such 
as the price elasticity (q) and the degree of publicness of the goods (a).
Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) develop a method for estimating demand functions 
of individuals for municipal public services which allows for predictions about tax structure, 
scale economies, and changes in economic and demographic variables on quantities of public 
goods to be supplied. By observing the choices of municipalities, inferences about 
responsiveness of individual demands for municipal services can be inferred employing some 
assumptions about the political process.
The assumptions of the model are: 1) municipalities provide services at constant cost 
qj, 2) the ith consumer’s tax share, t^  is a function of wealth and income and does not vary 
with the size of the expenditure nor personal tastes, 3) all consumers are aware of the tax 
price which is equal to t^-, 4) the quantity of a good supplied in municipality j is equal to the 
median quantities demanded by all i consumers in municipality j, and 5) the median of 
quantities is equal to the quantity demanded by the citizen with the median income. 
Conditions 1,2,3, & 4 constitute a Bowen equilibrium. The consumer's price of the goods 
provided is proportional to the tax share under the assumption of a constant tax share and 
service cost.
They use the log-linear equation
k
(2.6) log E = c + log N + 6 log t + e log Y + £
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where expenditure E is a function of population, N, tax share, t, median family income, Y 
and a set of socio-economic variables. Also employed in this model is the possibility for 
congestability in the consumption of certain goods. Z*=Z/N* where a is the congestion 
parameter. Thus demand for public services, Z, can be defined as
(2.7) Z=cq6t?YeN all+i)
where price and income elasticities (6 and e respectively) are constant. Given this then the 
congestion parameter, a, is equivalent to the elasticity of demand with respect to population. 
The vector of socio-economic variables are difficult to interpret and are included in order 
to eliminate distortions o f price, income, and population elasticity measures.
The tax share of the citizen with the median income, t; is an iid random variable with 
the E(tj) = t;. The tax bill on the house of median value (which is assumed to be the house 
of the citizen with the median income and constitutes his or her entire holding of property) 
is determined by tax rates and ratios of assessed to market values. This is then divided by 
total property tax revenue for the municipality to produce an estimate of the tax share.
(2.8) t;= tax bill /  total tax revenue
The demand equations by Borcherding and Deacon and Bergstrom and Goodman 
of these median voter models is a log-linear relationship between output, income, and tax 
price, aid, and other socio-economic variables, where tax price is equal to the cost of service
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[ C(G)/GN ], where G is total local spending on goods and services. By including 
technology into the budget model, there is a reduction in the possibility of omitted variable 
bias and estimation of the new parameter, N, can provide new information if interpreted 
correctly. The innovation of these works is the use of reduced form rather than structural 
estimates in the empirical evaluation of policies.
Turnbull (1985) points out how the use of reduced form rather than structural 
estimates has led to confusion surrounding empirical evaluation of policies. The main focus 
is on the interpretation of estimated coefficients of tax price elasticities. When a reduced 
form equation is specified as
(2.9) In E = B0 + BJnLS + BtlnT +B2ln(Y+T*BA)+ e
then a direct estimate of the price elasticity is available from the tax share term coefficient, 
T. LS is the community's local share of expenditures and BA is the community's 
unconditional aid award. But when the specification follows the form
(2.10) In E = B0 + BilnLS + (B2+B3)lnT + B2lnY + B3lnBA + e,
the tax share term coefficient, if interpreted as the price elasticity, will provide an estimate 
that is algebraically biased upward. Also noted is that the local share and tax share 
elasticities should not be identical under the median voter hypothesis, as implied by equation
(2.10). In sum, the estimated tax share elasticity is not always the sum of the tax price and
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grant elasticities. The tax price elasticities in these two models do possess this bias for 
there is no intergovernmental aid term present. Also, the same type of bias in interpretation 
mentioned by Turnbull can occur with the congestion parameter. Both Borcherding and 
Deacon and Bergstrom and Goodman are cautious in interpreting the congestion parameters 
because ratios of unbiased estimators do not necessarily lead to unbiased estimators.
Inman (1979) states that this demand framework examines local resource allocation 
as the choice of a single agent where outputs provide benefits and money is fungible, and 
implicit in this framework are a priori restrictions on the process of fiscal choice. Inman 
provides a three equation supply side model in which public outputs and factor inputs are 
simultaneously determined as part of the budgetary process. This system allows for the 
introduction of bureaucracy into the budget production model where labor and capital 
intensity are functions of the relative bargaining position of the relevant bureau. Also, the 
percentage of those who are eligible to receive favors become endogenous to the budget 
production process. Several studies using this budget-cum production system are 
cited.[Hambor, Phillips, and Votey (1973); Getz (1978)].
By adding another equation to the system, the endogeneity of wages can be included 
into the model. This endogeneity of wages is important for if there are omitted variables, 
then this can lead to biased coefficient estimation and misunderstanding of fiscal policy. 
Inman stresses the importance of wage effects and considers it a "first priority" in future 
research- an issue later addressed by Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1979).
Another potential problem that may contribute to model misspecification is the 
treatment of the grants-in-aid structure. Early econometric work did not distinguish the
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separate fiscal effects of lump-sum and matching aid. This misspecification was later 
realized and corrected. Inman then introduces the notion of "grantsmanship" which is the 
process of winning federal and state assistance. This process introduces the possibility of 
endogenous matching rates into the analysis and introduces further econometric 
complications. Studies by McGuire (1977) and Inman (1971) both introduce the 
endogeneity of matching aids in their fiscal models.
Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1982) take the construction of demand equations for public 
goods one step further along its evolutionary process. They concentrate on estimating 
demand for public goods using micro surveys of individuals rather than community spending 
data. Doing this allows one to test certain assumptions previously used in estimating 
demand equations using macro data, namely the median voter hypothesis [Borcherding and 
Deacon (1972); Bergstrom and Goodman (1973); Inman (1979)]. Incorporating this type 
of micro data allows one to control for different distributions of public services across 
individuals. Also, the demand for public services can be a function of community and 
individual income; a feature not possible using macro data. A key result from allowing 
different distributions of services is that demand for public services does not depend on the 
variation in income across individuals within a community. This addresses Bergstrom and 
Goodman's (1973) problem with the Bowen majority rule outcome being Pareto efficient 
with no proportional income taxation.
2.3 Models of Fiscal Illusion
Theoretically, income and lump sum aid should have the same effect on the level of 
local public goods provided under the median voter hypothesis (Oates 1979). However, it
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has been empirically observed that lump sum grants are more stimulative than income on the 
level of public expenditures. In a review of the empirical literature on the effects of 
intergovernmental grants Gramlich (1977) cites studies like that of Gramlich and Galper 
(1973) who find estimates of the marginal propensity to spend from lump sum grants to be 
much higher than the estimates of an increase in one dollars worth of private income. This 
asymmetry of income and aid that is observed has been dubbed the "flypaper effect"—or 
money sticks where it hits. Gramlich cites Feldstein (1975) and Weicher (1972) who also 
use a similar analysis for a pooled cross-sectional study and find empirical evidence of the 
asymmetry between income and aid elasticities. These studies all examine single purpose 
governments, school districts. It was these confusing results that caused Gramlich to call 
for further examination into the way in which governments, particularly overlapping 
governments, really work.
Fisher (1982) provides a review and a comprehensive analysis of the flypaper effect. 
He states that there are four basic explanations of the flypaper effect: 1) some form o f fiscal 
illusion, 2) political institutions, 3) tax substitution, and 4) statistical errors. The 
examination here focuses on fiscal illusion as a source of the flypaper effect. In his analysis, 
Fisher addresses the models of Oates (1979) and Courant, Gramlich, and Rubinfeld (1979) 
and concludes that whether or not this type of fiscal illusion can explain the flypaper effect 
depends on whether individuals or officials base their spending decisions on some form of 
average price instead of marginal price. It is this formulation that can generate price effects 
from lump-sum grants.
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Oates (1979) finds that changes in lump sum intergovernmental grants have price 
effects, that is, they move one along the demand curve as opposed to a shift brought about 
by changes in income. Oates provides a model of local budgetary choice in which local 
officials maximize output subject to the constraint that voter’s demand be fulfilled. Oates 
also uses the median voter model in his analysis as a way of aggregating voter preferences. 
He proposes that the voter makes his or her decision based on two pieces of information: 
the level of output and the associated tax liability which is known only as the tax price, not 
necessarily the true cost of the good. In this model, intergovernmental grants allow the local 
authority to provide a given level of services at a lower tax-price to the voters; this is the 
source of the price effect. What happens is that the median voter perceives the average and 
not the marginal price of the local public good, thus causing the perceived price to be lower.
The effect o f this price misperception on the level the level o f public expenditure is 
demonstrated in Figure 2.1. Segment AB is the voter’s original budget constraint when no 
intergovernmental aid is present. Maximizing the median voter's utility subject to this 
constraint yields a public expenditure level of gO. The introduction of unconditional grants 
from higher levels of government shifts the actual budget constraint to CD. The level of 
expenditure that will maximize the voter’s utility increases to g l . However, if the voter is 
unaware of the aid, he will misperceive the average for the marginal price of the public 
good. The average price, defined as total expenditures less aid divided by output, is less 
than the actual marginal tax price of public goods. This misperception causes the perceived 
budget constraint to become segment AE, and the level of public expenditure that maximizes 
the median voter’s utility is g2.
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Increases in the level of income shift the voter's budget constraint from AB to CD. 
But an increase in the level of intergovernmental aid causes the voter's perceived 
budget constraint to rotate from AB to AE. Because equilibrium must be on the actual 
budget constraint, the voter must chose output level g2. This difference of gl and g2 is due 
to fiscal illusion and illustrates the asymmetric effects of income and lump sum aid. In sum, 
it is the perception of the average rather than the marginal prices that is the source of the 
flypaper effect in this model.
In a concurrent work, Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1979) [CGR] also attribute 
the flypaper effect to fiscal illusion. They provide two modifications to explain the 
asymmetric effects of income and aid on the level of public expenditure. First, there is a 
misperception of the marginal tax price by the voter and second, that there may be wage 
effects by public employees that could cause incorrectly perceived relative prices and cause 
larger real expenditures. The economic rationale for the flypaper effect is based on the 
inability of the median voter to perceive the true marginal tax price of the local public good 
in the presence of lump sum aid. In order for symmetry to hold in this model, the level of 
grants must be taken into account in the computation of the tax shares. If intergovernmental 
aid is not computed in the formulation of tax share by the agent, then there would be price 
effects. They show that a higher level of expenditure is chosen when the government does 
not incorporate the revenue sharing grant into locally taxable income. Price illusion in this 
model can also occur if the revenue is raised by a property tax rather than an income tax. 
This occurs when the non-matching grant is not fully capitalized in property values an not
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all of the local resources are taxed. However, If the non-matching grant is fully capitalized 
into the property values, then no price illusion is present.
Filimon, Romer, and Rosenthal (1980) [FRR] present an modified analysis of the 
Oates fiscal illusion model, and according to Fisher (1982), report the first econometric 
evidence on fiscal illusion and the flypaper effect. In the FRR model, the median voter 
perceives the amount of aid to be less than it actually is and selects an optimal expenditure 
level based on that perception. The innovation here is that only a portion of the aid is 
unknown, thus causing grant illusion. This innovation is later applied by Holsey (1993).
The following analysis demonstrates that grant illusion is nothing more than tax price 
illusion. Let the average tax price, ATP, be
(2.11) ATP = [PgG - (1-0)A]/G
where 0 is the perceived portion of aid receipts, A represents the level of aid, (1-0) A is the 
unknown portion of aid, PG be the price of public goods, and G be the total quantity of 
public goods, then budget constraint for the consumer becomes
(2.12) I + (1-0)A = PqG - PyY
where I is income, Py is the price of private goods, and Y is the level of private goods. 
Rearranging yields
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which demonstrates that grant illusion reduces to the traditional tax price illusion.
Wagner (1976) provides a conceptual and empirical exploration of one aspect of the 
theory of fiscal illusion. He focuses on how the differing degrees of complexity in the 
revenue structure affects the stock of taxpayer knowledge concerning tax-prices of public 
goods. According to Wagner there are three reasons why fiscal illusion had not previously 
played a significant role in the agenda o f fiscal analysis. First, fiscal analysis had been 
predominantly normative and only when the analysis becomes positive does fiscal illusion 
becomes pertinent. Second, fiscal illusion had been widely interpreted as implying irrational 
individual behavior. Finally, fiscal illusion had been largely devoid of empirical content.
Winer (1983) and Wagner (1976) suggest that fiscal illusion by the voter stems from 
the imperfect information that arises from public sector fiscal complexity created by the 
separation of taxing and spending functions. Logan (1986) suggests that the source of this 
illusion arises from the distribution of aid from the higher levels of government.
Turnbull (1992, 1993, 1996) states that the typical approach to modeling fiscal 
illusion is that the imperfect information is modeled as a non-stochastic wedge between 
average and marginal tax prices. Such a method of modeling imperfect information in a 
certainty framework implies a violation of the rationality implied by the utility maximization 
(Logan 1986). Turnbull (1992, 1993, 1996) uses the theory of demand under uncertainty 
to model imperfect information, thus no longer violating the rationality assumption. Within 
this framework, fiscal illusion now represents the level of uncertainty facing the voters,
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thereby different degrees of fiscal illusion can be thought of as inducing differences in not 
only the mean but the variances of the perceived distribution of possible outcomes. Also, 
the ability of the bureaucrats and politicians to exploit the imperfect information is limited 
by the offsetting risk effects on voter demand.
Using the uncertainty framework, Turnbull (1992) finds that the offsetting risk 
effects on the median voter does not necessarily lead to an overexpansion of the budget 
implied by the certainty models. Empirically, the results are mixed and the illusion- 
expansion 'connection1 is unstable across different spending categories at the municipal level. 
It is important to note that this work, unlike many of the previous empirical examinations 
of fiscal illusion, uses various expenditure categories of a multi-service government, as 
opposed to a single service government like school districts.
An important outcome of this line of literature is the creation of a measure of fiscal 
complexity, the tax concentration and the expenditure concentration term. The tax 
concentration measurement is used by Wagner (1976) as a measure o f the complexity of the 
revenue side of the budget. The expenditure concentration measurement is used by Turnbull 
(1993) to capture the complexity on the spending side of the budget. The contribution of 
these works is the ability to examine two types of fiscal complexity which may influence 
voter perceptions. This implies that the taxpayer-voter not only is unsure about how much 
he is paying, but about what he is receiving as well (Turnbull 1995). These concentration 
terms also provide another way of directly testing the hypothesis that fiscal illusion is related 
to budget complexity.
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Holsey (1993) also considers the possibility that fiscal illusion concerns not only the 
misperception of expenditures but also the misperception of taxation levels associated with 
spending. This work is an important contribution to the fiscal illusion literature because in 
this demand model, fiscal illusion is looked upon as a two-dimensional rather than in a single 
dimensional issue. Traditional illusion is tax-price illusion which is caused by the 
misperception about the amount of aid that the local government is receiving. Holsey adds 
to this by opening up another avenue of misperception—not about how much you receive, 
but what you pay. Even if the voters know what their tax bill really is, the question becomes 
how much of that tax money goes to other jurisdictions; in other words how much does the 
taxpayer-voter perceive of what he pays for aid comes back as aid.
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Chapter Three 
Price and Income Illusion
3.1 Income Illusion
Holsey (1993) attempts to provide a unified framework in which the relative 
importance of both price and income illusion can be assessed. She states that it is premature 
to incorporate price illusion into standard theory and claim it as the sole source of illusion 
resulting from the grant system. She argues that although Winer (1983) and Filimon, Romer 
and Rosenthal (1982) conclude that grant induced price illusion is a significant determinant 
of local government expenditure, the role of price illusion remains undefined because they 
cannot isolate voter knowledge parameters. Further, neither study adequately recognizes 
the existence of imperfect information about donor government tax payments for grants.
Holsey labels this source of fiscal illusion, the imperfect information about how much 
of the donor government tax payments for grants actually comes back to the jurisdiction, 
as 'income' illusion. This type of illusion stems from the voter's failure to recognize the 
simultaneity in grant allocations to other jurisdictions. Previous models, like those presented 
earlier, assume a grant tax burden of zero. This model allows such an assumption to be 
relaxed. The contribution here is the modeling of demand such that the effects of 
simultaneity in grants can be examined, an extension of Winer's work.
Holsey's explanation of income illusion can be summarized using Figure 3.1. 
Segment AB is the voter’s original budget constraint when no intergovernmental aid is 
present. Maximization of the median voter's utility subject to this constraint yields a public
28
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expenditure level of gO. The voter's failure to recognize simultaneity in grant allocation 
creates a discrepancy between the actual and perceived budget constraints. Now, assume 
that all localities receive federal grants such that the voter’s share of his locality's grant just 
equals the increase in federal taxes he must pay for the overall increase in federal grants. 
The voter's actual income is not changed and the actual post-grant budget constraint remains 
segment AB. The level of expenditure that maximizes the voter's utility remains gO. 
However, the voter's perceived budget constraint becomes segment CD assuming he has 
perfect information concerning his own local grant but no knowledge of the associated tax 
burden required to pay for the grant. Post grant perceived income is equal to pre-grant 
income plus the voter's share o f his locality's grant. The level of public expenditures 
becomes gl. The amount of income illusion becomes the vertical distance between AC and 
the increase in public consumption due to the flypaper effect is gl-gO.
3.2 The Relationship between price and income illusion
The logical inconsistency in the Holsey description of income illusion is that the 
crucial voter's most preferred level of output, gl, is not on the actual budget constraint. 
Consistency requires that the voter be on both the perceived and actual budget constraint 
in equilibrium. The reason for this is that the median voter cannot consistently spend more 
on goods and services than his income will allow, which means that he cannot be outside of 
his actual budget constraint in equilibrium. The imposition of the consistency condition 
effects the relationship between income and price illusion that Holsey proposes. The 
analysis that follows clarifies the parametric interdependence between price and income 
illusion. It shows that Holse/s income illusion is really the traditional tax price illusion.
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Maximizing the median voter's utility subject to his budget constraint, which 
incorporates the imperfect information about intergovernmental grants, yields the demand 
equation for local expenditures under imperfect price and income information. Assume that 
there exist only two jurisdictions, 1 and 2, and only one level of higher government called 
state government.
Under perfect information the voter's problem can be expressed as
(3.1) max U(Y,G) subject to I = Y + T‘L + T‘s
where Y is the amount of private goods purchased, G is the total expenditures by the 
locality for public goods, TlL is community l's local tax burden for public goods and 
is community l's tax burden to the state for intergovernmental aid for local public goods. 
Local tax payments can be broken down into the individual components as
(3.2) TlL = w*L (G - Lls)
where w*L is the voter's marginal tax share of local expenditures, and Lls is the total amount 
of intergovernmental aid received from the state government by community 1. State level 
tax collections can also be broken down into the individual components as
(3.3) T‘s = w >s ( Lls + L2S) = wY ( Lls + L2s)Vl
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where L2S is the total amount of state aid going to community 2, w*s is the voter's tax share 
of the state tax burden, and V1 is the community's share of the state tax burden from 
community 1, where Vl+V2 = 1 and total aid, Ls = LY + L2S. Substituting (3.2) and (3.3) 
into (3.1) yields the expanded budget constraint
(3.4) 1= Y + w1l (G  + Lis) + w2l (L1s + L2s)V1 
and rearranging (3.4) yields
(3.5) Y = I - wV G + (wY + wY V1) Lls - wY L2SV‘
The last two components on the right hand side of the equation represent the perceived aid 
by the median voter net of state taxes. Equation (3.5) represents the budget constraint of 
the median voter who is not confronted with any misperceptions about the amount of aid 
received, amount of taxes being paid for the aid, or the amount of aid going to other 
jurisdictions.
The analysis of both price and income illusion is examined by introducing imperfect 
information about inteigovemmental aid into the model. There are two possible sources of 
imperfect information. The first is the misperception about the amount of aid received by 
the voter, which is the source of traditional tax price illusion. The second is the 
misperception about how much of the tax payments for aid is going to other jurisdictions, 
which is the source of Holsey's income illusion. The following analysis will show that
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incorporating both types of illusion into the above model reveals a functional dependency 
between the two types of illusion.
3.2.1 Income Illusion
The perceived amount of aid going to locale 2, per dollar o f aid to locale 1 is L*2S 
which can be defined as
(3.6) L*2S = FLls
where T measures locales 2's perceived aid as a proportion of l's aid. The asterisks denote 
perceived amounts by the median voter in locale 1. The perceived net aid component of
(3.5) now becomes
(3.7) w‘L (1 - V1 )L!S - w ^V 1 r L ‘s 
which reduces to
(3.7') w‘L{ (1 - V1) - V1 V} L‘s
In equilibrium it must be the case that the actual tax bill of 1 be equal to the perceived tax 
bill which implies that Tls = T*ls and can be expressed as
(3.8) (L's + L2S) w'L V, = (L's + L*2S) w'L V1
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
34
and substituting (3.6) into (3.8) yields the condition in equilibrium
(3.9) (L's + L2s) wlL V1 " (L 's  + a ' s X V  
Rearranging (3.9) and solving for T yields
(3.10) r = L2S / Lls
which is the actual distribution of aid and is the perfect information outcome. Therefore, 
"income illusion", which Holsey (1993) contends stems from the misperceptions of the voter 
in jurisdiction 1 about the amount of aid going to locale 2, cannot exist without tax price 
illusion.
3.2.2 Tax Price Illusion
Tax price illusion in the traditional sense stems from the misperception by the median 
voter of the amount of aid that he receives from higher levels o f government. Since the 
actual local tax bill is defined as w*L (G - L[s ), then a misperception about the amount of 
aid implies that there is a misperception about the marginal tax price of additional public 
spending. Incorporating the aid misperceptions into (3.2) and (3.3) gives us the perceived 
tax payments
(3.11) T*Y = w*L V1 (G - L*‘s ) 
and
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(3.12) T * 1s =  w1l V ‘ (L*‘s 0+0)
where L*Y = 6  L‘s and is the perceived amount o f aid received. 6  is the portion o f aid 
receipts that is perceived by the median voter. The perceived taxes which include the 
misperception in the marginal tax price can be expressed as
(3.13) T* Y = w* Y V1 (G - 0L ls ) 
and
(3.14) T *1s =  w*1l V 1(L*‘s (1+D )
where w* Y and w*Y are the perceived marginal tax shares. In equilibrium, the actual local 
tax bill must be equal to the perceived local tax bill, T*Y = TY, and thus ex post
(3.15) w*Y - ( 1  - (1-0) Lls/G).
Also, the actual state tax bill must equal the perceived state tax bill, T*Y = T‘s> which 
implies ex post that
(3.16) wY V i ( Lls + L2S) = w*Y V1 0  L‘s ( 1+D  
and substituting (3.15) into (3.16) yields
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Rearranging terms
(3.18) L1S + L2S= ( l-( l-0 )L V G )0 L ‘s (l+r).
Solving for T yields
i + l I/l I
(3.19) r  =  s— i  i
0 ( l - ( l - 0 ) i j / G )
Equation (3.19) demonstrates the result found earlier that under perfect information about 
intergovernmental aid receipts: if 0  = 1, then T = L2S / Lls . Thus "income" illusion, which 
Holsey (1993) maintains stems from the misperception about the portion of aid going to 
other jurisdictions, cannot exist independent of tax price illusion which in turn stems from 
misperceptions about own aid receipts.
3.3.3 The relationship between price and income illusion
The relationship between income and price illusion can be analyzed by rewriting (3.19) as
i + l I i l I  ,
(3.20) t = 0 ( l - ( l - e ) i s1/G).
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This equilibrium relationship implies that if there is an underestimation by the median voter 
of the tax payments for aid, that is T < L2S / Lls , then there must be an overestimation of 
the amount of aid received, 8  > 1, and the perceived marginal tax price must be higher than 
the actual marginal tax price. If there is an overestimation of the tax payments for aid, T 
> L2S / L^, then this implies an underestimation of the amount o f aid received, 9  < 1, thus 
causing the perceived marginal tax price to be lower than the actual marginal tax price. 
What is most important is that the existence o f income illusion implies tax price illusion, 
thus the two types o f illusion are not independent.
To illustrate how this consistency condition affects Holsey's conclusions, consider 
Figure 3.2. Segment AB is the voter's original budget constraint when no intergovernmental 
aid is present. Maximization of the median voter's utility subject to this constraint yields a 
public expenditure level of gO. If all localities receive federal grants such that the voter's 
share of his locality's grant just equals the increase federal taxes he must pay for the overall 
increase in federal grants, then the voter's actual income remains unchanged and the actual 
post-grant budget constraint remains segment AB.
Now assume that the median voter has perfect information concerning his own local 
grant. If the voter is ignorant of concomitant grants to other localities, hence ignorant of 
donor government tax payments for grants, then the perceived price of public goods to the 
voter increases. The reason for this price misperception is that the median voter formulates 
the perceived price of the good by associating the level of output with the associated tax 
liability. In this case, the median voter is associating a higher tax liability with a given level 
of output due to ignorance that a portion of his tax payments does not come back in the
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form of grants. This association causes an increase in the perceived price of public output 
by the median voter. As suggested by Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1979), the level 
of grants should be taken into consideration in the formulation of tax share. In the formal 
analysis by Holsey, the misperception of the tax liability for aid does not enter into the 
computation of the tax share.
The nature of the relationship between the effects of tax liability and grant 
perceptions becomes clear when the tax liability perceptions enter the tax share formulation, 
as demonstrated in the previous analysis. Given the changes in the perceived tax share by 
the median voter, the perceived budget constraint becomes segment CG because of the 
higher perceived price of public output. The utility maximizing voter then chooses 
expenditure level g l, and gl-gO is the result of income illusion. In this scenario, the level 
of public output Ms. Thus we conclude that income illusion produces a negative flypaper 
effect which is opposite of what the Holsey analysis predicts.
The implications of this analysis on the level of public goods chosen can be stated 
more formally:
1. If the voter overestimates the portion of his tax payments for aid going to other 
jurisdictions, then the perceived loss in net income due to grants generates an 
underestimation of the tax price by the median voter. This results in an expansion of the 
level of public expenditures.
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2. If the voter underestimates the portion of his tax payments for aid going to other 
jurisdictions, then the perceived gain in net income generates an overestimation of the tax 
price by the median voter. This results in a contraction in the level of public output.
3. If the voter has perfect knowledge of the grant receipts, then this implies that 
there is no misperception about the level of tax payments for grants going to other 
jurisdictions. Conversely perfect information about tax payments implies then that there 
must be perfect information about grant receipts.
These theoretical conclusions have empirical implications in the Stone-Geary 
framework. One should observe an inverse relationship between the income illusion 
parameter and the tax price illusion parameter in the estimable demand equation derived 
using the Stone-Geary framework. These parameters should not be estimated as 
independent but rather as functionally interdependent.
This theoretical innovation allows testing for the presence of fiscal illusion without 
directly estimating parameters that measure voter's perceptions about aid amounts and tax 
payments going to other jurisdictions. Empirical evidence of grants being more stimulative 
than income on the level o f public expenditures, a positive flypaper effect, suggests an 
underestimation of the level of aid received, 0  < 1. This underestimation of grant amounts 
is coupled with an overestimation of tax payments for grants going to other jurisdictions, 
T > 1, which yields a perceived price lower than the actual price. Evidence of grants being 
less stimulative than income, a negative flypaper effect, suggests an overestimation of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
41
level of aid received, 9  > 1. This overestimation of grant amounts is coupled with and 
underestimation of tax payments going to other jurisdictions, T < 1 which yields a higher 
than actual perceived price. In sum, the direction of the flypaper effect, or absence of it, 
indirectly reveals the source of tax price misperceptions. Therefore, the analysis of 
traditional tax-price and income illusion can be examined outside the context of a well 
defined structural model and extended into less restrictive reduce-form model specifications, 
a feature exploited in this study.
3.3 The Model
Holsey (1993) derives the median voter’s demand function from a Stone-Geary 
utility function, incorporating the imperfect voter information about intergovernmental 
grants. Appendix One provides the derivation of the demand equation using this 
methodology. The demand equation for local public goods incorporates parameters that 
allow for the estimation of price illusion due to grant receipts and income illusion due to tax 
payments. Holsey's innovation is that the estimating equation is derived directly from the 
underlying preference function. The Stone-Geary utility function has well-known properties 
and is a homothetic function which facilitates the aggregation of preferences.
Holsey estimates the demand using time series data on primary and secondary 
education finances from 40 U.S. states over 1966-1980. She uses a two-stage non-linear 
least squares technique proposed by Amemiya (1974) to estimate the non-linear model. In 
order to conform to the local education data, Holsey aggregates all variables to the state 
level. The income illusion parameter for the state level cannot be estimated and the equality 
of state and local tax shares is implied as a result of this aggregation.
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Holsey finds both illusion parameters significant and concludes that both types of 
fiscal illusion are determinants of voter behavior. Her estimates predict a $.51 increase in 
per student education expenditure for a $1.00 increase in per student grants, o f which $. 12 
is due to the traditional picture of grant induced price illusion. These results differ from 
those of Filimon, Romer, and Rosenthal who predict a $.71 increase in expenditure per 
dollar of grants. In the Holsey study only the tax price and the coefficient representing the 
known portion of aid are significantly different from zero.
An extension of Holsey's fiscal illusion model is presented in Appendix One where 
local public demand is estimated using the demand equations derived using the Holsey 
methodology. These empirical results using disaggregate county data illustrate the 
theoretical relationship presented earlier that price and income illusion are not independent 
o f each other. Both types of misperceptions by the voter concerning the level of aid 
received and taxes paid create a wedge between the actual and perceived price of the 
general services provided at the county level.
The parameters that measure income and price illusion are estimated independently, 
and therefore are biased in light of the previously established functional relationship between 
the parameters.3 The full estimable model derived using the Holsey methodology does not 
converge to a global minimum when estimated using disaggregate county data from 1970 
and 1980. The highly nonlinear specification of the model may be the reason for the inability 
o f the model to converge to a global minimum. The use of more restrictive model
1 The empirical specification of the model does not permit the parameters to be estimated as 
independent.
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specifications yields estimates of coefficients that are very fragile, unstable, and vary 
significantly with model specification. The results show that the size and significance o f the 
illusion parameter estimates depend on crucial assumptions about the knowledge of local, 
state, and federal tax shares as well as the empirical definition of the voter's income.
One important conclusion from this analysis is that the use of the Stone-Geary utility 
function is inappropriate for estimating demand equations using disaggregate county data. 
The fragility and variability of the estimates, including erroneous and economically 
inexplicable results, lead us to question the reliability of the estimates themselves for 
assessing the marginal impact of illusion on the perceived price of public goods.
3.4 The Log-Linear Model
One contribution of this paper is the use of a reduced form approach to indirectly 
analyze traditional tax price, or grant illusion, and income illusion. This paper exploits the 
log-linear model specification as an alternative to the more restrictive structural Stone-Geary 
model. The estimable demand equation derived form the log-linear model allows for the 
direct estimation of the voter's perception about the level of aid received. The theoretical 
innovations presented earlier allow us to indirectly attribute the cause of the price distortions 
by comparing the perception parameter estimates with the direction of the flypaper effect. 
The latter is calculated using the elasticity estimates from the empirical model.
Taking the variable definitions from the earlier analysis, the perceived marginal tax 
price of the median voter is
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(3.21) P;  ,  , L (1 -
g
where P*g is the voter's perceived price of public goods, wL is the voter's actual marginal tax 
share, PgG is the actual total expenditures on public goods and (1-0)LA is the level of 
unperceived lump sum aid. Under perfect information 6 = 1  and the perceived price of 
public goods reduces to the voter's actual marginal tax share. When the voter 
underestimates the level of aid, 6 < 1 and the perceived price is lower than the actual price 
of the public goods; when the voter overestimates the level of aid, 0 > 1 and the perceived 
price is higher than the actual price of public goods. Substituting (3.21) into the net aid 
component of (3.5) yields the perceived net aid to the voter in jurisdiction 1 and equals
(3.22) L’ = (1 - QLa - wl ( 1 - 0*r> V‘ *La
s s
The individual demand function for local public goods is defined as
(3.23) g =Al,N,Pg\ L ’ )
where the median voter's demand for public goods, g, is a function of income, I, local 
population, N, the perceived price of the public good, and the perceived net aid received 
respectively. Equation (3.23) can be stated more formally in an exponential functional form,
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and since individual output g = pG where p represents the congestion parameter, 
multiplying this form by Pg p and rearranging terms yields an expression for the total 
demand for local public goods and can be stated as
(3.24) PgG = o(q Nh P’*' L'*" Pg /p
Substituting (3.21) and (3.22) into (3.24) yields
(3.25) p p  = a0 at*1 wp ^  Pp*l) (l - e i “4 (l-F '( i+D)0< /p
Ps
Taking the logarithms of both sides of (3.25) and collecting terms yields an estimable 
equation for local public demand and is expressed as
Ln P p  = A0 + axLn I + apt M + (a3 +a4)Ln wL + (l+a3)L/i P
(3.26) ( l - Q ) L .+(a3+aJLn{l — - -  -) + a p i  LA 
&
where the constant A0 = o0 + aALnQ + a/n(i-F '(l+r)) - i«P •
3.5 Empirical Results
3.5.1 The Data
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Holsey (1993) uses data drawn from single-purpose governments—education 
spending by school districts-aggregated by state to estimate the effect o f fiscal illusion on 
the median voter's perceived budget constraint. This study extends Moisey's empirical 
analysis using two panel data sets, one for county government spending and the other for 
state government spending for the years 1970 and 1980. This data set allows us to address 
issues ignored in the earlier analysis. The panel data for county governments provides 
several important advantages. One advantage is that the disaggregate county data captures 
fiscal behavior at the jurisdictional level, which lies closer to the underlying median model 
appropriate for estimating local government spending functions. Another advantage is that 
county governments are multi-purpose and reflect differing degrees o f fiscal complexity, 
which Wagner (1976) argues underlies taxpayer-voter fiscal illusion. This allows us a basis 
by which we can assess how degrees of fiscal illusion can affect the crucial parameter 
estimates of fiscal illusion. Another benefit of using county data is that examination of the 
provision of general services as well as specific services provided by the local governments 
can be undertaken.
This data set also provides the ability to test the test for inter-temporal stability of 
the estimates. Conclusions about long term trends of fiscal illusion effects on local spending 
behavior can be deduced by examining the trend in size and significance of the key 
parameter estimates. Finally, the panel data for state governments allows for all of the above 
analysis as well as the ability to examine how fiscal illusion effects vary between higher 
levels of government and lower levels of government.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
47
The data used in this study are drawn from 437 county governments in the five 
midwestem states; Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin for the years 1970 and 
1980. These states were chosen because they are all contiguous and large scale variations 
in climate, culture, and fiscal structure can be minimized. Expenditure, revenue, and grant 
receipts data are from the 1970 and 1980 Census o f Governments. Population and income 
data come from the 1973 and 1983 City-County Data Book. A more complete explanation 
of the data used in this study is provided in Appendix Two.
3.5.2 Methodology and Assumptions
Estimation of the non-linear regressions is conducted using a maximum likelihood 
procedure.4 It is assumed that the errors are additive and normally distributed. The 
algorithm employed in this procedure is a Quasi-Newton method and the convergence 
criterion for each coefficient is set equal to .00001. Non-linear regressions are conducted 
using the disaggregate county data from 1970 and 1980 described earlier.
The data used in the estimation of equation (3.26) are county general expenditures 
(PgG), median family income (I), and county population (N). The price of the public goods, 
Pg, is measured by using the average wage of county employees. The median voter tax 
share, w, is assumed to be the median value house divided by the total property tax base in 
the county. These definitions are typically used in local public expenditure studies [Turnbull 
(1993); Turnbull and Djoundourian (1993,1994); Holsey (1993)].
4 The regressions are programmed and executed using the SHAZAM econometrics computer 
program version 7.0.
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This study estimates both county general expenditure functions and specific service 
functions at the county level. Five service categories are examined; education, public safety, 
transportation, environmental, and social services expenditures. The estimation of (3.26) 
for the service categories substitutes the total expenditures for each category as a measure 
of the dependant variable PgG.
3.5.3 General Expenditure Results
Estimates of the log-linear demand equation for county general expenditures which 
incorporates imperfect voter information for 1970 and 1980 is reported in Tables 3.1 and 
3.2, respectively. Examination of Table 3.1 indicates a significant and positive relationship 
between the median voter's income and general expenditures by the county government. The 
income elasticity (Al) estimate of .238 is slightly lower but consistent with income effects 
reported in the literature. Inman (1971) reports the income elasticity for education 
expenditures to be .56. Feldstein (1971) reports an income elasticity for education 
expenditures of .47. Ehrenberg (1973) using total local government data reports an income 
elasticity of .75.
The aid elasticity (A4) is also positive and significant with relation to general 
expenditures and the estimate of .536 is also consistent with the prevailing literature. 
Turnbull (1993) reports aid elasticities ranging from .48 to .78 for municipal governments. 
Ehrenberg (1973) reports the aid elasticity for total local government expenditures to be .22. 
Inman (1978) reports aid elasticities for education expenditures ranging from .23 to .40. 
The estimates for 1970 general expenditures show lump sum intergovernmental aid (A4) to
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Table 3.1
Log-Linear Model Specification 
County General Expenditures 
1970
Unrestricted Restricted
Model Model
Constant (AO) -1.718* -2.950*
0357 0396
Income (Al) .238* .231*
0.043 0.049
Population (A2) .307* .528*
0.031 0.03
Price Elasticity (A3) -.728* -.469*
0.034 0.033
Aid (A4) .536* .425*
0.024 0.025
Aid Perception .643*
Theta 0.012
Log Likelihood Value 233.5894 177.4402
SSE 8.7846 11.3586
F-Statistic
Ho: Theta = 1 112.30
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* = Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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Table 3.2
Log-Linear Model Specification 
County General Expenditures 
1980
Unrestricted Restricted
Model Model
Constant (AO) -1.444* -1.705*
0.446 0.575
Income (Al) .303* .263*
0.053 0.068
Population (A2) .187* .362*
0.027 0.032
Price Elasticity (A3) -.831* -0.648*
0.027 0.032
Aid (A4) .589* 0.454*
0.02 0.024
Aid Perception .646*
Theta 0.05
Log Likelihood Value 289.3410 189.9201
SSE 6.8062 10.7280
F-Statistic
Ho: Theta = 1 198.84
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* = Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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be more stimulative than income (A l) on the level of general expenditures at the county 
level.
Analysis of the 6 parameter allows us to assess the degree of grant and income 
illusion of the level of county general expenditures. The estimate for the level of aid 
perceived (6) by the median voter is .643 and is significantly different from zero. This result 
shows that the median voter underestimates the level of intergovernmental aid coming from 
the state and federal government. If the median voter underestimates the level of aid, as the 
results in Table 3.1 show, then according to the theory developed earlier, the median voter 
will underestimate the marginal tax price of the public goods. This price distortion causes 
an expansion of the level of output.
Table 3.1 also reports the estimates of the log linear model under the assumption 
that the median voter is confronted with perfect information about the level of aid received 
(0=1). The hypothesis that the median voter has perfect information is tested using a 
likelihood ratio test. The hypothesis that 0 = I is rejected at the 95% confidence level with 
an F-statistic of 112.30. These tests show the median voter does not have perfect 
information about the level of aid but is not totally unaware that it exists. This results 
supports the theory of partial grant illusion proposed by Filimon, Romer and Rosenthal 
(1980) and rejects the complete fiscal illusion proposed by Oates (1979).
Empirical evidence of grants being more stimulative than income on the level of 
public expenditures, a positive flypaper effect, suggests an underestimation of the tax price 
caused by an underestimation of the level of aid received or a corresponding overestimation 
of the tax payments for that aid. Comparing the differences in the marginal effects of
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income and aid on the level of expenditures gives us the direction of the flypaper effect and 
yields the source of the tax price misperceptions. The coefficients estimated using the log 
linear approach yield elasticity estimates and should not be interpreted as marginal effects. 
However, by making the appropriate transformations, we can calculate the direction of the 
flypaper effect.
A positive flypaper effect is when intergovernmental aid is more stimulative than 
income on the level of expenditures. This relationship can be stated more formally as:
d{PpG) diPjG)
(3.26) .
dl d(wL)
Multiplying both sides by I /PgG yields
d(PG)
(3.27) — -g—-
a / pgG d{wL) P p
and multiplying the right hand side of (3.27) by 1 (wL/wL) and rearranging terms yields
(3 28) B{PeG) 1 < W f i )  wL I  
SI P p  S(wL) P fiw L
which can be rewritten as
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where E (I,G) is the income elasticity and E(wL,G) is the aid elasticity. Therefore by 
multiplying the elasticity of aid by the ratio of the median voter's income and the share of 
aid, we can determine if intergovernmental aid is marginally more stimulative than income.
Multiplying the elasticity of aid from Table 3.1 by the income-aid share ratio, which 
for 1970 is 4.53, gives us a value of 2.431,5 This value is greater than the income elasticity 
of .238. Thus, for 1970 we find that intergovernmental aid is more stimulative than income. 
This result conforms with the theoretical results that an underestimation of the level of aid 
lowers the perceived price to public goods and leads to public output expansions. The 
positive flypaper effect confirms the result that the voter underestimates the level of aid and 
suffers from fiscal illusion.
The estimates for county general expenditures using the 1980 data are presented in 
Table 3.2. These results indicate a significant and positive relationship between income and 
intergovernmental aid and general expenditures by the local government for 1980. The 
income elasticity of .303 and the aid elasticity of .589 are both significantly different from 
zero. The estimate for the perception o f aid by the median voter is .646 and is significantly 
different from zero. The hypothesis that 9 = 1 is tested using a likelihood ratio test and is 
rejected at the 95% confidence level with an F-statistic of 198.84. The results using the 
1980 county data suggest that the median voter does not perceive the full level of aid
5 Mean and median values of the variables are reported in Appendix Two.
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received by the county government. The theory implies that this leads to an underestimation 
of the tax price, and causes an expansion in the level of output. We calculate the direction 
of the flypaper effect by multiplying the aid elasticity by the income-aid share ratio, which 
for 1980 is 2.43, and this gives us a value o f 1.43 which is greater than the income elasticity 
of .303. This result indicates that intergovernmental aid is more stimulative than income for 
1980 county general expenditures. This positive flypaper effect suggests an underestimation 
o f the tax price by the median voter resulting from an underestimation of the level of aid 
received. This relationship is confirmed by the estimate of 0 being less than one.
The empirical results presented above show that the median voter suffers from fiscal 
illusion. The source of this fiscal illusion stems from the voter's inability to perceive the full 
of amount of intergovernmental aid. This misperception drives a wedge between the actual 
and perceived marginal tax price o f public goods. These results also show an 
underestimation of the level of aid received by the local government as the source of the 
flypaper effect.
3.5.4 Service Category Results
An important contribution of this work is the use of the disaggregate panel data to 
examine the provision of specific services at the county level. This section analyzes five 
service functions at the county level for 1970 and 1980: education, public safety, 
transportation, environmental, and social services. Estimation of the expenditure functions 
indicates that the median voter suffers from fiscal illusion stemming from the 
underestimation of the level of aid received by the local government. In all five service
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categories for 1970 and 1980, intergovernmental aid is more stimulative than income on the 
level of expenditures.
Estimates of the log linear expenditure function using the 1970 data for the five 
service categories are presented in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. These tables indicate a significant 
and positive relationship between income and service functions with elasticity estimates 
ranging from .188 for public safety to .327 for education. The income effects appear to be 
stable across these categories. Further examination of these estimates indicates a positive 
and significant relationship between the level of intergovernmental aid and the specific 
expenditure categories. The intergovernmental aid elasticities for transportation, social 
services, and environmental expenditures at the county level are very strong and range from 
.833 to .950.
Analysis of the aid perception parameter (0) allows us to assess the degree of grant 
and income illusion on the level of spending in these five categories. Tables 3.3 and 3.4 
indicate that in all five expenditure categories the median voter underestimates the level of 
aid received for these specific functions. All the estimates of the theta parameters are 
significantly different from zero and are less than one. The hypothesis that the voter is 
confronted with perfect information about aid amounts (6=1) is tested using the likelihood 
ratio test. The estimates of the restricted models are reported in Appendix Three. The F- 
statistics of this test are also reported in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. Examination of these results 
indicate that for all five expenditure categories in 1970, the hypothesis that the voter is 
confronted with perfect aid information is rejected at the 95% confidence level. The
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Table 3 3
Log-Linear Model Specification 
Specific County Services 
1970
Education Transportation Public Safety
Constant (AO) -2.911* 1.759* -2.698*
0.488 0.482 0.541
Income (Al) .327* .242* .188*
0.0S4 0.061 0.062
Population (A2) .354* -.425* .240*
0.047 0.032 0.045
Price Elasticity (A3) -.633* -1.452* -1.000*
0.04S 0.036 0.045
Aid (A4) .430* .950* .544*
0.031 0.031 0.035
Aid Perception .602* .774* .788*
Theta 0.144 0.053 0.090
F-Statistic
Ho: Theta = 1 108.05 447.26 372.88
SSE 13.90 17.41 17.61
Log Likelihood Value 133.34 84.08 81.60
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
*  =  Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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Table 3.4
Log-Linear Model Specification 
Specific County Services 
1970
Social Services Environmental
Constant (AO) 3.912* 1.116*
0.832 0.835
Income (Al) .315* .317*
0.108 0.100
Population (A2) -.698* -.421*
0.0S8 0.063
Price Elasticity (A3) -1.923* -1.696
0.059 0.061
Aid (A4) .996* .833*
0.056 0.053
Aid Perception .777* .492*
Theta 0.088 0.036
F-Statistic
Ho: Theta = 1 855.26 673.22
SSE 54.29 47.19
Log Likelihood Value -164.36 -133.73
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
*  = Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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underestimation of the level of aid leads to an underestimation of the tax price by the 
median voter and causes an increase in service expenditures.
The direction of the flypaper effect indirectly reveals the source of tax price 
misperception. Multiplying the median voter's income by the income-aid share ratio for each 
category and comparing this result to the income elasticity estimate gives us the direction 
of the flypaper effect. All five county expenditure categories exhibit a positive flypaper 
effect which indicates that intergovernmental aid is more stimulative than income on the 
level of county service expenditures for 1970. Therefore, we conclude that the median voter 
suffers from fiscal illusion caused by the misperception of aid levels for these five functions.
Estimates of the log linear expenditure function using the 1980 data for the five 
service categories are presented in Table 3.5 and 3.6. Examination of these tables indicates 
a significant and positive relationship between income and all five service functions with 
elasticity estimates ranging from .403 for transportation to .826 for environmental. The aid 
elasticity estimates are all positive and significant with respect to service expenditures. The 
aid elasticity estimate for social services of 1.056 implies that social service expenditures rise 
by more than the increase in the level of intergovernmental aid.
Analysis of the aid perception parameter indicates that the median voter 
underestimates the level of aid received with estimates ranging from .447 for social services 
to .872 for environmental. The hypothesis that the median voter has perfect information 
regarding the level of aid received is rejected at the 95% confidence level. The F-statistics 
are reported in Tables 3.5 and 3.6. The results indicate that the median voter is suffering 
from fiscal illusion.
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Table 3.5
Log-Linear Model Specification 
Specific County Services 
1980
Education Transportation
Constant (AO) -4.726* 0.173
0.644 0.694
Income (Al) .592* .403*
0.075 0.083
Population (A2) .197* -.226*
0.040 0.038
Price Elasticity (A3) -.749* -1.199*
0.041 0.038
Aid (A4) .589* .669*
0.020 0.032
Aid Perception .646* .764*
(Theta) 0.050 0.060
F-Statistic
Ho: Theta = 1 132.57 57.83
SSE 14.52 16.71
Log Likelihood Value 123.85 93.04
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* = Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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Table 3.6
Log-Linear Model Specification 
Specific County Services 
1980
Social Services Environmental
Constant (AO) -.640 -3.201*
1.223 1.080
Income (Al) .802* .826*
0.146 0.127
Population (A2) -.760* -.487*
0.061 0.056
A3 -1.869* -1.632*
0.056 0.051
Aid (A4) 1.056* .982*
0.055 0.046
Aid Perception .447* .872*
Theta 0.041 0.074
F-Statistic
Ho: Theta = 1 855.26 562.41
SSE 53.98 39.54
Log Likelihood Value -163.12 -95.11
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* =  Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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Evidence of intergovernmental aid being more stimulative than income on the level 
o f service expenditures indicates the nature of the price distortion stems from the voter's 
misperception about the level of aid. By multiplying the income-aid share ratio by the 
reported aid elasticities for each service category, we find that these values are all greater 
than the income elasticity estimates in that category. Thus we conclude that the positive 
flypaper effects exhibited in the service categories are a result of fiscal illusion by the median 
voter.
3.5.5 Summary of Results
The empirical results of the log linear model using the disaggregate county data from 
1970 and 1980 are summarized in Table 3.7. The positive flypaper effects for county 
general expenditures and for specific categorical expenditures in 1970 and 1980 indicates 
that intergovernmental aid is more stimulative than income on the level of county 
expenditures. The consistent positive flypaper effect implies that the median voter 
underestimates the true marginal tax price of the public goods. The consistent 
underestimation of the level of aid for both general expenditures and specific service 
expenditures is summarized in Table 3.7 and is the cause of the price distortion. The 
empirical results show the median voter suffers from fiscal illusion. The source of this 
illusion stems from the inability of the median voter to perceive the full amount of 
intergovernmental aid. Thus we can conclude that the empirical phenomenon known as the 
flypaper effect is a result of fiscal illusion by the median voter. We find no evidence of 
Holsey's notion of income illusion which stems from the overestimation of the level of 
intergovernmental aid by the median voter.
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Table 3.7
1970
Fiscal Illusion Summary 
County Level
Direction of 
Flypaper Effect
Perception of 
Intergovernmental Aid
General Expenditures Positive Underestimation
Education Positive Underestimation
Public Safety Positive Underestimation
Transportation Positive Underestimation
Environmental Positive Underestimation
Social Services Positive Underestimation
Direction of Perception of
1980 Flypaper Effect Intergovernmental Aid
General Expenditures Positive Underestimation
Education Positive Underestimation
Public Safety Positive Underestimation
Transportation Positive Underestimation
Environmental Positive Underestimation
Social Services Positive Overestimation
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The empirical tests in this study show that the median voter does not have perfect 
information concerning aid receipts at the county level. Therefore, modeling local fiscal 
behavior under this assumption is inappropriate and can lead to biased estimates. Table 3.8 
compares the elasticity estimates o f the some key variables used in fiscal policy analysis 
estimated under perfect information with those estimates from the demand equation which 
incorporates imperfect information. The variables examined are income, intergovernmental 
aid, and tax price elasticities. Casual observation of the estimates show that the key 
parameter estimates under perfect information tend to be lower than the estimates which 
incorporate imperfect information into the model for both 1970 and 1980 county 
expenditures. Another interesting result is the consistent manner in which the median voter 
model explains categorical spending at the local level. It is shown that the median model 
tends to explain general expenditure behavior well at the municipal level, however lacks in 
explaining the specific functions (Turnbull and Djoundourian, 1994). One reason is that 
voter's have some influence in regards to the overall level of spending, but little control as 
to the specifics of the expenditures. At the county level, we find the median model a strong 
tool in predicting the behavior of the local fisc.
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Table 3.8
Comparison of Perfect versus 
Imperfect Information Model 
County Level
1970 Income Aid Tax Price
General Expenditures Same Lower Lower
Education Same Lower Lower
Public Safety Lower Lower Lower
Transportation Same Lower Lower
Environmental Lower Lower Lower
Social Servies Lower Lower Lower
1980 Income Aid Tax Price
General Expenditures Lower Lower Lower
Education Lower Lower Lower
Public Safety Lower Lower Lower
Transportation Lower Lower Lower
Environmental Lower Lower Lower
Social Servies Lower Lower Lower
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Chapter Four 
State Government
This chapter examines how fiscal illusion effects vary between higher and lower 
levels of government. We use state panel data from 1970 and 1980 to estimate a variant of 
the log linear demand equation developed in the previous chapter. The log-linear demand 
equation which incorporates imperfect voter information is estimated for state general 
expenditures and for five specific spending categories. The results provide strong evidence 
that the median voter suffers from fiscal illusion stemming from the underestimation of aid 
receipts at the state level. The estimates do show fiscal illusion as the source of the flypaper 
effect. The size and significance of the state estimates are compared with the county 
estimates to examine how fiscal illusion varies across levels of government. These results 
reveal an interesting difference between county and state governments.
4.1 Methodology and Assumptions
Estimation of the non-linear regressions is conducted using a maximum likelihood 
procedure. It is assumed that the errors are additive and normally distributed. The 
algorithm employed in this procedure is a Quasi-Newton method and the convergence 
criterion for each coefficient is set equal to .00001. Non-linear regressions are conducted 
using the state expenditure data from 1970 and 1980 described earlier. Expenditure, 
revenue, and grant receipts data are from the 1970 and 1980 Census of Governments.
65
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Population and income data come from the 1973 and 1983 City-County Data Book. A more 
detailed explanation of all variables used in the estimation is provided in Appendix Two.
A variation of the non-linear demand equation (3.26) is estimated using a maximum 
likelihood procedure and is expressed as
Ln PgG  =  A0 +  a xLn I  +  a^Ln N  + (a3 +aJLn wL +  (l+ a3)£/i P
(4 1 ) (1-0 ) ^
+(o3+ a4) I n ( l - ----------- - )  + a p n  LA +  ajSouth + a 6West + a^North
^s
This empirical specification includes regional dummy variables, south, west, and north to 
capture the effects of unmeasured determinants like weather, geography, and regional 
cultural effects.6 There are no a priori expectations about the signs of the regional dummy 
variables. The data used in the estimation o f equation (4.1) are state general expenditures 
(PgG), median family income (I), and state population (N). The tax price of the public 
goods, Pg, is measured by using the average wage of state employees. The median voter tax 
share, w, is assumed to be the median value house divided by the total property tax base in 
he state.
4.2 General Expenditure Results
Estimates of the log-linear state general expenditures equation which incorporates 
imperfect information for 1970 and 1980 are reported in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, respectively.
6 A test of the null hypothesis that slope coefficients across states of different geographic regions are 
the same cannot be rejected for both 1970 and 1980 general expenditures and categorical expenditures.
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The results in Table 4.1 show a positive relationship between median voter's income and 
state general expenditures in 1970. The income elasticity (Al) of .180 however is not 
significantly different from zero with a standard error o f . 155. The aid elasticity (A3) of 
.570 reflects a positive and significant relationship between intergovernmental aid and state 
general expenditures.
Analysis of the aid perception parameter (0) allows us to assess the degree of grant 
and income illusion at the state level concerning general expenditures. The estimate o f the 
level o f aid perceived is .779 and is significantly different from zero. Table 4.1 also reports 
the estimates of the log-linear model under the assumption that the median voter has perfect 
information concerning aid levels (6=1). This hypothesis is tested using a likelihood ratio 
test and is rejected at the 95% confidence level with an F-statistic of 5.28. Thus we 
conclude that the median voter underestimates the level of intergovernmental aid concerning 
state general expenditures in 1970. According to theory, this underestimation of the level 
of intergovernmental aid by the median voter leads to an underestimation of the marginal 
tax price of public goods.
Evidence of intergovernmental aid being more stimulative than income on the level 
of state general expenditures, a positive flypaper effect, also supports the conclusion that 
the median voter underestimates the tax price due to imperfect information concerning aid 
levels. Multiplying the elasticity o f aid by the income-aid share ratio, which for 1970 is 
3.49, gives us a value of 1.98. This value is greater than the income elasticity o f . 180 which 
indicates that intergovernmental aid is more stimulative than income on the level o f state 
general expenditures for 1970.
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Table 4.1
Log-Linear Model Specification 
State General Expenditures 
1970
Unrestricted Restricted
Model Model
Constant (AO) -.339 -.768
1.412 1.501
Income (Al) 0.18 0.204
0.155 0.164
Population (A2) .247* .302*
0.076 0.077
Price Elasticity (A3) -.638* -.568*
0.086 0.086
Aid (A4) .570* .527*
0.077 0.079
Aid Perception .779*
Theta 0.173
South .096* .113*
0.042 0.044
West -.045 -.053
0.051 0.052
North 0.07 0.078
0.046 0.047
Log Likelihood Value 46.6773 44.0389
SSE 0.4019 0.4486
F-Statistic
Ho: Theta = 1 5.28
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* =  Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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Table 4.2
Log-Linear Model Specification 
State General Expenditures 
1980
Unrestricted Restricted
Model Model
Constant (AO) -1.544 -1.799
1.470 1.470
Income (Al) 0.218 0.227
0.152 0.153
Population (A2) 405* .427*
0.074 0.072
Price Elasticity (A3) -.473* -.451*
0.082 0.080
Aid (A4) .466* 0.454*
0.077 0.076
Aid Perception .426*
Theta 0.215
South .130* .133*
0.042 0.042
West -.059 -.059
0.042 0.043
North 0.062 0.062
0.044 0.045
-
Log Likelihood Value 44.3996 44.3236
SSE 0.4419 0.4433
F-Statistic
Ho: Theta = 1 0.15
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* =  Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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The estimates for state general expenditures using the 1980 data are presented in 
Table 4.2. These results show a positive relationship between the median voter's income 
and the level of general expenditures. However, the income elasticity estimate of .218 is not 
significantly different than zero with a standard error of .152. The aid elasticity estimate of 
.466 reflects a positive and significant relationship between intergovernmental aid and state 
general expenditures.
The estimate of the level of aid perceived (6) is .426 and is significantly different 
from zero. This result indicates that the median voter underestimates the level of aid 
received. Table 4.2 also reports the estimates of the log-linear model under the assumption 
that the median voter has perfect information concerning aid levels (6=1). The hypothesis 
that the median voter has perfect information is tested using a likelihood ratio test and 
cannot be rejected at the 95% confidence level with an F-statistic o f . 15. The inability to 
reject the hypothesis of perfect aid information implies that the median voter does not 
underestimate the tax price of the public services at the state level for 1980.
Evidence of intergovernmental aid being more stimulative than income on the level 
o f state general expenditures, a positive flypaper effect, therefore cannot be attributed to 
fiscal illusion by the median voter stemming from the underestimation of the level of aid 
receipts. Multiplying the elasticity of aid by the income-aid share ration, which for 1980 is 
1.41, gives us a value of .659 and is greater than the income elasticity of .218. Evidence of 
a positive flypaper effect with no evidence of aid misperceptions implies that the source of 
the price distortions stem from something other than aid and tax payment misperceptions. 
This positive flypaper effect according to Fisher (1982) may result from various political
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institutions at the state level or some tax substitution. The positive flypaper effect may also 
reflect the presence of tax price risk or consumption risk facing the median voter (Turnbull 
1993,1995). The latter explanation seems more plausible because at the state level the 
median voter is further removed from the decisions concerning spending. This increased 
distance from the decision making process increases the cost of obtaining information and 
results in an increase in the risk or uncertainty the median voter must bear.
The empirical results show evidence that the median voter is confronted with 
imperfect information about aid receipts leading to price distortions concerning the marginal 
tax price of state level general expenditures. The evidence shows that the flypaper effect 
in the 1970 sample can be attributed to fiscal illusion caused by the underestimation of the 
ievel o f intergovernmental aid receipts by the median voter. However, there is no strong 
evidence that the positive flypaper effect observed in the 1980 sample can be attributed to 
the underestimation of the tax price stemming from aid misperceptions.
4.3 Service Category results
Examination of specific service expenditures by states gives us another dimension 
in which to analyze the effects of fiscal illusion. This section analyzes five service functions 
at the state level for the years 1970 and 1980: education, public safety, transportation, 
environmental, and social services. Estimation of the expenditure functions provide strong 
evidence that the median voter suffers from fiscal illusion stemming from the 
underestimation of the level of aid received in 1970. No strong evidence of fiscal illusion 
is found using the sample from 1980. Estimation of all five service expenditure categories 
for 1970 and 1980 find intergovernmental aid to be more stimulative than income on the
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level of expenditures. Overall, we find that the median voter model does not explain specific 
spending behavior well at the state level. The unstable/inconsistent estimates may reflect 
the increased distance between the median voter the specific spending decisions made at the 
state Ievel.
Estimates of the log-linear expenditure function using the 1970 data for all five 
service categories are presented in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. Examination of theses results shows 
that the income elasticity is positive for education, transportation, public safety, and social 
services. The estimates, which range from .052 for education to .519 for public safety, are 
not significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level. A negative and significant 
relationship between income and state environmental expenditures means the median voter 
perceives environmental services as an inferior good at the state level using the 1970 data. 
The unique nature of environmental services and uncertainty surrounding environmental 
expenditures may explain this negative relationship. Further examination of these tables 
indicate a positive and significant relationship between intergovernmental aid and 
expenditures in all the spending categories except public safety.
The estimates in Table 4.3 and 4.4 demonstrate that the median voter consistently 
underestimates the level of aid in regards to the specific service expenditures. The estimates 
of aid perception (6) are all less than one and are also significantly different from zero for 
all five spending categories. The hypothesis that the median voter has perfect information 
(0=1) is tested using a likelihood ratio test and is rejected at the 95% confidence level for 
all the categories except education. The critical values from the hypothesis tests are 
reported in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. The estimates from the restricted estimation are reported
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Table 4.3
Log-Linear Model Specification 
Specific State Services 
1970
Education Transportation Public Safety
Constant (AO) -.475 7.494* -7.800*
2.815 2.947 2.813
Income (Al) 0.052 0.519 0.516
0309 0332 0.294
Population (A2) .450* -.054 .666*
0.169 0.162 0.16
Price Elasticity (A3) -.388* -.902* -.214
0.192 0.185 0.181
Aid (A4) .324* .656* 0.047
0.168 0.168 0.157
Aid Perception .730* .397* .322*
(TheU) 0.246 0.133 0.040
South -.076 0.032 .199*
0.086 0.092 0.099
West -.105 -.036 .188*
0.102 0.096 0.087
North -.240* 0.088 -.159
0.092 0.107 0.085
F-Statistic
Ho: Theta = 1 0.24 20.04 12.16
SSE 1.65 1.90 1.44
Log Likelihood Value 13.14 9.39 16.05
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* =  Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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Table 4.4
Log-Linear Model Specification 
Specific State Services 
1980
Social Services Environmental
Constant (AO) 0.987 10.471*
3.550 2.788
Income (Al) 0.442 -1.048*
0396 O Jll
Population (A2) -.085 0.116
0.197 0.148
Price Elasticity (A3) -1.132 -.791*
0.221 0.168
Aid (A4) .860* .584*
0.204 0.152
Aid Perception .594* .444*
Theta 0.302 0.105
South 0.061 0.189
0.115 0.101
West -.057 .391*
0.129 0.049
North 0.225 0.123
0.117 0.095
F-Statistic
Ho: Theta = 1 19.70 16.47
SSE 2.75 1.55
Log Likelihood Value 0.49 14.21
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* =  Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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in Appendix Three. The underestimation of the ievel of aid by the median voter leads to an 
underestimation of the price of these services. These results provide strong evidence the 
median voter is confronted with fiscal illusion in regards to state level specific service 
expenditures using the 1970 sample.
Evidence that intergovernmental aid is more stimulative than income implies that the 
output effect stems from the voter's misperception about aid receipts. Multiplying the 
income-aid share ratio by the aid elasticity and comparing it to the income elasticity reveals 
the direction of the flypaper effect. For all five categories, a positive flypaper effect is 
observed, which is consistent with the determination that the median voter underestimates 
the marginal tax price of state services.
Estimates of the log-linear specific service functions using the 1980 state data are 
presented in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6. These results show an unstable relationship between 
the median voter's income and categorical expenditures. The income elasticity estimate for 
public safety of .456 is the only spending category exhibiting a positive and significant 
relationship between income and expenditures. Estimation of the model using transportation 
and environmental expenditures yields a negative and significant relationship between the 
voter's income and expenditures. The income elasticities for education and social services 
are negative, but not significantly different from zero. The inability of the median voter to 
control specific spending decisions at the state level, due to the increased distance from the 
decision making process itselfj may lead to these inconsistent income effects observed in the 
service category estimates. An alternative explanation could lie in the weakness of the 
median voter model in explaining the fiscal process at the state level. Either way, these
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
76
Table 4.5
Log-Linear Model Specification 
Specific State Services 
1980
Education Transportation Public Safety
Constant (AO) -1.296 4.1 -8.481*
2.962 3.663 3.010
Income (Al) -.050 -.201* .456*
0.176 0.384 211
Population (A2) .601* 0.114 .887*
0.1SI 0.187 0.158
Price Elasticity (A3) -.252 -.649* 0.04
0.171 0.205 0.173
Aid (A4) .336* .520* -.070
0.169 0.199 0.043
Aid Perception .645* .723* .595*
(Theta) 0.009 0.329 0.160
South 0.073 .256* .491*
0.075 0.109 0.086
West 0.017 0.021 .370*
0.08 0.105 0.083
North -.253* -.056 .257*
0.088 0.115 0.089
F-Statistic
Ho: Theta = 1 8.10 10.88 0.89
SSE 1.04 2.87 1.74
Log Likelihood Value 17.19 -0.06 11.45
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* =  Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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Table 4.6
Log-Linear Model Specification 
Specific State Services 
1980
Social Services Environmental
Constant (AO) -1.199 11.417*
2.753 3.578
Income (Al) -.063 -.961*
0.29 0.379
Population (A2) .462* -.135
0.150 0.184
Price Elasticity (A3) -.548* -.918*
0.164 0.218
Aid (A4) .514* .819*
0.155 0.212
Aid Perception .441* .865*
Theta 0.067 0.202
South -.0003 -.023
0.079 0.109
West -.248* 0.057
0.078 0.113
North 0.161 -.142
0.086 0.119
F-Statistic
Ho: Theta = 1 1.68 6.78
SSE 1.45 2.44
Log Likelihood Value 15.83 1.75
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* =  Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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inconsistent income effects do not affect the search for evidence o f fiscal illusion as the 
source of the flypaper effect.
Tables 4.S and 4.6 show a positive and significant relationship between 
intergovernmental aid and education, transportation, social service, and environmental 
expenditures. A negative but insignificant relationship is reported for public safety 
expenditures. Analysis of the aid perception parameter (6) allows us to assess the degree 
of grant and income illusion at the state level concerning state specific services. The 
estimates of aid perception, which range from .441 for social services to .865 for 
environmental, are significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level. The 
hypothesis that the median voter has perfect information (0=1) is tested using a likelihood 
ratio test and is rejected at the 95% confidence level for environmental, education, and 
transportation. The hypothesis that the median voter has perfect information cannot be 
rejected at the 95% confidence level for public safety and social services. The critical values 
from the hypothesis tests are reported in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6. The estimates from the 
restricted estimations are reported in Appendix Three. The estimates show that the median 
voter consistently underestimates the level of aid received with respect to environmental, 
education, and transportation expenditures. This underestimation of aid causes the median 
voter to underestimate the true marginal tax price of the services and will lead to an 
expansion in output.
Further, a positive flypaper effect is observed in four of the five service categories: 
education, transportation, social services, and environmental which is consistent with the 
misperception of aid receipts. The direction of the flypaper effect for public safety is
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negative, which would be consistent with an overestimation in the price of public safety by 
the median voter. However, we cannot attribute this overestimation of the tax price to an 
overestimation of taxes paid for these goods because the hypothesis that the median voter 
has perfect information concerning aid receipts cannot be rejected at the 95% confidence 
level with an F-statistic of .89. The negative flypaper effect, which represents an 
overestimation of the tax price, may stem from the increased tax price risk or consumption 
risk associated with public safety expenditures (Turnbull 1993,1995).
A summary of the empirical results concerning fiscal illusion using the 1970 and 
1980 state data is presented in Table 4.7. A positive flypaper effect is observed for general 
and specific services in 1970 which shows that intergovernmental aid is more stimulative 
than income on the level of expenditures. This underestimation implies the median voter has 
underestimated the true marginal tax price. The source of this price distortion stems from 
the inability of the median voter to perceive the full level of intergovernmental aid received 
as demonstrated by the results in column three of Table 4.7. The results using the 1980 
sample also provide evidence of fiscal illusion, however the results are not as robust when 
compared with the 1970 sample. The positive flypaper effect can be attributed to fiscal 
illusion for education, transportation, and environmental services. The positive flypaper 
effect for 1980 general expenditures and social service expenditures cannot conclusively be 
attributed to the consistent underestimation of the level of aid. Also, the negative flypaper 
effect for public safety cannot be attributed to fiscal illusion stemming from the 
overestimation of the level o f intergovernmental aid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
80
1970
Table 4.7
Fiscal Illusion Summary 
State Level
Direction of 
Flypaper Effect
Perception of 
Intergovernmental Aid
General Expenditures Positive Underestimation
Education Positive Perfect
Public Safety Positive Underestimation
Transportation Positive Underestimation
Environmental Positive Underestimation
Social Services Positive Underestimation
Direction of Perception of
1980 Flypaper Effect Intergovernmental Aid
General Expenditures Positive Perfect
Education Positive Underestimation
Public Safety Negative Perfect
Transportation Positive Underestimation
Environmental Positive Underestimation
Social Services Positive Perfect
Page 1
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These empirical results demonstrate that the median voter suffers from fiscal illusion 
at the state level and are consistent with the results found using county data. The notion of 
complete income illusion is rejected in favor of the notion o f partial grant illusion. We find 
that the median model explains general expenditure patterns better than specific spending 
patterns at the state level. This result is consistent with the conclusion by Turnbull and 
Djoundourian (1994) that the aggregated municipal expenditures correspond better to the 
median voter hypothesis than any of the single spending categories.
4.4 Fiscal Illusion Effects Across Levels of Government
Comparison of the size and significance of the key parameter estimates allows us to 
assess how fiscal illusion varies across levels of government for the provision of general 
services and specific services. Table 4.8 compares the estimates of the spending equations 
for county and state general expenditures in 1970 and 1980. It shows that the median voter 
suffers from fiscal illusion stemming from the underestimation of the level of 
intergovernmental aid at the county and state level. We find the income elasticity to be 
significant only at the county level in 1970 and 1980. The elasticity estimates at the state 
level are positive but not significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level. The 
relationship between intergovernmental aid and the level of general expenditures at the state 
and county level is positive and significant in both the 1970 and 1980 samples. This table 
also shows the aid estimates to be stable across the levels of government and across time.
The aid perception parameter (6) indicates that the median voter underestimates the 
level of aid received for general expenditures at both the state and county levels for 1970 
and 1980. The median voter perceives less of the intergovernmental aid at the county level
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Table 4.8
Fiscal Illusion Effects 
Across Level o f Government 
General Expenditure Results
1970 State County
Income (Al) 0.18 .238*
0.155 0.043
Population (A2) .247* .307*
0.076 0.031
Price Elasticity (A3) -.638* -.728*
0.086 0.034
Aid (A4) .570* .536*
0.077 0.024
Aid Perception .779* .643*
Theta 0.173 0.012
Flypaper effect Positive Positive
1980 State County
Income (Al) 0.218 .303*
0.152 0.053
Population (A2) 405* .187*
0.074 0.027
Price Elasticity (A3) -.473* -.831*
0.082 0.027
Aid (A4) .466* .589*
0.077 0.02
Aid Perception .426* .646*
Theta 0.215 0.05
Flypaper effect Positive Positive
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* =  Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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(64%) than at the state level (78%) in 1970. Interestingly, the 1980 sample yields the 
opposite result, with the median voter perceiving 65% of the aid at the county level and only 
42% at the state level. We cannot, however, reject the hypothesis that 0=1 using the 1980 
state level data. Further examination of Table 4.8 reveals that intergovernmental aid is more 
stimulative than income on the level of general expenditures at the county and state levels 
for 1970 and 1980. The positive flypaper effect observed in both levels of government and 
in both samples is consistent with 0 < 1, but these results do not exhibit a consistent pattern 
of changes in the estimates from the county to the state level.
Comparisons of the state and county estimates for the five services categories using 
the 1970 and 1980 samples are presented in Table 4.9. The 1970 results show that the 
median voter consistently underestimates the level of aid received at both the state and 
county level. The aid perception estimates are all significantly different from zero at the 
95% confidence level and are all less than one. This table also shows that the median voter 
perceives less intergovernmental aid at the state level than at the county level in all the 
service categories except education. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that the 
further the median voter is from the decisions concerning expenditures, the more imperfect 
the information. We also observe a positive flypaper effect at the state and county levels in 
1970. The reason that aid is more stimulative than income is explained by the consistent 
underestimation of the level of intergovernmental aid.
The 1980 results yield a different pattern concerning the perception of 
intergovernmental aid by the median voter. These results show the perception of 
intergovernmental aid by the median voter to be very stable across levels of government in
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Table 4.9
Comparison of Fiscal Illusion Effects 
Across Level of Government
Service Category Resutls
Aid Percption Flypaper Effect
1970
State County State County
Education .730* .602* Positive Positive
Transportation .397* .774* Positive Positive
Public Safety .322* .788* Positive Positive
Social Services .594* .996* Positive Positive
Environmental .444* .833* Positive Positive
1980 State County State County
Education .645* .646* Positive Positive
Transportation .723* .764* Positive Positive
Public Safety .595* .794* Negative Positive
Social Services .441* .447* Positive Positive
Environmental .865* .872* Positive Positive
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all the services categories except public safety. For public safety, the median voter perceives 
less o f the aid at the state level (60%) than at the county level (79%); a result consistent 
with the 1970 results. We also observe aid to be more stimulative than income on the level 
of specific services at the county and state level, with the exception of state level public 
safety expenditures. Unlike the results using the 1970 sample, we do find some uniformity 
between the state and county estimates using the 1980 sample.
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Chapter Five 
Fiscal Complexity and Fiscal Dlusion
This chapter focuses on the issue of fiscal complexity as a possible source of fiscal 
illusion. We assume that voter imperfect information arises from the complicated structures 
of the government fiscal decision-making process [Wagner (1976), Winer (1983), Logan 
(1986), Oates(1979)]. To test this hypothesis, we employ Goldfeld and Quandt's (1973) 
switching regression technique to partition the sample by degree of fiscal complexity and 
then compare the size and significance of the fiscal illusion parameter estimates for both 
county and state general and specific service expenditures. Using two measures of fiscal 
complexity, we find strong evidence that the source of the fiscal illusion which stems from 
intergovernmental aid misperceptions by the median voter is positively related to the degree 
of budgetary complexity.
5.1 Fiscal Complexity as a Source o f Fiscal Illusion
Wagner (1976) provides a conceptual and empirical exploration of one aspect of the 
theory of fiscal illusion. Fiscal illusion arises because the institutional manner in which 
citizens are required to pay for government can affect taxpayer perceptions o f the price of 
government, thereby affecting the size of the public sector. Wagner (1976) focuses on how 
the differing degrees of complexity in the revenue structure affects the stock of taxpayer 
knowledge concerning tax prices of public goods.
86
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According to Wagner, there are three reasons why fiscal illusion has not played a 
significant role in the agenda of fiscal analysis. First, fiscal analysis had been predominantly 
normative and only when the analysis becomes positive does fiscal illusion becomes 
pertinent. Second, fiscal illusion had been widely interpreted as implying irrational 
individual behavior. Finally, fiscal illusion had been largely devoid o f empirical content.
The conceptual analysis about how consumers form a perception of tax price is a 
Kantian analysis in which perception entails the formation of a hypothesis about price. To 
form a hypothesis about the price of public output, a person must take primary sense data 
and create a pattern of interpretation. Thus, the ability of fiscal institutions to create fiscal 
illusion depends on the ability of these institutions to influence the hypothesis a person forms 
about the cost of government. The question is whether a particular revenue structure can 
affect this perception. A tax system is characterized as containing different Fiscal Extraction 
Devices (FEDs), and different tax structures can be conceptualized as differences in the 
placement of FEDs. Wagstaff (1965) has presented evidence that changes in the placement 
and operation of the FEDs can influence the hypothesis that a taxpayer will reach regarding 
price.
With only a single based revenue structure, the primary sense data is more easily 
attained by the consumers for it is concentrated. But in a complex fiscal structure, FEDs 
are numerous and accurate perceptions regarding price become more difficult. With a more 
complex revenue structure, there is increased temporal and spatial variation of the FEDs. 
Also, some FEDs may become less obtrusive. With this increased complexity of revenue 
structure, it becomes more costly for the taxpayer to inquire about the nature in which the
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FEDs make their extractions. Thus, the accuracy of a persons perception of the cost of 
government will vary inversely with the complexity of the revenue structure.
The budgetary consequences will depend on the change in the hypothesis formed 
regarding the price of the public output. If the increased complexity causes the shift in the 
direction of higher costs of government, then lower budgets would result. If the hypothesis 
is toward lower costs of government, then larger budgets would result. Wagner asserts that 
the high cost of incorporating sense data from a more complex revenue structure is 
increased by the lessened importance of accurate perceptions in collective choice. In sum, 
the value to a citizen of forming an accurate hypothesis is less in collective choice than in 
market choice. Thus an increased complexity in government revenue structure is likely to 
diminish a citizens hypothesized cost of government resulting in increased budgetary size.
Wagner tests whether or not the simplicity of revenue structure will lead to 
decreased public expenditure using a model for public expenditure for the SO largest 
American cities. The estimated linear equation uses current expenditures as the dependent 
variable with, income, intergovernmental revenue, percent of population below the poverty 
line, average wages, city population as a percent of SMSA population, population density, 
and simplicity of revenue structure as the independent variables. Wagner (1976) measures 
the simplicity of the revenue structure with a Herfindahl index of tax sources. He finds that 
increased simplicity or concentration in revenue structure is associated with a reduced level 
of public expenditure.
Wagner offers several interpretations of the empirical results. It might be the case 
that the larger the level of public expenditure, the more fragmented must revenue structures
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become in order to minimize the excess burden o f collection the given revenue. In order to 
use this implication, though, some assumptions about the actions of the public officials must 
be made. In this paper, no such examination is undertaken, rather the revenue structure is 
taken as given and the consequences are then examined. Munley and Greene (1978) re­
examine the empirical tests employed by Wagner (1976) and introduce the concept o f the 
degree of publicness in local public services into the model. Munley and Greene argue that 
Wagner's ad hoc model could have possibly left out some relevant independent variables 
from the estimating equation, resulting in biased estimates of coefficients and standard 
errors.
Munley and Greene (1978) also argue that omitting population as an independent 
variable in an equation explaining gross rather than per-capita expenditures constitutes a 
specification error. They re-examine Wagner's, taking into account the effects of population 
on the level of public expenditures, which they find to be negative and significant. What is 
particularly interesting is that, with the inclusion of population, they also find that the 
coefficient for revenue structure simplicity is no longer significant, although is does retain 
its negative sign.
Munley and Greene (1978) conclude that Wagner's fiscal illusion results may not be 
as strong as earlier thought, and that further empirical investigation should take aim to 
correctly specify the expenditure equation. However, Munley and Greene too merely add 
terms to the expenditure equation without trying to figure out how to structurally model the 
effects of revenue structure on the demand for public goods (Gramlich and Rubinfeld,
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1982). These studies do not address the question of if the complexity of the revenue 
structure enters the taxpayer's utility function or the budget constraint.
In the body of his paper, Wagner (1976) takes the revenue structure as given, but 
in the conclusion, he does address the question of why revenue structures are the way they 
are. Differences in the revenue structure may be based on the actions of the public officials. 
The budget maximization hypothesis implies that public officials are self-interested, implying 
that increased fiscal illusion by the government will increase their utilities. The burden 
minimization hypothesis implies that public officials are benevolent, thus implying a more 
concentrated revenue structure.
Winer (1983) and Wagner (1976) suggest that fiscal illusion by the voter stems from 
the imperfect information that arises from public sector fiscal complexity which arises from 
the separation of taxing and spending functions. In contrast, Logan (1986) argues that the 
source of this illusion arises from the distribution of aid from the higher levels of 
government.
Turnbull (1992, 1993, 1996) states that the typical approach to modeling fiscal 
illusion is that the imperfect information is modeled as a non-stochastic wedge between 
average and marginal tax prices. Such a method of modeling imperfect information in a 
certainty framework implies a violation of the rationality implied by the utility maximization 
(Logan 1986). Turnbull (1992, 1993, 1996) uses the theory of demand under uncertainty 
to model imperfect information, thus no longer violating the rationality assumption. Within 
this framework, fiscal illusion represents the level of uncertainty facing the voters; different 
degrees of fiscal illusion can be thought of as differences in not only the mean but the
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variances of the perceived distribution of possible outcomes. Also, he finds that the ability 
of the bureaucrats and politicians to exploit the imperfect information is limited by the 
offsetting risk effects of fiscal illusion on voter demand.
An important outcome of this line of literature is the creation of a measure of fiscal 
complexity, the tax concentration and the expenditure concentration term. The tax 
concentration measurement is used by Wagner (1976) as a measure of the complexity of the 
revenue side of the budget. The expenditure concentration measurement is used by Turnbull 
(1993) and Turnbull and Djoundourian (1994) to capture the complexity on the spending 
side of the budget. The contribution of these works is the ability to examine two types of 
fiscal complexity which may influence voter perceptions. This implies that the taxpayer- 
voter is not only unsure about how much he is paying, but what he is receiving as well 
(Turnbull 1996). These concentration terms also provide another way of empirically testing 
the hypothesis that fiscal illusion is a function of budget complexity.
5.2 Measuring Fiscal Complexity
Governments raising revenues from one source with expenditures primarily on one 
category of services exhibits the simplest fiscal structure. These governments more closely 
resemble the 'single-tax-single service1 model. In these governments we expect voters to 
obtain information regarding marginal tax prices with less uncertainty. Governments with 
more sources of revenues and a wider array of services exhibit a more complex fiscal 
structure. In this environment, we expect voters to have a more difficult time obtaining 
more perfect information concerning marginal tax prices.
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Budgetary or fiscal complexity is measured using two indexes, TAXCON and 
EXPCON, which are defined as Herfindahl indexes reflecting the concentration of own 
revenues raised by the government and the concentration of general expenditures as 
allocated to different service categories in the budget. The definitions of these indexes for 
county governments is:
(5.1) TAXCON = ( Pr°Per*  Tax )2 + ( Other Tax )2 + ( Charges )2
Own Revetmes Own Revenues Own Revenues
EXPCON - (Education Expenditurey + ^Transportation Expenditure y  +  ^Public Safety Expenditure ^  
General Expenditures General Expenditures General Expenditures
S^ocial Service Expenditurey  + E^nvironmental Expenditurey  
General Expenditures General Expenditures
The definition of EXPCON (5.2) is the same definition used in the state government 
analysis. The TAXCON term for state governments varies slightly from (5.1) and is defined 
as
TAXCON ~ ( Pr°Per{y  y  + ^General Sales Taxy  
Own Revenues Own Revenues
(5.3)
/ Selective Sales Tax.2 , Income + Other Taxs2+ (--------------------------- y  + (----------------------------- y
Own Revenues Own Revenues
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If fiscal illusion arises from voter uncertainty and voter uncertainty rises with government 
budgetary complexity, then the degree of fiscal illusion declines with greater TAXCON and 
EXPCON values.
In order to test the hypothesis that fiscal illusion is a function of fiscal complexity, 
the samples are sorted by TAXCON and EXPCON index values. Goldfeld and Quandt's 
(1973) switching regression technique is employed to find the optimal partition of the low 
and high TAXCON and EXPCON sub-samples. This technique allows us to examine if the 
key parameter estimates vary across the 'simple' (high) and 'complex' (low) budgetary 
regimes. We then estimate the appropriate state and county expenditure functions for each 
of the sub-samples, using the size and significance of the aid perception parameters across 
the sub-samples to analyze how fiscal complexity affects these key estimates.
5.3 County General Expenditure Results
The non-linear least squares estimates of (3.26) for the partitioned samples using 
1970 county general expenditures are presented in Table 5.1. The estimates for the simple 
and complex sub-samples using the tax complexity measure appear in the first two columns 
and the estimates for the simple and complex sub-samples using the expenditure complexity 
measure are presented in the last two columns of the table. In both dimensions of fiscal 
complexity, there is an optimal partition between the simple and complex regimes. The 
sample partitions and the corresponding F-statistic for the structural change between the 
two regimes are reported in the last row of the table. The switching regression results find 
the aid perceived by the median voter to be significantly influenced by the complexity of the 
budgetary process.
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Table 5.1
Fiscal Complexity Results 
County General Expenditures 
1970
Tax Concentration Expenditure Concentration
Simple Complex Simple Complex
Constant (Al) -3.912* -274 BH -4.694* -.678
0.S26 0.381 Hitt 0.662 0.387
Income (A2) .546* 0.086 jig .634* .093*
0.067 0.034 ■11 0.083 0.044
Population (A3) .217* .308* ||Jj| .214* .334*
0.034 0.08 IB 0.036 0.037
Price Elasticity (A3) -.788* -.741* PPM -.766* -.721*
0.036 0.089 l|ipil| 0.06 0.042
Aid (A4) .596* .533* w B k  .599* .504*
0.026 0.062 H 0.044 0.027
Aid Perception .889* .793* 11111 .762* .297*
0.103 0.090 BBSS 0.219 0.033liiii
SSE 5.524 2.532 SB 4.568 3.371
Log-likelihood Value 187.657 62.286 liii 107.944 150.956111
Ho: Theta = 1 j|j|
Chi-Square Statistic 1.148 5.178 lllll 1.174 160.440liii
Partition 125,437 1,125 iSBiB 224,437 1,223
F-statistic 38.709 i l l 50.624
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
*  =  Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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Table 5.1 shows that the degree of fiscal complexity has little influence on the 
relationship between intergovernmental aid and the level of county general expenditures in 
1970. The aid elasticity (A4) in the simple and complex tax and spending samples are 
positive and significantly different from zero. These estimates are stable across all the 
samples and range from .504 to .599. Further examination of this table reveals that the price 
elasticity estimates do not vary much with the degree of fiscal complexity. These estimates 
are significant and stable across the different samples with estimates ranging from -.721 to 
-.788. However, the relationship between the median voter’s income and the level of county 
general expenditures does seem to be affected by the complexity of the budget; note the 
unstable estimates between the simple and complex samples. In the simple tax and simple 
spending samples, the estimates of the income elasticity are positive and significant and 
conform to values usually reported in the local public spending literature. In the complex 
tax sample the income elasticity of .086 is not significantly different from zero at the 95% 
confidence level. In the complex spending sample the income elasticity estimate is .093 but 
is significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level.
Analysis of the aid perception parameter allows us to assess how the complexity of 
the budget affects the median voter's perception o f the marginal tax price of county general 
expenditures. The aid perception by the median voter in the simple tax sample is .88, which 
is significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level. However, the hypothesis 
that the median voter has perfect aid information ( 0 = 1 )  cannot be rejected at the 95% 
confidence level with a chi-square statistic of 1.148. In contrast, under the complex tax 
structure the aid perception is .779. This estimate is significantly different from zero at the
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95% confidence level and the hypothesis that 0 = 1 is rejected at the 95% confidence level 
with a chi-square statistic of 5.178. This indicates an underestimation of the true marginal 
tax price of county general expenditures in 1970 caused by an underestimation of the level 
of aid received. These results demonstrate that fiscal illusion is absent at lower levels of 
budgetary complexity, but arises at the higher level of budgetary complexity, as measured 
by the concentration of taxes.
The parameter estimates from the simple and complex spending samples also 
support the theory of budgetary complexity as a source of fiscal illusion. The aid perception 
parameter in the simple spending sample shows that the estimate of .762 is significantly 
different from zero but not significantly different from one at the 95% confidence level. The 
aid perception parameter estimate is .297 in the complex spending sample. This estimate 
is significantly different from zero and the hypothesis that 0 = 1 is rejected at the 95% 
confidence level with a chi-square statistic of 160.4. We observe a very strong 
underestimation of the level of aid (29%) in the complex spending sample and find no 
significant evidence of underestimation in the simple spending sample. Thus we conclude 
that fiscal complexity, measured by tax or spending complexity, is the source of fiscal 
illusion stemming from the underestimation of aid receipts by the median voter.
The non-linear least squares estimates of (3.26) for the partitioned samples using 
1980 county general expenditures are presented in Table 5.2. An optimal partition between 
the simple and complex regimes is found in both dimensions of fiscal complexity. The 
sample partitions and the corresponding F-statistics testing for the structural change 
between the two regimes are reported in the last row of Table 5.2. The switching regression
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Table 5.2
Fiscal Complexity Results 
County General Expenditures 
1980
Tax Concentration Expenditure Concentration
Simple Complex Simple Complex
Constant (Al) -.550 -1.204 -1.824* -1.929*
0.6S8 0.626 f t . 0.664 0.546
Income (A2) .197* .307* f i f f e .412* .294*
0.083 0.072 0.078 0.066
Population (A3) .213* .165* ss t s  s s 0.035 .305*
0.047 0.032
W.*■* s v 0.043 0.035
Price Elasticity (A3) -.829* -.840* -.994* -.694*
0.047 0.031 0.043 0.035
Aid (A4) .577* .584* .725* .497*
0.035 0.026 M W X -y Jw w / 0.033 0.027
Aid Perception .983* .655* W&H'- .782* .634*
0.088 0.095
> .
0.13 0.103
r'-f/fv?
SSE 2.251 4.001 2.155 3.982
Log-likelihood Value 98.574 209.561 116.325 195.68
Ho: Theta = 1 
Chi-Square Statistic 0.033 13.001
I.**.-., ;5- 
v 2.806 12.384
Partition
F-statistic
291,437
37.589
1,290 <WmB 279,437 45.329
1,278
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* =  Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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results find the aid perceived by the median voter to be significantly influenced by the 
complexity of the budgetary process.
Table 5.2 shows that the degree of tax complexity has little influence on the 
relationship between intergovernmental aid and the level of county general expenditures in 
1980. The aid elasticity (A4) in the simple and complex tax and spending samples are 
positive and significantly different from zero. These estimates are stable across both samples 
and are similar to those found using the 1970 sample. The aid elasticity in the simple and 
complex spending samples do not exhibit the stability seen in the tax complexity samples. 
The aid elasticity estimates are positive and significant, but we find the relationship between 
intergovernmental aid and county general expenditures to be stronger in the simple spending 
sample. This table also reveals that the price elasticity estimates do no vary with the degree 
of fiscal complexity. The relationship between the median voter’s income and the level of 
county general expenditures in 1980 does not seem to be affected by the complexity of the 
budget, given the more stable estimates between the simple and complex samples. In the 
simple tax and simple spending samples, the estimates of the income elasticity are slightly 
higher than in the complex tax and spending samples.
Analysis of the aid perception parameter allows us to assess how the complexity of 
the budget affects the median voter's perception of the marginal tax price of county general 
services. In the simple tax sample we find the aid perception by the median voter is .983, 
which is significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level. However, the 
hypothesis that the median voter has perfect aid information ( 0 =1 )  cannot be rejected at the 
95% confidence level with a chi-square statistic of .033. Under the complex tax structure
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the aid perception is .655. This estimate is significantly different from zero at the 95% 
confidence level and the hypothesis that 0 = 1 is rejected at the 95% confidence level with 
a chi-square statistic of 13.001. This indicates there is an underestimation the true marginal 
tax price of county general expenditures in 1980 caused by an underestimation of the level 
of aid received. The aid perception parameter in the simple spending sample of .782 is 
significantly different from zero but not significantly different from one at the 95% 
confidence level. In the complex spending sample the aid perception parameter estimate is 
.634. This estimate is significantly different from zero and the hypothesis that 0 = 1 is 
rejected at the 95% confidence level with a chi-square statistic of 12.384.
The 1980 data shows the median voter underestimates the level of aid received in 
complex tax or spending regimes. This underestimation of aid causes the underestimation 
of the true marginal tax price of county general services. We find no evidence of fiscal 
illusion by the median voter in the simple tax or spending regimes. These results are 
consistent with the theory that the source of the fiscal illusion by the median voter arises 
from the complexity of the budgetary process.
5.4 County Service Category Results
Table 5.3 provides a summary of the aid perception parameter estimates from the 
estimation of (3.26) for the partitioned samples using 1970 county specific service category 
expenditures. A complete set of parameter estimates from the service category estimation 
is presented in Appendix Four. These results demonstrate a consistent pattern of 
underestimation of the level of aid by the median voter in complex budgetary regimes and 
little or no evidence of fiscal illusion in the simple budgetary regimes. In the simple tax
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Table 5.3
Aid Perception Estimates 
County Service Categories 
1970
Tax Concentration Expenditure Concentration
Service Category Simple Complex Simple Complex
Education .818* .609* .925* .605*
0 . 2 1 0 0 . 1 1 2 0 . 1 5 1 0 . 1 2 6
Ho: Theta = I 
Chi Square Statistic 0.748 11.967
w  V /
- V-C
0.24 9.678
Public Safety .525* .554* - s - .611* .454*
0 . 4 2 0 . 0 S 7 0 . 1 1 6 0 . 0 3
Ho: Theta = 1 
Chi Square Statistic 122.214 60.676
i i§ n
11.172 318.199
Transportation .968* .608* •<S .770* .722*
0 . 1 0 4 0 . 1 3 1
: c w w > : w :
0 . 2 4 0 . 0 5 2
Ho: Theta = I 
Chi Square Statistic 0.092 8.812 Mm 0.911 27.505
Social Services .934* .689* .887* .628*
0 . 0 9 7 0 . 0 3 7
s. V  v .
0 . 0 7 7 0 . 0 4 5
Ho: Theta = 1 
Chi Square Statistic 0.703 68.446
*  5 N )
*  s .9 . t 2.085 67.479
Environmental .741* .510* ’.v^jv.syA'i;.: .881* .704*
0 . 0 7 8 0 . 0 8 7
v A w v w y
WAVSMfliJi'
0 . 1 6 0 . 0 6 7
Ho: Theta = I 
Chi Square Statistic 10.751 35.886 0.55 19.949
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
*  =  Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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sample we reject the hypothesis that the median voter underestimates the level of aid in three 
of the service categories; education, transportation and social services. In the complex tax 
sample, the estimates show the median voter underestimates the level of aid for all five 
service categories. The estimates are significantly different from zero and are very stable 
across the categories. The hypothesis that 0 = 1 is rejected at the 95% confidence level for 
all five categories in the complex tax sample.
We do observe fiscal illusion concerning environmental expenditures in the simple 
tax sample, however, the estimates show the degree of fiscal illusion is greater in the 
complex tax sample (51% of the aid perceived) than in the simple tax sample (74% of the 
aid perceived). Public safety is the only spending category which does not demonstrate a 
higher degree of fiscal illusion in the complex tax sample.
In the simple spending sample we reject the hypothesis that the median voter 
underestimates the level of aid in all the service categories except public safety. In the 
complex tax sample, the estimates show the median voter underestimates the level of aid in 
all five service categories. The hypothesis that 0 = 1 is rejected at the 95% confidence level 
for all five categories in the complex tax sample. The service category results from 1970 
confirm the general expenditure conclusions that fiscal illusion arises from the complexity 
of the budgetary process.
Table 5.4 summarizes the aid perception parameter estimates from the estimation of 
(3.26) for the partitioned samples using 1980 county specific service category expenditures. 
The results also provide strong evidence of budgetary complexity as the source of fiscal 
illusion by the median voter. In the simple tax sample the aid perception
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Table 5.4
Aid Perception Estimates 
County Service Categories 
1980
Tax Concentration Expenditure Concentration
Service Category Simple Complex Simple Complex
Education .981* .277* ‘ • • • j 's . . - ; . .901* .650*
0 . 1 3 1 0 . 0 9 3 0 . 0 7 4 0 . 1 3 2
Ho: Theta = 1 
Chi Square Statistic 0.02 97.585 N S ~ ' ,> , 1.753 6.932
Public Safety .962* .435* .950* .426*
0 . 0 5 5 0 . 0 2 7
•l-Xvlssv.ssv.
:• • 0 . 0 7 4 0 . 0 6 3
Ho: Theta = 1 
Chi Square Statistic 0.451 432.37 0.432 87.755
Transportation .951* .621* .•Ivsv.w.'.v.v .909*
*r*">00un
0 . 1 1 8 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 8 6 0 . 1 0 3
Ho: Theta = I 
Chi Square Statistic 0.168 38.864
k V *  •v
1.098 16.155
Social Services .700* .716* .897* .625*
0 . 0 6 1 0 . 0 3 8 0 . 0 4 6 0 . 0 5 5
Ho: Theta = 1 
Chi Square Statistic 23.421 55.083 : 4.774 46.37
Environmental .875* .590* .754* .427*
0 . 0 8 9 0 . 0 8 5
ViW AVAW A
.. 0 . 1 4 2 0 . 0 7 3
Ho: Theta = 1 
Chi.Square Statistic 1.941 22.891
tip ' =: 
- 2.966 60.598
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* =  Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
103
parameter is not significantly different from one in all categories except social services. This 
implies that the median voter does not underestimate the level of aid receipts. In the 
complex tax sample, the estimates of the aid perception are significantly different from zero 
and from one at the 95% confidence level; the median voter underestimates the level of aid 
in the complex regime, which leads to the underestimation of the marginal tax price of these 
services. The conclusions regarding budgetary complexity as the source of the 
underestimation of aid levels are the same using the expenditure dimension of budgetaiy 
complexity. The hypothesis that 0 = I cannot be rejected for all the service categories in the 
simple spending sample except social services. In the complex spending sample, the 
estimates of 0 are significantly different from zero and one at the 95% confidence level for 
all five service categories.
The patterns exhibited by the service category estimates conform with those observed 
in the general expenditure case for 1970 and 1980. These results provide strong evidence 
that the source of the intergovernmental aid misperceptions stem from the complexity of the 
budgetary process at the county level. Using two popular measures of fiscal complexity, we 
find the median voter consistently underestimates the level of aid in the more complex 
budgetary regimes, and strong evidence of perfect aid information in the more simple 
regimes.
5.5 State General Expenditure Results
The nonlinear least squares estimates of (4.1) for the partitioned samples using the 
1970 state general expenditures are presented in Table 5.5. An optimal partition between
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Table 5.5
Fiscal Complexity Results 
State General Expenditures 
1970
Tax Concentration Expenditure Concentration
Simple Complex Simple Complex
Constant (Al) -.543 -.943 f c 0.095 0.098
1 . 5 6 8 2 . 3 6 1 Wii 1 . 6 1 8 1 . 5 5 3
Income (A2) 0.263 0.239 ■* 0.067 0.184
0 . 1 7 2 0 . 2 6 9 0 . 1 8 0 . 1 7 4
Population (A3) 0.132 .383* .303* 0.19
0 . 1 0 4 0 . 0 9 1 0 . 0 9 9 0 . 0 9 9
Price Elasticity (A3) -.165* -.440* « < « « « : -645* -.654*
0 . 1 1 8 0 . 1 0 5 0 . 1 1 8 0 . 1 1
Aid (A4) .660* .380* - .544* .604*
0 . 1 0 0 0 . 1 0 5 0 . 1 1 0 . 1 0 2
Aid Perception 1.108* .632* .914* .256*
0 . 2 2 7 0 . 1 9 0 . 1 0 6 0 . 1 0 6
South (A5) 0.051 .263* : 5^ ' .122* 0.137
0 . 0 5 2 0 . 0 7 1 ■ . S U M 0 . 0 6 9 0 . 0 9 8
West (A6) 0.07 0.018 0.083 -.059
0 . 0 5 8 0 . 0 6 5 C l ' 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 9 3
North (A7) .110* -.005 .204* 0.042
0 . 0 5 4 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 4 6 0 . 0 9 8
X s ^ s v
SSE 0.22 0.075 ; 0.107 0.114
Log-likelihood Value 29.614 25.612 38.175 23.233
Ho: Theta = 1 
Chi-Square Statistic 0.006 3.727 0.65 48.767
i sXvss
Partition
F-statistic
20.48  
17.098
1 .19 21.48
29.461
1.20
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* =  Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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the simple and complex budgetary regime is found for both measures of fiscal complexity. 
The sample partitions and the corresponding F-statistic testing for structural change is 
reported in the last row of the table. The estimates in Table 5.5 exhibit a pattern similar to 
the 1970 county general expenditure results. We find that the level of intergovernmental aid 
for state general expenditures is significantly influenced by budgetary complexity
The income elasticities in all four samples are positive but not significantly different 
from zero at the 95% confidence level. The aid elasticity estimates are positive and 
significant and appear relatively stable across the samples. The price elasticity estimates 
exhibit the same pattern of stability across the samples, just like in the case of county general 
expenditures. The aid and price elasticity estimates are slightly lower in the complex tax 
sample.
Analysis of the aid perception parameter allows us to assess how fiscal complexity 
affects fiscal illusion. In the simple tax sample, the estimate of the perceived level of aid is 
1.108. This estimate is significantly different from zero but the hypothesis that 0 = 1 is not 
rejected at the 95% confidence level with an F-statistic of .006. In the complex tax sample 
we find that the estimate of .632 for 0 is significantly different from zero and one. This 
indicates the degree of tax complexity influences the flow of perfect information concerning 
intergovernmental aid to the median voter. Evidence of this relationship is stronger when 
analyzed from the spending concentration dimension of budgetary complexity. In the simple 
spending sample the hypothesis that the aid perception estimate of .914 is significantly 
different from one cannot be rejected at the 95% confidence level. The estimate of .256 in 
the complex spending sample is significantly different from zero and one. This means that
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in complex expenditure regimes, the median voter perceives only 25% of the 
intergovernmental aid for state general expenditures. The results of the analysis based on 
the expenditure concentration measure of budgetary complexity for the 1970 state data is 
almost identical to those reported in the 1970 county sample. This evidence supports the 
notion that fiscal complexity is the source of fiscal illusion.
Table 5.6 presents the estimates of (4.1) for the partitioned samples using 1980 state 
general expenditures. The optimal sample partitions and the corresponding F-statistics are 
reported on the last row of the table. The switching regression results indicate the median 
voter's perception of intergovernmental aid is highly influenced by the complexity of the 
budget. The estimates reveal the median voter is totally unaware of aid receipts concerning 
state general expenditures.
Table 5.6 shows that the degree of tax complexity severely influences the income 
elasticity estimates. The income elasticity is negative and significant (-1.062) in the simple 
tax sample and positive (.274) and not significantly different from zero in the complex tax 
sample. The significant income elasticity estimate of .535 in the simple spending sample is 
more consistent with previously reported income elasticities using state data. The price 
elasticity estimates in the 1980 sample are lower than the estimates using the 1970 state 
sample. The price elasticity in the simple tax sample does not conform with previously 
reported estimates and implies that state general expenditures are price elastic. This same 
unusual pattern is seen in the aid elasticity estimates. In the simple tax sample, the aid 
elasticity estimate of 1.177 is significantly different than zero and does not conform with the 
estimates reported in the other samples. This unusual pattern of instability in the estimates
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Table 5.6
Fiscal Complexity Results 
State General Expenditures 
1980
Tax Concentration Expenditure Concentration
Simple Complex Simple Complex
Constant (A1) 15.094* -2.236 1 i -4.185* 2.583
4 . 7 7 8 1 . 4 1 9 S-SMS® ' V i . 1 . 5 7 9 2 . 4 0 8
Income (A2) -1.062* 0.274 t f ' r V  f f f .535* -.259
0 . 4 2 6 0 . 1 5 1 s 0 . 1 7 0 . 2 4 4
Population (A3) -.394 .435* .440* .462*
0 . 2 8 4 0 . 0 6 9 0 . 0 6 9 0 . 1 2 4
Price Elasticity (A3) -1.342* -.439* -.432* -.443*
0 . 2 9 8 0 . 0 8 3
$  e %
0 . 0 7 2 0 . 1 3 2
Aid (A4) 1.177* .438* v 5 v “ A . ' .420* .464*
0 . 2 7 1 0 . 0 7 9 ' .tS ? ' . .  \ 0 . 0 6 9 0 . 1 2 2
Aid Perception .939* 0.445
*  ■> 
w l'm & fx r.w iv .  
& .970* 0.697
0 . 2 4 0 . 3 0 5 *  V 0 . 2 4 8 0 . 5 1
South (A5) 0.096 0.122* .178* 0.181
0 . 1 0 . 0 4 3 '$ \" X 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 9 4
West (A6) -.176 .117* -.046 1 *o V\
0 . 1 0 5 0 . 0 4 5
•5 vk s v.
0 . 0 3 4 0 . 0 9 3
North (A7) -.167 0.071 1 - .146* -.034
. 1 0 8 0 . 0 4 6 0 . 0 3 6 0 . 1 0 7
SSE 0.003 0.253 0 . 1 1 0.156
Log-likelihood Value 13.473 41.24 43.429 15.717
S  S ’#
Ho: Theta = 1 
Chi-Square Statistic 0.063 3.926 0.013 0.351
'S7T"
Partition
F-statistic
39, 48
20.672
1,38
WiMAsWM*. 18, 48
29.494
1, 17
Standard Errors are reported henealh the estimates 
* ~ Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
leads us to question the reliability of the results from the tax complexity dimension of this 
analysis. However, there is little evidence suggesting the results from the expenditure 
dimension of this analysis are unreliable.
Analysis of the aid perception estimates indicate the median voter is confronted with 
complete fiscal illusion at the state level. The estimate for 0 of .939 in the simple tax sample 
is not significantly different from zero and the hypothesis of perfect aid information cannot 
be rejected at the 95% confidence level. In the complex tax sample the 0 estimate o f .445 
is significantly different from one, but we cannot reject the hypothesis that 0 is significantly 
different from zero. The same results are observed in the expenditure dimension of this 
analysis. In the simple spending sample the estimate for 0 of .970 is significantly different 
from zero but not significantly different than one at the 95% confidence level. In the 
complex spending sample we find the estimate of .697 is not significantly different than one 
and not significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level. Although these results 
are not as stable as the 1970 results, they do suggest an increase in fiscal illusion. This result 
supports the hypothesis that the further the median voter is from the decision-making 
process, the more imperfect the voter's budgetary information.
The empirical results from the 1970 and 1980 state general expenditure samples 
provide strong evidence the median voter suffers from fiscal illusion. The source of the 
illusion stems from imperfect information about aid receipts. We find evidence that the 
source of the imperfect information stems from the complexity of the budgetary process. 
Using two measures of fiscal complexity, we find the median voter does not suffer from 
fiscal illusion in simple budgetary regimes, and find strong evidence of aid misperceptions
with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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in complex regimes. These results support the findings of the county general expenditure 
analysis regarding the relationship between fiscal complexity and fiscal illusion.
5.6 State Service Category Results
A summary of the aid perception parameter estimates for the 1970 and 1980 specific 
state service functions is presented in Tables 5.7 and 5.8, respectively. The remainder of the 
parameter estimates from the estimation of (4.1) for the state service categories are 
presented in Appendix Four. These estimates are consistent with the conclusions drawn 
from the general expenditure results and show that the source of the aid misperceptions 
which lead to tax price misperceptions by the median voter stem from the complexity of the 
budgetary process. Using both measures of fiscal complexity, we find the median voter 
underestimates the level of aid in complex regimes and cannot reject the hypothesis of 
perfect aid information in the simple regimes.
In the simple tax sample in Table 5.7, we reject the hypothesis that the median voter 
underestimates the level of intergovernmental aid for all five service categories. In the 
complex tax sample, the hypothesis that 0=1 cannot be rejected at the 95% confidence level 
in any of the five spending categories. The estimates of the perceived aid levels are 
significantly different from zero and are all less than one in the complex tax sample. This 
implies the median voter underestimates the level of intergovernmental aid. These results 
show the source of the fiscal illusion lies in the complexity of the budgetary process.
We observe this same pattern using the alternative definition of budgetary 
complexity. In the simple spending sample of Table 5.7, we cannot reject the hypothesis of 
perfect aid information in all the spending categories except public safety. In the complex
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Table 5.7
Aid Perception Estimates 
State Service Categories 
1970
Tax Concentration Expenditure Concentration
Service Category Simple Complex Simple Complex
Education .679* .521*
*iT\OO .415*
0 . 2 4 3 0 . 1 2 4
&&&&&ift
0 . 1 7 5 0 . 1 3 6
Ho: Theta = 1 
Chi Square Statistic 1.723 14.722
i s  ss's **
.svaVAS’.SSs-. 0.774 18.275
Public Safety .835* .354* -ySfc <u .476* .741*
0 . 1 0 2 0 . 1 1 9 wmm 0 . 0 3 6 0 . 2 4 9
Ho: Theta = I 
Chi Square Statistic 2.591 29.039 209.121 1.065
Transportation .946* .525* l i i i 1.005* 0.304
0 . 3 9 7 0 . 1 3 2 Wmm 0 . 2 1 0 . 1 0 7
Ho: Theta = 1 
Chi Square Statistic 0.018 12.765 0.0007 41.685
Social Services .992* .437* .728* .329*
0 . 2 5 9 0 . 1 9 3 M m 0 . 1 3 5 0 . 1 5 2
Ho: Theta = 1 
Chi Square Statistic 0.0007 8.486
mmmm
2.969 19.298
Environmental 1.010* .470* .866* .517*
0 . 2 3 6 0 . 1 6 7 0 . 1 4 0 . 1 2 7
Ho: Theta = 1 
Chi Square Statistic 0.001 10.024 0.907 14.403
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
*  -  Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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Table 5.8
Aid Perception Estimates 
State Service Categories 
1980
Tax Concentration Expenditure Concentration
Service Category Simple Complex Simple Complex
Education .892* .541* iM tl .485* .450*
0 . 3 1 1 0 . 1 7 1 0 . 2 9 7 0 . 1 6
Ho: Theta = I 
Chi Square Statistic 0.043 7.115 IM fi 2.98 11.749
Public Safety .743* .576* M i 1.115* .633*
0 . 2 0 2 0 . 2 0 8 0 . 1 6 4 0 . 2 2 7
Ho: Theta = I 
Chi Square Statistic 1.603 4.12
spSsiis
0.888 2.588
Transportation .946* .518* s * .814* .194*
0 . 3 4 4 0 . 2 3 2
vXj. ..V
0 . 2 8 7 0 . 0 5 3
Ho: Theta = 1 
Chi Square Statistic 0.024 4.299
isvlwivl'jy.*.
0.418 226.071
Social Services .904* .608* 00 o * .343*
0 . 2 7 9 0 . 1 2 7
s
0 . 1 7 1 0 . 1 1 3
Ho: Theta = 1 
Chi Square Statistic 0.116 9.334 1.291 33.353
Environmental .870* .673* .506* .905*
0 . 2 1 5 0 . 1 8 1 0 . 1 9 9 0 . 4 4 7
Ho: Theta = I 
Chi Square Statistic 0.362 3.232 v * v v 6.122 0.044
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* =  Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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spending sample, all the aid perception estimates are significantly different from zero and less 
than one. Additionally, we reject the hypothesis of perfect aid information for all categories 
except public safety. The unusual result observed for public safety however does not 
diminish the strong evidence of fiscal complexity as a source of fiscal illusion. The stability 
of the aid perception estimates in both complex samples provides strong evidence of the 
underestimation of aid by the median voter.
The aid perception estimates of the 1980 state service categories in Table 5 .8 also 
support the positive relationship between the degree o f fiscal complexity and the presence 
of fiscal illusion. The estimates of 0 in the simple tax sample are significantly different from 
zero but not significantly different from one at the 95% confidence level which implies no 
fiscal illusion. In the complex tax sample, the median voter consistently underestimates the 
level of intergovernmental aid. These stable estimates are very similar to the estimates 
reported in the 1970 complex tax sample.
The switching regression results for the state service categories in 1970 and 1980 
show the degree of fiscal complexity as the source of fiscal illusion by the median voter. The 
strong patterns exhibited in Tables 5.7 and 5.8 conform with the results observed in the state 
general expenditure analysis. Using two measures of fiscal complexity, we find that the 
median voter consistently underestimates the level of aid in the more complex budgetary 
regimes, and find evidence of perfect information in the simple budgetary regimes. These 
results support Wagner’s (1976) theory concerning the relationship between fiscal complexity 
and fiscal illusion.
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Chapter Six 
Inter-temporal Stability
This chapter evaluates the inter-temporal stability of the estimates by examining the 
trend in size and significance of the key parameter estimates from previous chapters, using 
pooled cross-sectional data from 1970 and 1980 to test the inter-temporal stability of the 
estimates at the county and state level. The tests reveal inter-temporal instability. 
Nonetheless, the key parameter estimates show no systematic growth or decline in fiscal 
illusion at the county or state level for either the provision of general or specific services.
6.1 County Inter-temporal Analysis
Table 6.1 presents the estimates of the pooled data from 1970 and 1980 county 
general expenditures. Using a chow test to test the hypothesis that there is no structural 
change in the estimates over time, the hypothesis is rejected at the 95% confidence level with 
an F-statistic of 196.018. Casual observation of the estimates between the two periods, 
however, reflects a stable relationship between the county general expenditure estimates for 
many of the key parameters.
Table 6.2 compares the 1970 and 1980 county general expenditure estimates. It 
shows that there was only a slight increase in the income elasticity estimate, from .536 in 
1970 to .589 in 1980. Comparison of the aid perception parameters between the two 
samples allows us to see if fiscal illusion increases or decreases over time. Table 6.2 shows 
that the estimates of the aid perception parameters are quite stable across time. Both are
113
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Table 6.1
Pooled Regression Results 
County General Expenditures
Constant (AO) -2.027*
0.339
Income (Al) .280*
0.039
Population (A2) .243*
0.019
Price Elasticity (A3) -.780*
0.019
Aid (A4) .611*
0.014
Aid Perception .496*
Theta 0.100
F-statistic for Chow Test 196.018
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* — C '^efficients that are significant at the 95% level
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Table 6.2
Inter-temporal Stability 
County General Expenditures
1970 1980
Constant (AO) -1.718* -1.444*
0.357 0.446
Income (Al) .238* .303*
0.043 0.053
Population (A2) .307* .187*
0.031 0.027
Price Elasticity (A3) -.728* -.831*
0.034 0.027
Aid (A4) .536* .589*
0.024 0.02
Aid Perception .643* .646*
Thela 0.012 0.05
Log Likelihood Value 233.5894 289.3410
SSE 8.7846 6.8062
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* -  Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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significant at the 95% confidence level and are less than one, indicating that the median voter 
perceives approximately 64% of the intergovernmental aid from higher level governments 
in each decade. The underestimation of the level of intergovernmental aid by the median 
voter regarding county general expenditures is consistent across time and yield additional 
support for this median voter model of county level fiscal behavior.
The chow tests for the pooled estimation of each of the county service categories 
also reveal a structural change overtime. A comparison of the 1970 and 1980 key parameter 
estimates for the county service categories is presented in Table 6.3; the pooled regression 
results for the service categories are presented in Appendix Five. This table shows 
increasing income elasticities over time for all five service categories between 1970 and 
1980. The most notable increases are seen in environmental and social service expenditures. 
The aid elasticities for county services between 1970 and 1980 appear stable. The aid 
elasticity estimates for transportation expenditures show the only significant decrease 
between the two decades with a decline from .950 to .669. Casual observation of these key 
parameter estimates finds a systematic increase in the relationship between the median voter’s 
income and county service expenditures and a stable relationship between the amount of 
intergovernmental aid and county service expenditures from 1970 to 1980.
Looking at the aid perception parameters, we observe remarkable stability in the 
estimates across time and across the spending categories of education, transportation, and 
public safety. These robust estimates reflect a consistent pattern of underestimation of 
intergovernmental aid by the median voter, with the level of aid perceived ranging from 60% 
to 79%. These perception estimates are similar to the estimates found in the general
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Table 6.3
Inter-temporal Stability 
County Service Categories
Income Elasticity Aid Elasticity Aid Perception
1970 1980 1970 1980 1970 1980
Education .327* .592* m .430*
■»»»«.
.589* illS
s
.602* .646*
Transportation .242* .403* .950* .669* ■f .774* .764*
Public Safety .188* .436* \  .544*
'  *■.
*00tn .788* .794*
Social Services .315* .802* .996*
,» ' i W
1.056*
✓ w ,  
v.v.wX*.
vt::$ifr£■>;v a w
.777* M l*
Environmental .317* .826* .833* .982* ¥  
•* V
.492* .872*
*  =  Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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expenditure analysis and exhibit the same consistent pattern. The degree of fiscal illusion 
increases over time for social service expenditures with the level of perceived aid falling from 
77% in 1970 to 44% in 1980. We see the opposite trend concerning environmental 
expenditures, for which the median voter perceives 49% of the aid in 1970 and 87% in 1980. 
Although we find no definitive pattern of growth or decline in fiscal illusion between 1970 
and 1980, the results still indicate that the median voter systematically underestimates the 
level of intergovernmental aid.
6.2 State Inter-temporal Analysis
Table 6.4 presents the estimates from the pooled state general expenditure sample 
for 1970 and 1980. Using a chow test to test the hypothesis that there is no structural 
change in the estimates over time, we reject the hypothesis that there is no structural change 
at the 95% confidence level, with an F-statistic o f25.868. Comparisons of the results from 
the two samples also support this conclusion.
Table 6.5 compares the 1970 and 1980 state general expenditure estimates to show 
that the income elasticity estimate remains statistically insignificant across both time periods. 
This result by itself appears to raise doubt about the strength of the median voter model for 
predicting state level behavior. The aid elasticities between the two time periods are quite 
stable with significant estimates of .570 for 1970 and .466 for 1980. The size and stability 
of the aid effects at the state level are very similar to the county general expenditure results 
in Table 6.2.
Comparison of the aid perception parameters between the two samples allows us to 
see if fiscal illusion increases or decreases over time. Table 6.5 shows a decrease in the level
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Table 6.4
Pooled Regression Results 
State General Expenditures
Constatn (AO) -1.932
1.106
Income (Al) .373*
. 0.114
Population (A2) .121*
0.027
Price Elasticity (A3) -.780*
0.028
Aid (A4) .730*
0.029
Aid Perception .122*
Theta 0.044
South (AS) .096*
0.033
West (A6) -.087*
0.033
North (A7) 0.036
0.034
F-statistic for Chow Test 25.868
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* ~ Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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Table 6.5
Inter-temporal Stability 
State General Expenditures
1970 1980
Constant (AO) -.339 -1.544
1.412 1.470
Income (Al) 0.18 0.218
0.155 0.152
Population (A2) .247* 405*
0.076 0.074
Price Elasticity (A3) -.638* -.473*
0.086 0.082
Aid (A4) .570* .466*
0.077 0.077
Aid Perception .779* .426*
Theta 0.173 0.215
South .096* .130*
0.042 0.042
West or -.059
0.051 0.042
North 0.07 0.062
0.046 0.044
Log Likelihood Value 46.6773 44.3996
SSE 0.4019 0.4419
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* -  Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
121
of intergovernmental aid perceived by the median voter. Both estimates are significant at the 
95% confidence level and are less than one. These estimates indicate the median voter 
perceives approximately 78% of the intergovernmental aid in 1970 and about 42% of the aid 
from higher level governments in 1980. Unlike the county sample, the state sample reflects 
an increase in fiscal illusion by the median voter from 1970 to 1980.
The chow tests for the pooled estimation of the state service categories also finds 
inter-temporal instability in the estimates. Table 6.6 provides a comparison between the 
1970 and 1980 key parameter estimates for the state service categories; the pooled 
regression results for the service categories are presented in Appendix Five. The income 
elasticities support the chow test conclusions of inter-temporal instability. The income 
elasticity estimate for 1980 public safety expenditures is the only estimate which is positive 
and significant. The negative and significant income elasticities for environmental 
expenditures is the only evidence of inter-temporal stability in the income elasticity estimates 
for the individual spending categories.
The aid elasticity estimates for state services do not exhibit the same pattern observed 
for the county service categories. The aid elasticities reflect inter-temporal stability between 
1970 and 1980 in only two categories, education and transportation. The aid elasticity 
estimates for social service expenditures decrease between the two decades with a fall from 
.860 to .514, while the aid elasticity estimates for environmental expenditures rise from .584 
to .819. Casual observation of these key parameter estimates finds no systematic increase 
or decrease in the relationship between the median voter's
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Table 6.6
Inter-temporal Stability 
State Service Category Expenditures
Income Elasticity Aid Elasticity Aid Perception
1970 1980 1970 1980 1970 1980
Education 0.052 -0.050 324*
V*s
.336* H I
m i
.730* 645*
Transportation 0.519 -.201* Y% .656* .520* .397* .723*
Public Safety 0.516 .456* J l!  0 1 4 7 -0.070 ^ .322* .595*
Social Services 0.442 -0.063 860*w ss' v'
•514* £
nda
.594* .441*
Environmental -1.048* -.961* <-/! oo * .819* .444* .865*
*  =  Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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income or the level of intergovernmental aid and state service expenditures from 1970 to 
1980.
Comparison of the aid perception parameters between the two samples for the state 
service categories allows us to see if fiscal illusion increases or decreases over time. We do 
not observe the same stability in the state estimates across time and category as we see in the 
county service category estimates. The degree of fiscal illusion increases over time for 
education and social service expenditures. The perceived level of aid falls from 73% in 1970 
to 64% in 1980 for education expenditures and falls from 59% in 1970 to 44% in 1980 for 
social services. We observe the opposite trend concerning environmental, public safety, and 
transportation expenditures. The perceived level of aid in all three of these services 
categories doubles from 1970 to 1980 which indicates a decrease in fiscal illusion, which is 
just the opposite of what we find for the state general expenditures. Although there is no 
systematic pattern of growth or decline in fiscal illusion between 1970 and 1980 for the state 
service categories, the results still indicate that the median voter underestimates the level of 
intergovernmental aid.
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion
This paper examines the nature of fiscal illusion, which is the notion that taxpayers 
misperceive the tie between public spending and the associated taxes, and its effect on local 
government spending. This study contributes to the recent literature concerned with 
empirically evaluating the strengths of the fiscal illusion effects, especially the strengths of 
the different channels of influence identified in the literature.
This dissertation provides both theoretical and empirical contributions to the growing 
body of literature on fiscal illusion. The theoretical contribution is a clarification of the 
parametric interdependence between price and income illusion. Traditional tax price, or 
grant illusion, stems from voter misperceptions about aid receipts and income illusion stems 
from the misperceptions of the taxes associated with aid. Holsey (1993) identifies grant and 
income illusion as independent and estimates local public demand equations derived from the 
Stone-Geary utility function. Taking her study as a point of departure, this dissertation 
shows that the two separate types of fiscal illusion are parametrically interdependent; the 
methodology employed by Holsey, therefore leads to inconsistent econometric estimates. 
It is shown that income illusion is actually tax price illusion. The empirical results show that 
the structural demand equations derived from the Stone-Geary Utility function which 
incorporates the relationship between grant and income illusion leads to fragile and unstable 
estimates.
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The theoretical innovation provides a new way of estimating local public demand 
equations without positing a specific utility function. The analysis of fiscal illusion can be 
examined outside the context of a well defined structural model and extended into a less 
restrictive model specification, like the reduced form approach taken in this study. This 
reduced form approach exploits the derived relationship between grant and income illusion 
to test for the presence of different types of fiscal illusion. The results from the reduced form 
approach demonstrate that fiscal illusion is felt primarily through the traditional grant channel 
rather than Holsey's depiction of income illusion.
The empirical contribution is the estimation of demand equations using a reduced 
form approach, the log-linear model. The regressions are conducted using disaggregate 
county and state data from 1970 and 1980. This data set allows us to address issues ignored 
in earlier fiscal illusion analysis. For example, how do fiscal illusion effects vary between 
higher and lower levels of government, and does the degree of fiscal illusion vary with 
respect to the provision of general versus specific categorical expenditures? We examine 
how degrees of fiscal illusion can affect the crucial parameter estimates of fiscal illusion and 
test Wagner’s (1976) hypothesis that the degree of fiscal complexity underlies taxpayer-voter 
fiscal illusion. This data set also provides the ability to test for inter-temporal stability of the 
estimates.
The empirical results from the estimation of the log linear model using the 
disaggregate county data from 1970 and 1980 show the median voter suffers from fiscal 
illusion. The source of this fiscal illusion stems from the voter's inability to perceive the full 
amount of intergovernmental aid. This misperception drives a wedge between the actual and
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perceived marginal tax price of public goods. The results also show an underestimation of 
the level of aid received by the local government as the source of the flypaper effect, which 
is the empirical phenomenon of intergovernmental aid being more stimulative than income 
on the level of public expenditures. Thus we conclude that the flypaper effect is a result of 
fiscal illusion by the median voter. We find no evidence of Holsey's notion of income illusion 
which stems from the overestimation of the level of intergovernmental aid.
Another interesting result of this empirical analysis is the consistent manner in which 
the median model explains categorical spending at the county level. Turnbull and 
Djoundourian (1994) show that the median model tends to explain general expenditure better 
than specific spending behavior at the municipal level. At the county level, we find the 
median model a strong tool in predicating the behavior of the county fisc, but at the state 
level we find the median model does not perform well in explaining state level categorical 
spending.
The state level analysis also shows the median voter is confronted with imperfect 
information about aid receipts which leads to misperceptions concerning the marginal tax 
price of state level general and categorical expenditures. We do not find a consistent pattern 
of changes in the fiscal illusion estimates from the county to the state level, however we do 
find strong evidence of fiscal illusion at both levels of government.
Using two measures of budgetary complexity, we find strong evidence that the 
source of fiscal illusion which stems from intergovernmental aid misperceptions is positively 
related to the degree of budgetary complexity. The county level estimates find the median 
voter suffers from fiscal illusion in complex budgetary regimes and finds no evidence of fiscal
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illusion in the simple budgetary regimes. The patterns exhibited by the county service 
category estimates conform with those observed in the general expenditure case in 1970 and 
1980. The regression results for the state general expenditure and service categories in 1970 
and 1980 also show the degree of fiscal complexity as the source of fiscal illusion by the 
median voter. These empirical results support Wagner's (1976) theory concerning the 
relationship between fiscal complexity and fiscal illusion.
The pooled regression results for both county and state general and categorical 
expenditures indicate inter-temporal instability in the estimates. Comparisons of the key 
parameter estimates also support the tests and show no systematic growth or decline in fiscal 
illusion at the county or state level for either the provision of general or specific services.
This dissertation shows that modeling local fiscal behavior under the assumption of 
perfect information is inappropriate and can lead to biased estimates. The evidence 
demonstrates that the median voter is confronted with imperfect aid information which leads 
to price distortions and, consequently, output effects. Thus, the output effects must be taken 
into account by policy makers when considering a system of unconditional block grants as 
a method of revenue sharing.
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Appendix One
Holsey (1993) uses a Stone-Geary framework and the median voter’s demand 
function is derived by maximizing the median voter's utility subject to a budget constraint 
which incorporates imperfect voter information about intergovernmental grants. The 
estimable demand equation allows for the estimation of local public demand and incorporates 
parameters that allow for the estimation of price illusion due to grant receipts and income 
illusion due to tax payments. The innovation here is that the estimable demand equation is 
derived from a structural rather than a reduced form equation. The Stone-Geary utility 
function has well-known properties and is a homothetic function which facilitates the 
aggregation of preferences.
Voter's perceptions are assumed to equal some proportion of actual amounts and are 
measured throughout the model by the o parameters. This assumption allows us to control 
for imperfect information that may arise from non-grant sources and imperfect knowledge 
concerning tax shares The parameter a does not measure the price and income illusion due 
directly to the intergovernmental grant system.
A Stone-Geary framework is employed and the median voter’s utility function can 
be stated as
( A l l )  U = P, ln(Y-T,)  + Pqln(q-Tq)
132
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where Y is the level of private goods, q is the voter's perceived level public goods. The P 
parameters measure the individual taste for each good, and the t's are interpreted as the 
voter's minimum subsistence level of each good [see Samuelson (1947)]. The voter's 
perceived level of public goods, q, is equal to some share, p,7, of the voters perceived level 
of the total quantity of public goods, oqQ. Thus,
(Al.2) q = p,oQQ
The median voter will maximize his or her utility subject to the following budget constraint: 
(A1.3) I = PyY + o,w l ttlTl  + osws7rsTs + oFwFTF
where Py is the price of private goods and I is the pre-tax income. The w's represent the 
voters actual marginal tax shares, where marginal tax shares are assumed to be equal to 
average tax shares; the it's represent the voter's actual net burden after taxes and the 
awarding of local tax credits when paying state and federal income taxes. TL represents the 
voter's perception of local tax collections, and Ts and TF equal the voter’s perception of total 
state and federal tax payments for grants. The o's represent the proportion of effective local, 
state, and federal tax shares known to the voter. oLwLnLTL is the voters perceived level of 
local tax payments, osws7tsTs is the perceived level of state tax payments for
7 If Hi =1. this implies that education is a pure public good, and p, = 1/N. then education is a pure 
private good: where N is equal to the local population.
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intergovernmental grants, and ofwftcfTf is the perceived level of federal tax payments for 
intergovernmental grants.
Local tax collections are then separated into its individual components.*
(A 1.4) TL = (1 -as - aF) (JpPQa0Q - 0SLS - 0fLf
where (l-as- c^) OpPQ is the perceived price of education, 05 L. is the perceived state to local 
lump-sum grant amounts, and 0FLp is the perceived federal to local lump sum grant amounts. 
The a's estimate the proportionate reduction in price due to price illusion. Voter knowledge 
of state to local grants is estimated by 0S, and voter knowledge of federal to local grants is 
estimated by 0F. If the 0 parameter is equal to 1, then this implies that the voter has perfect 
knowledge of the grant. Holsey's analysis states that when 0 is equal to 0, the voter is totally 
unaware of the grant, and a value between 0 and 1 implies that the voter has imperfect 
information of grant amounts. The unknown aid, (1-0S)LS and (1-0F)LF, is assumed to be 
spent on the public good. Mathematically this relationship can be written as (1-0S)LS = 
«sPqQ and ( 1-0f)Lf = a FPQQ.
State and federal tax collections for intergovernmental grants can also be separated 
into their individual components as follows:
W
(a i .5) t s= ( i+r sj > / ) e / s
8 .This expansion of the local tax term is and extension o f Inman's methodology by Holsey.
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The distribution of grants amounts to this and other localities is taken into consideration in 
these two equations. Ls and Lp is the localities own lump-sum grant. 2PS and 2 Pf is the 
sum of the proportion of this localities grant which are received by the other m localities in 
the state and other n localities in the country. Lump-sum aid to all other localities then 
becomes 2PSLS and 2PFLF. for federal and state respectively.
Included in (A1.5) and (A1.6) are the parameters that estimate voter knowledge of 
grant amounts received by other localities. Voter knowledge of the amount that other 
localities receive depends on how much knowledge the voter has of his or her own grants; 
measured by the 0 parameters. The T parameter measures the voter’s knowledge of the 
proportions of his or her own local grant which is received by other localities. As in the 
above analysis, the voter's perceived level of the proportions of his or her own grant which 
is received by other localities is assumed to be equal to some proportion of the actual 
amount. This implies that if the voter has perfect knowledge, the Ps will be equal to 1, no 
knowledge implies a value of 0, and imperfect information implies a value between 0 and 1. 
As with the 0 parameters, it is demonstrated in the following section that the value of V is 
not restricted to values between 0 and 1.
A. 1 The Budget Constraint.
Substituting the expanded tax terms, (A l.4 ), (A1.5), and (A1.6), back into equation 
(A 1.3) yields the voters perceived budget constraint.
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(A1.7)
PrY * \(aLwLnL) ( \ - a ^ a ^ O p P ^ q  =  /  + {(oLwLnL&s) - (<jswsksQs)(1 >rs'£ p ') \L s
*{{oLwL%Le F) - (0 'M'sk sq f ){[ p jf)\l f
Output in this equation, Q, is converted into the individual quantities, q. The constraint is 
interpreted as perceived payments for private goods plus perceived payments for public 
goods is equal to the consumers private income I plus the perceived net income from state 
and federal grants, respectively. The perceived net income terms are divided into two parts, 
the perceived amount of grant received less perceived payments for the grant.
The consumer maximizes his or her utility, (A1.1), subject to the perceived budget 
constraint (A 1.7). Maximization of the utility function subject to the budget yields the 
following demand equation for local public expenditure:
P qQ  1 «■ P v xQ(I B,) - -B,)(l -0^ .)— - 1 B |)(1 0F)—
(A1.8) t [B,0s+(l~05)|/,s ( B P & s
f [B:0FHl -0f)|iF (B S f T p a ^ W p -K ^ J T  P F)LF
where 8L = l/wL7t^ . The first term represents the income component and is followed by the 
Pj.tj. term and expanded version of the Pqtq term found in the traditional linear expenditure 
systems. These two terms can be interpreted as the minimum expenditure levels of each 
good and depend on price. The rest of the equation represents the expanded version of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
137
grant terms. The expanded grant terms include the change in local income due to the grant, 
the change in local income due to tax payments for the own local grant and the change in 
income due to tax payments for grants to other localities for state and federal grants 
respectively.
Holsey estimates demand using time series data on primary and secondary education 
finances from 40 U.S. states from 1966-1980. A two-stage non-linear least squares 
technique proposed by Amemiya (1974) is employed in order to be able to estimate the non­
linear empirical specification of the model and the non-linearity of the endogenous variables 
Ls /Q and Lp/Q
In order to conform to the local education data, Holsey aggregates all variables to 
the state level; as a result, £ F S = 0 and she could not estimate r s. Her aggregation method 
also implies that a portion of grant received is equal to the tax payment for the grant, 
Ls/wl t^ = U/w-Tt;. Since n = 1 for simplicity and it is assumed that marginal tax shares are 
equal to average tax shares, this implies that wL = ws , and the assumption of equal tax 
sharing implies that the tax share is equal to 1/N, where N is equal to the population of the 
jurisdiction in question. It is also assumed that voter knowledge of his or her local tax share 
is equal to knowledge about his or her state tax share; which implies that aL = as. The 
consumer price index for each state serves as a proxy for the price of the private good which 
is aggregated into a composite good, Y. Also assumed is that knowledge about state and 
federal grants is the same in order for parameter identification to be possible, thus, 0S = 0F
Given these assumptions the estimable equation becomes:
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(PQ0 )/S = A -  [B4]N/S + [(1 -B x)xg\P JS  -  [(I -5,)Ty(l -®j\(LJQ)/S
-  [ ( l - ^ ^ i - e i K y o y s  + [b 2]n i/s  + [ i - e j i ^
(A1.9)
+ [(£2e M l - 0 ) ] V S  -  [£2©o^](M i^ f )/S
-  [ ^ © r ^ K ^ s ^ z . ^  + BhD + b t t  + BpP + \i
which is
 ^State grants ^
Exfendiutres = ^  F £ P _  - [(1-B ,)t0 ] ^ - I eS c.h l a±D L  - [(1-B w i - 0 ) |  ° ^ “ f
Students Students p Students Students
 ^Federal grants ^
- [ ( 1 -B ,V  1-0)|__________   - g^ro to / Income 6 | Stoto_gram ^
(A 1  IQ ) Students Students Students
g ^ Z-Wtjra/ grants |g  q 0 j Population x  Fed tax share x Federal grants 
Students 2 FL Students
\{Population x  Fed tax share X 2 P /)  —
Students
- Slate Dummies - 77mc' Dummies - Characteristics o f  utility & production
where P ,  =  P / C P y + P , ) ,  P 2 = (Pi /  OpOy), P 3 =  ( P 2 /  ° l ) ,  p 4 =  Pj^y- 9 =  0 s = 0 f-  wFis the 
federal tax share which is proxied by 1 over the national population 1/N. The price of
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education is measured by using the average teacher salary, and output, Q, is measured by 
taking total expenditures on education and dividing it by the average teacher salary.
The empirical results from the estimation of this demand equation finds both illusion 
parameters to be significant determinants of voter behavior. The unbiased estimates of this 
study predict that $.51 increase in per student education expenditure for a $ 1.00 increase in 
per student grants, of which $. 12 is due to grant induced price illusion. These results differ 
from those of Filimon, Romer, and Rosenthal who predict a $.71 increase in expenditure per 
dollar of grants. However, in the Holsey study only the tax price and the 0 coefficient is 
significantly different from zero. Thus the analysis which includes what is deemed "income" 
illusion using the non-significant coefficient T is questionable.
A. 2 Empirical Results
A.2.1. Methodology and Assumptions
Estimation of the non-linear regressions is conducted using a maximum likelihood 
procedure.9 It is assumed that the errors are additive and normally distributed. The 
algorithm employed in this procedure is a Quasi-Newton method and the convergence 
criterion for each coefficient is set equal to .00001. Non-linear regressions are conducted 
using the disaggregate county data from 1970 and 1980 described earlier. Several model 
specifications are estimated in order to examine the stability of the illusion parameter 
estimates. The results show that the size and significance of the illusion parameter estimates 
depend on certain assumptions about the knowledge of local, state, and federal marginal tax
Q The regressions are programmed and executed using the SHAZAM econometrics computer 
program version 6.2.
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shares as well as the definition of the crucial voter's income. Estimation of the full model 
allows for the interrelationship of all three levels of government to be assessed.
The full estimable equation now becomes:
{PJQ) =a - bJj . * Ki-fl.jtyiPy - [(i-fl,Ky( i - e , ) i ^  - * b j
where terms inside brackets represent estimable parameters. For simplicity, it is assumed 
that the actual net burden after taxes are equal ; thus tcl = us = %. The parameter w 
represents the marginal tax share for local, state, and federal tax payments respectively and 
is measured by 1 over the county, state, and national population respectively. Ls and LF 
represent the level o f aid received from the state and federal governments, respectively. 
Output, Q, can be derived by taking general expenditures and dividing it by the average wage 
of the county employee. The sum of the proportion of aid going to other jurisdictions is 
calculated by taking the total grant amounts less the locality's level of aid and dividing by the 
county level of aid from the state and federal government.
The knowledge of own grant amounts is measured by the 0S and 0F parameters and 
knowledge about the proportion of own state to local and federal to local grants received 
by other localities is measured by Ts and TF, respectively. Under perfect information, 0 and 
r  are equal to 1. A value of 0 or V > 1 implies an overestimation of aid and tax payments
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for grants. A value of 0 or T < I implies an underestimation of grant and tax payments for 
grants.
Thus the estimable equation becomes
County lien Exp - A -Btcounty pop *[(l -S,)tpl4yg county wage
'  [(1 - g . i v 1 - [(1 -fl,)T^I -&f)\IG*  Fe-- ■ ByIncome
Output v Output
(A1.12) _Bj V0R Slate _ [[^e^n f(',R Stale - [g^gfysPi)!L^ t e  fop  lCiR Sla,e
- [5 ,e f -( 1 -9 f )\IGR Fed - H g ,0 /Jn ) |Cou1^Lf.°£ ,c,R Fed - [ B # fln T & P JF)\L°l n!>’ P?PiGR Fed
Satl Pop cJatl Pop
The full model, as described above, does not converge to a minimum of the sum of 
squared errors. The highly non-linear specification of the model may be the reason for the 
inability o f the full model to converge, thus a series of more restrictive models is used. 
Model 2 assumes that the proportion of federal and state marginal tax shares known to the 
crucial voter are equal. This implies that os = oF and it follows that oSL = o^. Model 3 
assumes that proportion of marginal local, state, and federal tax shares known to the crucial 
voter are equal, therefore oSL = o ^  = 1. Model 4 assumes that since 2 P S and SPF is 
calculated by implicitly assuming that state and federal lump-sum grants have the same 
effects on local public expenditure, then knowledge about the proportion of state and federal 
grants received by other jurisdictions should be the same; thus Ts = TF. Model 5 
incorporates the same assumptions as model 4 and adds the restriction that oSL = = 1.
Model 6 assumes that r s = TF and that oSL = I. Model 7 aggregates the state and federal
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governments lump sum aid which implicitly assumes that the crucial voter does not 
differentiate between the behavior of the two levels of governments and implies then that 0S 
= 0F and r s = r F. All model specifications are estimated using both average household and 
median family income as a measure of the crucial voter’s income level.
A.2.2 General Expenditure Results in the Stone-Geary Model
Estimation of the expenditure function derived from the Stone-Geary utility function 
using the 1970 and 1980 county data identifies both grant and payment price illusion as 
significant determinants of voter behavior. Parameter estimates and t-statistics for the 
different model specifications using median family income are presented in Table A 1.1 and 
Table A1.2 and estimates and t-statistics using average household income are presented in 
Table A 1 .3 and Table A 1.4 for 1970 and 1980 respectively.
Examination of Table A 1.1 indicates a significant and negative relationship between 
the voter's median family income, B3, and general expenditures by the county for 1970. This 
relationship is stable across all model specifications with estimates ranging from -.348 to - 
.369.
Analysis of the 0 and T parameters allows us to assess the impact of grant and 
payment price illusion on the level of county general expenditures. For 1970, grant induced 
price illusion becomes significant only under the assumption that the proportions of local, 
state, and federal marginal tax shares known to the voter are equal (models 3 and 6). These 
results show that the crucial voter underestimates the amount of aid coming from the state 
to the county, 0S < 1, causing an underestimation of the tax price to the voter and thus
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table A l . l
General Expenditures 1970
Median Family Income
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Parameter Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
| Constant 7558
(1.526)
-1252
(-1.168)
-3374
(-1.384)
-5808*
(-3.134)
-3303
(-1.796)
2543
(0.982)
B2 1.009*
(43.44)
1.008*
(955.360)
7.921*
(1.926)
0.984*
(40.877)
3.146*
(3.511)
1.034*
(155.100)
Income -0.328*
(-3.719)
-0.295*
(-2.982)
-0.272*
(-2.488)
-0.346*
(-3.792)
-0.272*
(-2.716)
-0.334*
(-3.353)
B4 -0.349*
(-30.966)
-0.348*
(-31.679)
-0.369*
(-32.191)
-0.352*
(-61.985)
-0.369*
(-33.403)
-0.369*
1-31.862)
Tax Price -0.980
(-1.478)
-0.055*
(-3.725)
0.060
(0.118)
0.587
(1.812)
0.053
(0.128)
-0.184*
(-1216)
State Aid
Perception
1.614
(1.874)
-1.364*
(-4.294)
-0.099
(-1.47)
0.162
(1.738)
-0.322*
(-2.158)
Federal Aid
Perception
5.810
(1.373)
135.31*
(5.176)
0.046
(0.993)
-6.332
(-1.589)
0.148
(1.467)
Aid Perception 7.503*
(6.118)
State Tax
Perception
-4.516
(-0.623)
0 .0 0 2
(0.334)
Federal Tax
Perception
32.466
(0.636)
- 0 .1 2 2
(-1.621)
Tax Perception 0.976*
(5.582)
-2.528*
(-1.651)
0.978*
(5.865)
0.242
(1.270)
Sigma SL 1.281*
(5.607)
Sigma FL 105.51*
(2.063)
82.602*
(2.610)
Sigma 0.060
(0.66S)
SSE .4662484 e l l .4445252 el I .4629794 e ll .4766088 cl 1 .4629786 e l l .4764717 el I
t-statistics are in parenthesis
t-statistics I. 96 indicate significance at 95% condfidence level.
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Table A1.2
General Expenditures 1980
Median Family Income
Parameter Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
[Constant 5024
(0.647)
125*
(124.100)
-10667
(-1.559)
2507
(0.335)
13210
(1.748)
3856
(0.392)
B2 0.633*
(5.142)
1.296*
(26.748)
0.226
(0.920)
0.616*
(5.054)
0.750*
(11.452)
0.457*
(199)
Income -1.235*
(-3.459)
-0.286*
(-4343)
-1.301*
(-3.719)
-1.376*
(-3.719)
-1.345*
(-3.353)
-1.246*
(-3.362)
B4 0.138*
(2.071)
0.410*
(6.122)
0.184*
(2.234)
-0.215*
(-6.833)
0.057
(0.678)
-0.327*
(-10.582)
Tax Price 2.097*
(4.665)
-0.078
(-0.468)
2.805*
(6.837)
2.407*
(5.104)
1.752*
(4.251)
2.779*
(S.468)
State Aid
Perception
-0.257*
(-2.018)
-2.376*
(-10.812)
0.336*
(2.762)
-0.060*
(-3.152)
-0.524*
(-4.057)
Federal Aid
Perception
-3.535*
(-3.018)
6.901*
(7.493)
-2.301*
(-3.397)
-3.576*
(-3.329)
-5.227*
(-3.370)
Aid Perception -0.799*
(-2-314)
State Tax
Perception
1.148*
(5.951)
0.737*
(17.324)
Federal Tax
Perception
5.29*
(3.532)
-10.663*
(-13.880)
Tax Perception 2.411*
(10.133)
19.440*
(2.293)
2.905*
(6.094)
36.859
(1.123)
Sigma SL -9.613
(-0.785)
Sigma FL 50.988
(0.726)
5.854*
(2.823)
Sigma 6.534
(1.589)
SSE .1719615 e l2 .1656921 e l2 .1735076 e!2 .1838798 c !2 .1790675 c l 2 .2267066 c l2
t-statistics are in parenthesis
t-statistics 1.96 indicate significance at 95% condfidence level.
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Table A1.3
General Expenditures 1970
Average HH Income
Parameter Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Constant 25153*
(4.8951
10947*
(3.282)
19703*
(2.883)
12671*
(4.322)
1226*
(4.244)
11640*
(3.362)
B2 1.029*
(20.955)
1617.7*
(3.325)
1.382*
(2.31)
4.426*
(1.981)
4.28*
(3.502)
3.349*
(2.074)
Income -3.17*
(-7.359)
-3.069*
(-7.303)
-3.096*
(-7.407)
-3.176*
(-7.387)
-2.983*
(-7.592)
-3.146*
(-7.278)
B4 -0.35*
(-31.821)
-0.355*
(-59.342)
-0.357*
(-31.106)
-0.338*
(-40.919)
-0.364*
(-40.494)
-0.335*
(-36.442)
Tax Price 0.507
(0.765)
1.714*
(3.171)
0.909
(1.221)
1.708*
(3-07)
1.588*
(3.364)
1.813*
(3.653)
State Aid
Perception
-4.270
(-0.677)
-0.0003*
(-2.693)
-1.509
(-0.755)
-0.139
(-1.509)
-0.218*
(-2.148)
Federal Aid
Perception
-8.450
(-0.679)
- 0 . 0 0 0 1 
(-1.449)
-0.394
(-0.383)
-0.055
(-0.854)
-0.0001
(-0.438)
Aid Perception - 0 .1 0 0
(-1.291)
State Tax
Perception
9.005
(0.397)
1.873*
(7.013)
Federal Tax
Perception
-74.358
(-0.381)
-122.660
(-1.362)
Tax Perception 1.494*
(3.707)
1.582*
(5.597)
1.242*
(7.212)
2.053*
(3.231)
Sigma SL 0.350
(0.874)
Sigma FL -28.918
(-0.361)
-32161
(-0.443)
Sigma 0.017
(0.352)
SSE .4273136 e l l .4354131 e l l .4261262 el I .4400816 e l l .4276803 el 1 .4478491 e l l
t-statistics are ill parenthesis
l-statistics 1.96 indicate significance at 95% condfidence level.
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Table A1.4
General Expenditures 1980
Average HH Income
Parameter Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Constant -1470
(-0 179)
-6518
(-0 962)
-36244
(-5078)
-3790
(4)459)
6654
(1.099)
-2057
(-0 196)
B2 0.635*
(5015)
1.290*
(26 55)
-0.001*
(-3.649)
0.621*
(4 833)
0.754*
(12685)
0.480*
(2.092)
Income -0.836*
(-’ 118)
0.090
(0 238)
-0.465
(-1.281)
-0.980*
(-2467)
-1.120
(-3 071)
-0.854
(-1086)
B4 0.146*
(1200)
0.416*
(6 578)
-0.841*
(-29 507)
-0.211*
(-5 977)
0.059
(0 709)
-0.326*
(-1021)
Tax Price 2.000*
(4 628)
-0.104
(-0 688)
3.044*
(7492)
2.300*
(4 523)
1.690*
(4 506)
2.657*
(5 076)
State Aid
Perception
-0.264*
(-1 9871
-2.39*
(-11 086)
0.857*
(6 659)
-0.061*
(-1679)
-0.522*
(-1089)
Federal Aid
Perception
-3.598*
(-187)
7.108*
(7 333)
-1.595*
(-11 962)
-3.674*
(-2843)
-5.376*
(-3 689)
Aid Perception -0.843*
(-1198)
State Tax
Perception
1.123*
(5 855)
0.730*
(16 88)
Federal Tax
Perception
5.282*
(3 607)
-10.433*
(-13 113)
Tax Perception -0.434
(-1 520)
18.778*
(I 988)
2.889*
(6219)
32.715
(1 132)
Sigma SL 2405*
(4 957)
Sigma FL 57907*
(5 26)
5.678*
(3 089)
Sigma 6.453
(I 5811
SSE 0.1743427 e!2 .1658951 c l2 0.1790438 e!2 .1866211 e l2 .1804055 c l2 0.2293848 e 12
t-statistics are in parenthesis
t-statistics 1.96 indicate significance at 95% condfidence level.
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leading to larger general expenditures by the county government. However, model 3 also 
indicates that the amount of federal aid coming to the jurisdiction is overestimated, 0F > I, 
causing an overestimation of the tax-price which induces lower levels of expenditures. In 
these two model specifications, knowledge about the proportion of own federal and state 
grants received by other jurisdictions, Ts and TF, are not found to be significant at a 95% 
confidence level.
Payment price illusion becomes a significant determinant of voter behavior in only 
two model specifications, models 4 and 6. In both of these specifications, it is assumed that 
knowledge about the proportion of state and federal grants received by other jurisdictions 
is the same ( r s = TF). The hypothesis that Ts = TF is rejected at the 95% confidence interval 
with an F-statistic o f30.89. The estimates of .976 and .978 lead to the conclusion that very 
little of the price illusion that is evident can be attributed to misperceptions about own grant 
amounts going to other jurisdictions.
Examination of Table A 1.2 indicates a significant and negative relationship between 
the voter’s median income and general expenditures by the local government for 1980. The 
estimates are stable in all the model specifications except in model 3 where the negative 
impact of median household income is smaller with an estimate of -.286. The other models 
estimate the negative impact of income on general expenditures to be between -1.235 and 
-1.376.
Table A 1.2 shows that grant induced price illusion estimates are significant in all of 
the model specifications for 1980. The estimates of 0S are not very stable and range from - 
.06 to -2.376. These results however are consistent in that they show the voter
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underestimates the amount of aid coming from the state to the county. Examination of the 
estimates of 0F appear more stable across the various model specifications with the exception 
of model 3. Model 3 reports that the crucial voter overestimates the amount of aid coming 
from the federal government to the county while the other models show the voter 
consistently underestimating the amount of aid coming from the federal government with 
estimates ranging from -2.031 to -5.227.
Estimates of T parameters are significant at the 95% confidence level in all but one 
of the model specifications, model 7, and imply that payment price illusion is a significant 
determinant of voter behavior. These estimates, like those of the grant illusion parameters, 
are unstable and vary with the specification of the model. With the exception of model 3, 
the estimates consistently predict that the crucial voter overestimates the proportion of own 
grants going to other jurisdictions. In model 3, the estimates show that the voter 
underestimates the proportion of state and federal aid going to other jurisdictions.
Models using average household income as the crucial voter's income drive different 
estimates of the key parameters for the 1970 data and are presented in Table A1.3. Models 
using average household income as the crucial voter's income have very little effect on the 
key parameter estimates using the 1980 data set. These estimates are presented in Table 
A 1.4. The only significant difference in these results lie in the estimates of the income 
coefficient B3. The effect of the level of income on the level of expenditures is smaller and 
significant in only four of the sue model specifications. The use of average household income 
appears to drive the estimates of the income effect downward.
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These results support the theory developed earlier about the relationship between 0 
and r .  Although the illusion parameter estimates are unstable across different model 
specifications, they reveal that an overestimation of the amount of aid going to other 
jurisdictions ( r  > 1) corresponds to an underestimation of the amount of aid received from 
the higher levels of government (0 < 1). Only in model 3 does this inverse relationship not 
hold. The estimates using the 1970 data support the hypothesis that asymmetric 
information about aid receipts received by the county and asymmetric information about how 
much of own local grants are distributed to other jurisdictions cause a discrepancy between 
the actual and perceived price of county general expenditures. However, examination of 
these results shows that the significance and size of the estimates vary with certain 
assumptions about the knowledge of marginal tax shares and with the crucial voter’s 
definition of income.
The estimates of the expenditure function using the 1980 data provides strong 
evidence that both grant and payment price illusion are significant determinants of voter 
behavior. These results show that there is a consistent underestimation by the crucial voter 
about the amount of aid received from higher levels of government. Corresponding to this 
underestimation about grant amounts received, is the consistent overestimation about the 
level of own grant amounts going to other jurisdictions. These results support the 
hypothesis that grant and payment price misperceptions are not independent of each other. 
Both types of misperceptions by the voter create a wedge between the actual and perceived 
price of the general services provided at the county level. The estimates of these coefficients
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are fragile and vary with model specification, leading us to question the reliability of the 
estimates themselves for assessing the marginal impact of this illusion on the perceived price.
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Appendix Two
Variables used in county and state regression analysis
Median Family Income 
Population
Tax Share = Median Value Home / Total Tax Base 
Average Wage of Employee 
General Expenditures
Intergovernmental Aid from State Governments
Intergovernmental Aid from Federal Governments
Education Expenditures
Social Service Expenditures
Transportation Expenditures
Environmental Expenditures
Social Service Expenditures
Variables used in calculating concentration variables
County
Own Revenues 
Property Tax 
Other Tax 
Charges
Government Administration Expenditures 
Other Expenditures
State
Own Revenues 
Property Tax 
General Sales Tax 
Special Sales Tax 
Charges 
Other Income
Government Administration Expenditures 
Other Expenditures
1980
105.850.000
43.776.000 
18,913
Mean Values 1970
County General Expenditures 44,963,000
County Aid Receipts 15,004,000
County Median Family Income 9,126
151
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County Tax Share .0001343 .00017754
State General Expenditures 3,266,300,000 4,219,900,000
State Aid Receipts 1,420,400,000 1,650,500,000
State Median Family Income 23,320 23,358
State Tax Share .000003 .00001
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Appendix Three
Table A3.1
Restricted Model Estimation 
Log-Linear Model Specification 
Specific County Services 
1970
Education Transportation Public Safety
Constant (AO) -5.188* 0.804 -7.653*
0 . 5 0 3 0 . 9 9 3 0 . 8 2 9
Income (Al) .321* .283* 0.128
0 . 0 6 7 0 . 1 2 2 0 . 1 0 6
Population (A2) .708* -.377 .888*
0 . 0 3 9 0 . 0 6 3 0 . 0 5 8
Price Elasticity (A3) -.238* -1.286* -.425*
0 . 0 4 3 0 . 0 6 8 0 . 0 6 4
Aid (A4) .256* .898* .155*
0 . 0 3 3 0 . 0 5 2 0 . 0 5 0
SSE 17.80 48.51 41.34
Log Likelihood Value 79.31 -139.79 -104.83
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
*  =  Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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Table A3.2
Restricted Model Estimation 
Log-Linear Model Specification 
Specific County Services 
1970
Social Services Environmental
Constant (AO) -6.753* -12.501*
2.273 1.754
Income (Al) -0.016 0.223
0.291 0.222
Population (A2) .589* 1.189*
0.I7S 0.132
Price Elasticity (A3) -.396* -0.224
0.196 0.146
Aid (A4) .883* .352*
0.150 0.110
SSE 384.28 220.22
Log Likelihood Value -591.99 -470.34
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* -  Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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Table A3.3
Restricted Model Estimation 
Log-Linear Model Specification 
Specific County Services 
1980
Education Transportation Public Safety
Constant (AO) -5.949* 0.914 -5.881*
0.732 1.281 1.179
Income (Al) .484* .317* .320*
0.093 0.159 0.146
Population (A2) .500* -.025 .618*
0.043 0.075 0.072
Price Elasticity (A3) -.460 -.913* -.638*
0.043 0.075 0.071
Aid (A4) .422* .286* .189*
0.034 0.059 0.056
SSE 19.66 57.83 49.66
Log Likelihood Value 57.56 -178.19 -144.92
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
*  =  Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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Table A3.4
Restricted Model Estimation 
Log-Linear Model Specification 
Specific County Services 
1980
Social Services Environmental
Constant (AO) 0.916 -8 .122*
3 . 2 9 6 2 . 0 2 1
Income (Al) -.146 .641*
0 . 4 0 . 2 5 2
Population (A2) -.333 0.057
0 . 1 8 8 0 . 1 2 3
Price Elasticity (A3) -1.350* -1.185*
0 . 1 5 6 0 . 1 2 3
Aid (A4) 1.239* .918*
0 . 1 4 4 0 . 0 9 5
SSE 375.94 143.21
Log Likelihood Value -587.19 -376.31
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* =  Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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Table A3.5
Restricted Model Estimation 
Log-Linear Model Specification 
Specific State Services 
1970
Education Transportation Public Safety
Constant (AO) -2.178 7.790* -10.805*
2 . 7 9 1 3 . 7 0 7 3 . 0 6 9
Income (Al) 0.100 -0.625 .664*
0 . 3 0 8 0 . 4 0 7 0 . 3 3 4
Population (A2) .627* 0.204 .944*
0 . 1 5 4 0 . 2 0 1 0 . 1 6 3
Price Elasticity (A3) -0.170 -.614 0.117
0 . 1 7 3 0 . 2 2 3 0 . 1 8
Aid (A4) 0.229 .471* -0.191
0 . 1 5 7 0 . 2 0 1 0 . 1 6 4
South -0.044 0.097 .264*
0 . 0 8 9 0 . 1 1 6 0 . 1 0 8
West -0,130 -0.030 .194*
0.100 0 . 1 2 3 0 . 0 9 7
North -.241* 0.090 -.203*
0 . 0 8 9 0 . 1 3 4 0 . 0 9 3
SSE 1.63 3.53 1.85
Log Likelihood Value 13.02 -5.50 9.97
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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Table A3.6
Restricted Model Estimation 
Log-Linear Model Specification 
Specific State Services 
1970
Social Services Environmental
Constant (AO) -2.138 11.515*
4.482 3.44
Income (Al) 0.157 -1.271*
0.494 0.375
Population (A2) 0 .2 0 0 0.311
0.250 0.182
Price Elasticity (A3) -.797* -.537*
0.276 0.199
Aid (A4) .699* 0.419
0.251 0.188
South 0.166 0.052
0.143 0.125
West - 0 . 1 1 1 .457*
0.157 0.122
North .336* 0.141
0.150 0.107
SSE 4.15 2.19
Log Likelihood Value -9.36 5.60
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* =  Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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Table A3.7
Restricted Model Estimation 
Log-Linear Model Specification 
Specific State Services 
1980
Education Transportation Public Safety
Constant (AO) -0.559 2.961 -9.072*
3.018 4.08 3.152
Income (Al) -0.084 -0.175 0.500
0.322 0.428 0.328
Population (A2) .607* 0.275 .992*
0.182 0.2 U 0.145
Price Elasticity (A3) -0.215 -.458* 0.148
0.204 0.233 0.159
Aid (A4) 0.281 0.388 -0.136
0.198 0.2 U 0.152
South 0.068 .309* .514*
0.086 0.13 0.08
West 0.002 0.025 .381*
0.09 0.125 0.084
North -.328* -0.069 .263*
0.088 0.132 0.092
SSE 1.26 3.53 1.78
Log Likelihood Value 13.14 -5.50 11.01
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* ~ Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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Table A3.8
Restricted Model Estimation 
Log-Linear Model Specification 
Specific State Services 
1980
Social Services Environmental
Constant (AO) -2.031 11.2 2 1 *
2.688 3.905
Income (Al) -0.04 -1.024*
0.281 0.407
Population (A2) .544* -0.034
0.139 0.196
Price Elasticity (A3) -.469* -.789*
0.152 0.075
Aid (A4) .469* .751*
0.144 0.218
South 0.006 -0.015
0.077 0.115
West -.256* 0.062
0.08 0.12
North .164* -0.16
0.083 0.123
SSE 1.50 2.83
Log Likelihood Value 14.99 -1.64
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* ~ Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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Appendix Four
Table A4.1
Fiscal Complexity Results 
County Education Expenditures 
1970
Tax Concentration Expenditure Concentration
Simple Complex Simple Complex
Constant (Al) -2.357* -6.028* -2.127* -6.080*
0.523 1.086 0.501 0.801
Income (A2) .224* .931* .197* .747*
0.059 0.129 § 0.057 0.096
Population (A3) .474* -.092 1V. .418* .227*
0.047 0.087 s "  i! 0.053 0.048
Price Elasticity (A3) -.532* - 1.112* i s g i i -.587* -.789*
0.053 0.094 g 0.06 0.052
Aid (A4) .341* .769* * tot .423* .517*
0.036 0.068
jv
0.043 0.035
Aid Perception .818* .609* '  | .925* .605*
0.21 0.112 1 0.151 0.126
5$
SSE 10.395 2.24 ■* * %V.'  & 6.355 3.700
Log-likelihood Value 97.439 61.183 :>:•. '  w* ... wW 98.816 107.721
* &
85
Ho: Theta = 1 
Chi-Square Statistic 0.748 11.967
ss 
1  
i  
'  ¥■ v*: 0.24 9.678
&
Partition
F-statistic
114. 437 
50.570
1. 113 if;
V*
194. 437 
146.4
1. 193
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* -  Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table A4.2
Fiscal Complexity Results 
County Environmental Expenditures 
1970
Tax Concentration Expenditure Concentration
Simple Complex Simple Complex
Constant (Al) 1.244 6.527* ■ k -.580 4.320*
1.383 0.914 * ' s 2.448 0.798
Income (A2) .679* 0.124 1.255* .246*
0.184 0.112 >& % ❖A-} 0.351 0.102
Population (A3) -.792* -.940* -1.557* -.605*
0.077 0.103 0.183 0.053
Price Elasticity (A3) -1.947* -2.116* -2.173* -1.780*
0.074 0.119 0.170 0.058
Aid (A4) .992* 1.158* 1.753* .820*
0.072 0.113
ftwI&WwrfSss*
0.165 0.056
Aid Perception .741* .510*
*00 0o .704*
0.078 0.087 - 0.16 0.067
o'
SSE 51.185 9.805 19.415 29.258
Log-likelihood Value -119.812 -19.661 -60.996 -72.683
Ho: Theta = 1 
Chi-Square Statistic 10.751 35.886 0.55 19.494
N '  H ^
Partition
F-statistic
122,437 
1.112
1, 121 i&'z ,
316,437 
0.098
1,315
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* =  r oefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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Table A4.3
Fiscal Complexity Results 
County Social Service Expenditures 
1970
Tax C oncentration Expenditure C oncentration
Simple Complex Simple Complex
Constant (Al) 0.81 5.469* M -1.133 3.800*
1.967 0.895 m m 2.332 0.804
Income (A2) 0.404 .282* iM 1.273* .230*
0.267 0.109 Bril 0.314 0.100
Population (A3) -.569* -.964* -1.499* -.516*
0.097 0.073 0.168 0.057
Price Elasticity (A3) -1.819* -2.207* -2.696* -1.715*
0.085 0.078 fig /, -? 0.16 0.061
Aid (A4) 1.096* 1.205* ' 1.756* .807*
0.086 0.073 0.153 0.054
Aid Perception .934* .689* .887* .628*
0.097 0.037 *  sWAv.v.'.y.'.'.y 0.077 0.045
-
SSE 19.544 26.247 *  *  S 21.302 27.463
Log-likelihood Value -57.024 70.782 ■■. ■■■ : -66.922 -66.484
,
Ho: Theta = 1 
Chi-Square Statistic 0.703 68.446 2.085 67.479
Partition
F-statistic
266,437
73.099
1,265
; > & £  % %
303,437 
61.898
I, 302
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* = ( 'oefficienls that are significant at the 95% level
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Table A4.4
Fiscal Complexity Results 
County Transportation Expenditures 
1970
Tax Concentration Expenditure Concentration
Simple Complex Simple Complex
Constant (Al) 2.333* -3.655* -6.114* 2.695*
0.52 1.271 m 1.299 0.456
Income (A2) .185* .659* .955* .157*
0.069 0.150
;*Ss * "  Si
0.181 0.057
Population (A3) -.434* -.042 M, -.253* -.416*
0.036 0.103 S#'*' 0.113 0.03
Price Elasticity (A3) -1.464* -.994* Xsm i ,  i st -1.182* -1.437*
0.038 0.116 I P ^ v f 0.112 0.034
Aid (A4) .974* .543* l § 5 f .850* .912*
0.034 0.083 te&S "■C J 0.093 0.031
Aid Perception .968* .608* WBW V: .770* .722*
0.104 0.131 ,  & V 8 0.24 0.052
SSE 14.886 1.325 3.674 10.251
Log-likelihood Value 62.594 47.142 27.024 106.215
Ho: Theta = 1 
Chi-Square Statistic 0.092 8.812
ISISI
0.911 27.505
Partition
F-statistic
78,437 
51.306
1,77 -
1 M I
333,437 
98.311
1,332
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* =  Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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Table A4.5
Fiscal Complexity Results 
County Public Safety Expenditures 
1970
Tax Concentration Expenditure Concentration
Simple Complex Simple Complex
Constant (A1) -4.523* -1.850* -5.511* -2.484*
0 . 8 4 0 0 . 7 3 2 1 . 2 7 8 0 . 5 5 1
Income (A2) .410* 0.096 .405* .180*
0 . 1 0 6 0 . 0 6 8 i m 0 . 1 8 2 0 . 0 6
Population (A3) .173* .214* 0.249 .246*
0 . 0 5 5 0 . 0 9 3 0 . 1 3 1 0 . 0 4 7
Price Elasticity (A3) -1.060* -1.012* ' -1.005* -.971*
0 . 0 5 3 0 . 0 9 5 Ip fc l 0 . 1 2 3 0 . 0 4 8
Aid (A4) .592* .565* fjPPPPI .615* .482*
0 . 0 4 1 0 . 0 7 2 f t ® 0 . 1 0 1 0 . 0 3 5
Aid Perception .525* .554* .611* .454*
0 . 0 4 2 0 . 0 5 7 .* * K 0 . 1 1 6 0 . 0 3
$
SSE 12.568 4.185 - l 5.291 10.458
Log-likeli hood Value 48.212 47.050 1 22.271 84.675
1 / $
Ho: Theta = 1 
Chi-Square Statistic 122.214 60.676 S 11.172 318.199
1
Partition
F-statistic
141.437
27.318
1, 140 310, 437 
50.687
1.437
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* = Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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Table A4.6
Fiscal Complexity Results 
County Education Expenditures 
1980
Tax Concentration Expenditure Concentration
Simple Complex Simple Complex
Constant (A1) -5.903* -3.971* i  § -3.286* -3.273*
1 . 7 1 1 0 . 6 2 3 $ & 0 . 5 4 8 1 . 6 1 1
Income (A2) .901* .443* i ft .464* .436*
0 . 2 2 2 0 . 0 7 0 . 0 6 6 0 . 1 7 7
Population (A3) -.080 .264* .143* .240*
0 . 1 4 7 0 . 0 3 5 0 . 0 3 6 0 . 0 8 3
Price Elasticity (A3) -1.152* -.711* ■vfts f  A * -.856* -.829*
0 . 1 4 6 0 . 0 3 5 f  s 0 . 0 3 6 0 . 0 8 6
Aid (A4) .739* .535* t .631* .481*
0 . 1 0 9 0 . 0 2 6
v f .
0 . 0 2 7 0 . 0 6 2
Aid Perception .981* .277* v-’s v .901* .650*
0 . 1 3 1 0 . 0 9 3
Ijrttf.SV.V.V.W.'
0 . 0 7 4 0 . 1 3 2
:’v 0 $ V *
SSE 5.766 6.946 ' ' 4.898 6.014
Log-likelihood Value -7.103 193.502 207.643 11.075
Ho: Theta = 1 
Chi-Square Statistic 0.02 97.585 ss, .y  *••• s 1.753 6.932
Partition
F-statistic
355,4.37 
125.101
1,354
v s
s X s '  i.  
& '  *
124,437
189.741
1,123
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* -  Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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Table A4.7
Fiscal Complexity Results 
County Environmental Expenditures 
1980
Tax Concentration Expenditure Concentration
Simple Complex Simple Complex
Constant (Al) -6.175* 1.66 |i s jf -4.881* -6.486*
1 . 2 6 8 1 . 8 2 5 I ' - § 2 . 1 0 0 1 . 3 3 4
Income (A2 ) .922* 0.27 i ' 1 .458* .936*
0 . 1 4 9 0 . 2 0 5 \ f i; 0 . 2 3 3 0 . 1 4 7
Population (A3) -.509* -.584* -.325* -.496*
0 . 0 6 3 0 . 1 0 6
■ . .......
0 . 1 1 5 0 . 0 6 4
Price Elasticity (A3) -1.649* -1.721* -1.519* -1.636*
0 . 0 5 6 0 . 0 9 9
:!;V s's
0 . 1 0 6 0 . 0 6
Aid (A4) 1.011* .976* w *  % ■> "I,AVwSv*V»S>NV ^  s .982* .946*
0 . 0 5 2 0 . 0 8 9 0 . 0 9 8 0 . 0 5 6
Aid Perception 0.875 .590* .754* .427*
0 . 0 8 9 0 . 0 8 5 ^v.\ 0 . 1 4 2 0 . 0 7 3
■*
SSE 22.617 11.943 is*.” '..'. 9.591 28.718
Log-likelihood Value -52.664 -10.822 i t 1-'-- -21.292 -66.881
sW
Ho: Theta = 1 
Chi-Square Statistic 1.941 22.891 2.966 60.598
Partition
F-statistic
182.437
63.24
1.181 .-V. 326,437 
13.866
1,325
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* = Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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Table A4.8
Fiscal Complexity Results 
County Social Service Expenditures 
1980
Tax Concentration Expenditure Concentration
Simple Complex Simple Complex
Constant (Al) 3.467* 1.988 0.288 0.854
1 . 1 8 1 1 . 1 5 1
v j
1 . 4 9 6 Z 0 6 4
Income (A2) 0.202 .570* .899* 0.444
0 . 2 3 1 0 . 1 7 5 ■■. s c 0 . 1 7 7 0 . 2 3 9
Population (A3) -.731* -.613 1 00 # -.386*
0 . 0 9 7 0 . 0 6 7
. . ■ ■ ■
0 . 0 7 4 0 . 0 9 2
Price Elasticity (A3) -1.975* -1.6 6 6 * s’" " -2.094* -1.532*
0 . 0 8 6 0 . 0 6 3
*
0 . 0 7 1 0 . 0 8 6
Aid (A4) 1.272* .850* 1.231* .786*
0 . 0 8 3 0 . 0 6 1
•A ' > v.
0 . 0 7 0 . 0 8
Aid Perception .700* .716*
s s
■v/» s
* *  5 s i  s .897* .625*
0 . 0 6 1 0 . 0 3 8 0 . 0 4 6 0 . 0 5 5
SSE 15.362 27.096 33.288 14.381
Log-likelihood Value -42.585 -67.771 i s f l l i l l -97.452 -37.977
Ho: Theta = 1 
Chi-Square Statistic 23.421 55.083 4.774 46.37
Partition
F-statistic
291.437
105.528
1.290 147. 437 
55.381
1, 146
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* = Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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Table A4.9
Fiscal Complexity Results 
County Transportation Expenditures 
1980
Tax C oncentration Expenditure C oncentration
Simple Complex Simple Complex
Constant (A1) -1.392 1.785* I f l l -.339 1.704
1.17 0.855 0.866 1.146
Income (A2) .721* 0.153 l l i l l .511* 0.14
0.145 0.102 \  | 0.104 0.133
Population (A3) -.520* -.068 -.253* -.159*
0.071 0.041 H 0.053 0.052
Price Elasticity (A3) -1.507* -1.043* -1.2 0 0* -1.144*
0.074 0.04
■3
0.054 0.053
Aid (A4) .927* .529* v - i .650* .686*
0.063 0.035 ^  i 0.045 0.044
Aid Perception .951* .621* - ■*. ! .909* .583*
0.118 0.06 * W' & 0.086 0.103
&
SSE 6.158 9.017 ;*x: 12.416 3.496
Log-likelihood Value 12.564 107.582 58.853 47.916
§
Ho: Theta = 1 
Chi-Square Statistic 0.168 38.864 l||l§ lt 1.098 16.155
'V ssi
Partition
F-statistic
310.437 
54.21
1.309 ■4 v A
XS %■'.v.v^Xv.v.vlv.'
128,437 
27.457
1, 127
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* =  Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
170
Table A4.10
Fiscal Complexity Results 
County Public Safety Expenditures 
1980
Tax Concentration Expenditure Concentration
Simple Complex Simple Complex
Constant (A l ) -2.606* -3.581* -4.748* -1.189
0.91 1.188 0.92 1.178
Income (A2) .424* 365* .613* 0.102
n.u 2 0.133 0 |07 0.134
Population (A3) 0.02 .205* .676* .186*
0.053 0 084 0.062 0.061
Price Elasticity (A3) -1.150* -942* -1.079* -990*
0.049 0 079 0.058 0 058
Aid (A4) .635* .507* tliilltl .595* .562*
0.04 0.065 0.04 0.047
Aid Perception .962* .435* .950* .426*
0.055 0.027 0 074 0 063
SSE 10.021 649 13.041 4 094
Log-likelihood Value 39.235 58.216 49.962 44.399
Ho: Theta = 1 
Chi-Square Statistic 0.451 432.37 0.432 87.755
Partition
F-statistic
200. 437 
35.048
1. 199 136.437 
20.871
1. 135
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* -  ( 'oefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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Table A4.ll
Fiscal Complexity Results 
State Education Expenditures 
1970
Tax Concentration Expenditure Concentration
Simple Complex Simple Complex
Constant (Al) 18.176* -.176 Mi -.845 -4.173
4.835 2.981 3.189 2.991
Income (A2) .956* 0.018 -.076 0.627
0.425 0.338 s/ £ S 0.35 0.328
Population (A3) .767* .585* .'yf.-J'iv.'i'y,' .698* -2.18
0.215 0.152 0.165 0.192
Price Elasticity (A3) -.086 -.186 A -.189 -1.076*
0.235 0.172 0.197 0.218
Aid (A4) 0.071 0.137 HWiV,V* 0.135 1.509*
0.197 0.153 .>WM*rSy.V.!iy 0.166 0.205
Aid Perception .679* .521*
#t}-
00 .415*
0.243 0.124 0.175 0.136
South (A5) 0.232 0.005 ■.svWisviw. -.031 0 .222
0.151 0.079 0.102 0.161
West (A6) .473* 0.067 0.172 -.349*
0.101 0.101 0.095 0.153
North (A7) .241* -.383* -.124 .236
0.075 0.100 ■MC/,VWAVWMV. 0.089 0.151
M '" ...
SSE 0.104 0.744 ■ Ssfr 0.677 0.167
Log-likelihood Value 11.436 18.736 18.33 11.121
Ho: Theta = 1 
Chi-Square Statistic 1.723 14.722 %'"$$;'■ 0.774 18.275
s&ie&fri
Partition
F-statistic
3 7 .4 8  
34.056
1,36
W/jlftwAVMW.
‘.vZ^wXvasv
15 ,48  
32.612
1. 14
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* = Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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Table A4.12
Fiscal Complexity Results 
State Environmental Expenditures 
1970
Tax Concentration Expenditure Concentration
Simple Complex Simple Complex
Constant (Al) 12.617* 6.876* 5.932 7.705*
3.039 3.407 4.988 3.078
Income (A2) 0.475 -.468 -.816 -.731*
0.362 0.39 0.55 0.336
Population (A3) .570* -.151 .615* -.062
0.23 0.143 0.171 0.166
Price Elasticity (A3) -.284 -.948* -.107 -1.006*
0.26 0.168 mix... 0.188 0.195
Aid (A4) 0.184 .729* 0.131 .794*
0.221 0.168 K ? 0.167 0.182
Aid Perception 1.010* .470* :< <». % i-v * W w  * «•XtWA V .866* .517*
0.236 0.167
.SJfMSWrtVW/
f 0.14 0.127
South (A5) -.016 .337*
;.s,  ^ s
- 0.027 0.037
0.101 0.147 0.143 0.113
West (A6 ) .558* .274* 0.085 .345*
0.112 0.098 -ftrM-X-JW-M.VX' 0.094 0.1
North (A7) 0.033 .364* 1 % "ft. f  /  W -.423 0.137
0.101 0.098 0.082 0.108
SSE 0.618 0.333 0.067 0.978
Log-likelihood Value 9.843 17.248 V •• 15.784 12.94
I p M !
Ho: Theta = 1 
Chi-Square Statistic 0.001 10.024
JvsStyiw.w.v
{ W  V 
:• e  * % 0.907 14.403
Partition
F-statistic
25. 48 
25.77
1,24
:: *5.
l ip P i f
36,48 
29.036
1,35
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* -- Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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Table A4.13
Fiscal Complexity Results 
State Social Service Expenditures 
1970
Tax Concentration Expenditure Concentration
Simple Complex Simple Complex
Constant (Al) 1.079 8.093 l | l i 2.686 -2.432
3.909 7.683 B i s 4.408 3.434
Income (A2) 0.215 -1.059 ’LsKSnCwS'.vfrWKyM-jhK. -.235 0.388
0.433 0.897 0.487 0.381
Population (A3) -.363 0.277 .vw w .w w -.012 0.026
0.243 0.251 0.237 0.216
Price Elasticity (A3) -1.436* -.873* V. ^ A * -1.195* -.870*
0.268 0.301 . - v 0.284 0.24
Aid (A4) 1.069* .776* .841* .716*
0.241 0.313 0.269 0.223
Aid Perception .992* .437* .728* .329*
0.239 0.193 0.135 0.152
South (A5) -.059 -.017 0.146 0.01
0.127 0.254
....
0.18 0.214
West (A6 ) -.079 -.009 0.156 -.113
0.145 0.192 0.152 0.206
North (A7) 0.225 0.176 .523* 0.069
0.129 0.179
S KSV
0.125 0.217
' w 'V■a WAV vv v>s\ s s
SSE 1.639 0.501 .VMViViVmW 0.923 0.502
Log-likelihood Value 2.138 4.993 VSViSW.V.'ASV. 8.835 7.541
Ho: Theta = 1 
Chi-Square Statistic 0.0007 8.486
s
s-Xsn S ^ 2.696 19.298
Partition
F-statistic
17, 48 
13.29
l, 16 Z T t s ' - * ' 20, 48 
31.794
I, 19
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* -  C 'oefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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Table A4.I4
Fiscal Complexity Results 
State Transportation Expenditures 
1970
Tax Concentration Expenditure Concentration
Simple Complex Simple Complex
Constant (Al) 18.645* 5.155 13.941 9.551*
7.562 3.435 7.229 2.245
Income (A2) -1.810 -.190 -1.051 -.925*
0.824 0.395 0.808 0.254
Population (A3) 0.281 -.065 '.v.,Xsw.vX->X ■A -s-w5* -.465 .455*
0.355 0.169 0.303 0.135
Price Elasticity (A3) -.556 -.934* -1.561* -.355*
0.395 0.19 0.378 0.153
Aid (A4) 0.496 .639* asW i 'a v A v : 1.196* 0.235
0.346 0.181 0.368 0.139
Aid Perception .946* .525* 1.005* .304*
0.397 0.132 0.21 0.107
South (A5) 0.146 0.11 -.421 0.134
0.287 0.104 0.298 0.08
West (A6) 0.199 0.087 .■.••vKv.s-.w,-: 0.092 0.11
0.219 0.123 0.226 0.098
North (A7) 0.109 -.173 -.263 0.157
0.141 0.121 0.191 0.092
» T  ■}■■'W 5S9K «K *K4 'i^ *V A V .W .
SSE 0.422 1.08 0.745 0.326
Log-Iikelihood Value 3.832 11.203 5.26 21.275
Ho: Theta = 1 
Chi-Square Statistic 0.018 12.765
a-.'
f  ■> ^ '  * 0.0007 41.685
Partition
F-statistic
36, 48 
11.281
1,35
sy> h ^
K SV*vl •, ,K
W S - jA w w l*
28,48
34.288
1.27
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* =  Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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Table A4.15
Fiscal Complexity Results 
State Public Safety Expenditures 
1970
Tax Concentration Expenditure Concentration
Simple Complex Simple Complex
Constant (Al) -10.549* 6.262 lH -1.283 -10.295*
3.149 2.015 ■ » » » » < 2.888 2.173
Income (A2) .787* -1.044* * i& i -.348 .908*
0.327 0.231 0.314 0.284
Population (A3) .592* .794* : * V** .862* 0.203
0.187 0.086 0.144 0.163
Price Elasticity (A3) -.280 -.264* .V^VSSNV -.142 -.642*
0.209 0.11 0.166 0.187
Aid (A4) 0.157 0.015 -.015 .586*
0.183 0.104 0.143 0.17
Aid Perception .835* .354* .476* .741*
0.102 0.119 0.036 0.249
South (A5) .436* -.436* -.007 .457*
0.097 0.086 v s ; 0.119 0.09
West (A6 ) .310* .326* .304* -.067
0.105 0.047 0.088 0.074
North (A7) 0.143 -.211* -.129 -.768*
0.094 0.052 0.074 0.149
SSE 0.96 0.029 0.483 0.114
Log-likelihood Value 12.389 23.345 '%* 24.043 13.75
Ho: Theta = 1 
Chi-Square Statistic 2.591 29.039 209.121 1.065
Partition
F-statistic
15. 48 
39.361
1.14
•>WK*W.
15. 48 
43.47
1. 14
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* - Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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Table A4.16
Fiscal Complexity Results 
State Education Expenditures 
1980
Tax Concentration Expenditure Concentration
Simple Complex Simple Complex
Constant (A1) 3.484 0.896 i S l -.067 -0.513
3.786 3.245 2.96 4.54
Income (A2) -.490 -.134 m m 0.036 -.066
0.372 0.362 0.326 0.449
Population (A3) .577* .575* .519* .628*
0.187 0.177 0.163 0.191
Price Elasticity (A3) -.366 -.205 -.234 -.161
0.2 0.215 0.178 0.202
Aid (A4) 0.297 0.229 0.223 0.205
0.183 0.211 m i® 0.169 0.184
Aid Perception .892* .541* 0.485 .450*
0.311 0.I7I 0.297 0.16
South (A5) 0.347 0.07 ttk jtl 0.115 0.265
0.115 0.098 ' 0.081 0.148
West (A6 ) -.137 0.169 fX- 'r 0.13 i © ■fc.
0.081 0.114 , , 0.08 0.143
North (A7) -.401* -.267* -.367* -.055
0.1 0.11 £ 0.086 0.159
SSE 0.28 0.837 WX- '* 0.73 0.272
Log-likelihood Value 10.754 11.993 17.033 7.711
Ho: Theta = 1 
Chi-Square Statistic 0.043 7.115 « 2.98 11.749
Partition
F-statistic
32.48
22.48
1.31 ;£*■■■' ; 15,48 
26.475
1,14
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
*  -  Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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Table A4.17
Fiscal Complexity Results 
State Environmental Expenditures 
1980
Tax Concentration Expenditure Concentration
Simple Complex Simple Complex
Constant (Al) 7.751 9.277 steiijg;:Wmm 19.636* 12.007*
4.461 5.238 P P P 4.292 5.334
Income (A2) -.845 -1.082 y.v/AvMV.Wiv.<?SSWV ^ -1.989* -1.206*
0.522 0.583 Jm m m x 0.481 0.549
Population (A3) 0.352 0.182 -.044 0.23
0.235 0.298 . . 0.185 0.287
Price Elasticity (A3) -.425 -.674 -1.031* -.550
0.264 0.352 0.193 0.314
Aid (A4) 0.387 .742* .877* 0.503
0.243 0.345. 0.188 0.299
Aid Perception 0.870* .673* t ' .506* .905*
0.215 0.181 ........ 0.199 0.447
South (A5) 0.107 -.097 -V* -.335* 0.088
0.121 0.159 0.116 0.221
West (A6 ) 0.249* -.014 %s % V 0.141 0.045
0.095 0.185 0.098 0.212
North (A7) 0.284* -.149 -.315* -.023
0.107 0.17 sfrtP * t s 0.102 0.245
SSE 0.305 2.358 0.858 0.838
Log-likelihood Value 8.971 -3.683 V* '  - . 11.596 1.455
s /.
Ho: Theta = 1 
Chi-Square Statistic 0.362 3.232 6.122 0.044
Partition
F-statistic
24, 48 
11.22
1,23 18,48 
26.748
1. 17
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
*  =  Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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Table A4.18
Fiscal Complexity Results 
State Social Service Expenditures 
1980
Tax Concentration Expenditure Concentration
Simple Complex Simple Complex
Constant (Al) 2.556 -5.989* M M -6.674* 7.791*
5.037 2.697 2.716 3.212
Income (A2) -.581 0.469 .583* -1.151*
0.471 0.3 0.289 0.312
Population (A3) .887* 0.196 0.209 .816*
0.279 0.151 0.146 0.16
Price Elasticity (A3) -.112 -.845* i l l -.796* -.169
0.306 0.181 0.155 0.163
Aid (A4) 0.052 .849* l i l t .777* 0.201
0.282 0.178 iiiijiii 0.147 0.147
Aid Perception .904* .608* .805* .343*
0.279 0.127 H ifc 0.171 0.113
South (AS) 0.227 -.074 0.021 .310*
0.138 0.085
Ifi 0.074 o.u
West (A6 ) -.078 -.350* -.032 0.104
0.105 0.095 .vSvvis'.v.sv.v 0.078 0.106
North (A7) 0.205 -.048 .242* .314*
0.126 0.089 0.078 0.13
.•••My.s’S'.'S-.'
w w w w v .
SSE 0.373 0.637 ? $ 0.54 0.21
Log-likelihood Value 7.357 17.245 ’^V^AViMSW, 19.882 11.95
Ho: Theta = 1 
Chi-Square Statistic 0.116 9.334
.........
smism. 1.291 33.353
Partition
F-statistic
33.48
17.545
1,32 mmM 17,48
32.006
I. 16
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
*  _  Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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Table A4.19
Fiscal Complexity Results 
State Transportation Expenditures 
1980
Tax Concentration Expenditure Concentration
Simple Complex Simple Complex
Constant (Al) 10.242* -.732 ' i W 14.257* 5.275
5..096 5.233 5.987 3.779
Income (A2) -.629 -.151 ■■■&&— -1.606* -.221
0.484 0.587 0.635 0.401
Population (A3) -.292 .631* .541* -.133
0.254 0.275 0.236 0.222
Price Elasticity (A3) -.977* -.216 -.486 *
SO00r
0.288 0.325 0.262 0.244
Aid (A4) .926* 0.236 0.275 .772*
0.269 0.321 0.248 0.228
Aid Perception .946* .518* *>>-*. % f  s:.VWr .814* .194*
0.244 0.232 0.287 0.053
South (A5) -.002 .423* ' 0.105 0.302
0.144 0.137 0.146 0.193
West (A6 ) -.049 0.11 -  ','s-w .280* -.042
0.107 0.18 '  •# ?  A 0.126 0.188
North (A7) -.005 0.06 -.028 -.045
0.155 0.176 1 ‘W/.; f f f . 0.138 0.191
v l : *
SSE 0.406 2.255 <;s ^  a  *■' 0.812 0.905
Log-likelihood Value 6.681 -2.966 W h y  . v».- 8.157 3.877
Ho: Theta = 1 
Chi-Square Statistic 0.024 4.299 0.418 226.071
X U
Partition
F-statistic
24. 48 
8.512
1,23
’’vV •.
23,48
25.147
1,22
Standard Errors are reported beneath the estimates 
* =  Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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Table A4.20
Fiscal Complexity Results 
State Public Safety Expenditures 
1980
Tax Concentration Expenditure Concentration
Simple Complex Simple Complex
Constant (Al) 10.321* 7.216* ..... -3.324 -22.261*
5.246 2.77 2.838 8.134
Income (A2) -.622 0.324 0.038 1.714*
0.488 0.304 0.309 0.773
Population (A3) -1.240* 1.131* .853* .992*
0.388 0.127 0.15 0.32
Price Elasticity (A3) -2.285* .408* 0.024 0.153
0.403 0.156 •~AS5 0.162 0.346
Aid (A4) 2 .112* -.366* -.112 -.097
0.381 0.157 ,‘/X*Xva,.Va,.v 0.152 0.311
Aid Perception .743* .576* 1.115* .633*
0.202 0.208 0.164 0.227
South (A5) .597* .447* ?&■■> % v s .408* 0.488
0.096 0.091 0.079 0.273
West (A6 ) 0.087 .290* sissfv .424* 0.246
0.09 0.096 0.07 0.266
North (A7) -.046 .211* .169* 0.209
0.094 0.094 0.081 0.292
SSE 0.14 0.727 0.599 0.693
Log-likelihood Value 12.36 17.116 20.413 1.175
-
Ho: Theta = 1 
Chi-Square Statistic 1.603 4.12
*
0.888 2.588
Partition
F-statistic
35,48 
36.05
1,34 15.48
20.275
1, 14
Standard Errors are reported heneath the estimates 
* = Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
181
Table A5.1
Pooled Regression Results 
County Service Categories
Income Elasticity Aid Elasticity Aid Perception
Education o:o5i .324* ' .736*
transportation 6.519 .656* .391*
Public Safety 6.516 0.147 .321*
Social Services 6.441 .866* .594*
Environmental -1.648* .584* .444*
* = Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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Table A5.2
Pooled Regression Results 
State Service Categories
Income Elasticity Aid Elasticity Aid Perception
Education .311* .3$!* .430*
transportation .111* .403* .544*
Public Safety .31$* .416* .589*
Social Services .188* .802* .585*
Environmental .in * .826* 1.056*
* = Coefficients that are significant at the 95% level
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